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An Anthropological Analysis of IT Offshore Labor between Japan and India 
Akiko Murata 
 
 The rapid expansion of information and communication technology (ICT) has 
accelerated the distribution of work across geographically dispersed areas, and this 
transnational relocation of work is viewed as a seamless transaction by proponents of 
technological globalization. However, a close examination of the collaboration involved 
in Indian/Japanese software offshoring illuminates an array of difficulties that 
problematize the “seamlessness” of this endeavor.  
 This dissertation investigated the complex social world of offshoring by 
focusing on analyzing India-Japan software offshoring, and the study revealed corporate 
control as well as workers’ efforts and struggles to make this ICT-supported relocation of 
work function smoothly.   
 Through the analysis of the interviews with Indian software engineers and 
liaison officers between companies and within companies, in combination with 
observations of their workplaces, this dissertation highlights the corporate deman s for 
flexibility in two layers: demands for being flexible in macro-labor circulations, to 
function as “labor buffers,” and being flexible in terms of micro-communication issues 
and clients’ demands.  
 
 At the same time, it also reveals that corporate control is not a monolithic and 
totalizing force, but a complex and contradictory process generated through the struggles 
and intense labor of both Indian and Japanese sides that attempt to connect the 
disjunctions and make the business look “seamless.” This study illuminates the irony that 
the relocation of work can intensify labor for both sides because of clients’ 
micromanagement and communication difficulties. In addition, it also captures workers’ 
efforts to distance themselves from corporate control, and their attempt to utilize the 
“onsite opportunity” to pursue their own interest. 
 By highlighting the corporate demands for dual flexibility, as well as layers of 
communication difficulties and contradictions in Japan-Indian offshoring businesses, this 
dissertation provides insight into an anthropological and sociological analysis of 
offshoring as a complex global social phenomenon. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Offshore outsourcing Relocation of work to external organizations in other 
countries 
Onsite Clients’ offices in their home country. In this 
dissertation, it refers to clients’ offices in Japan unless 
otherwise stated. 
Offshore Indian development center (in this dissertation). 
Onsite engineer (onsite 
coordinator/bridge 
engineer) 
Engineers who are employed by Indian firms and work 
in clients’ offices in Japan as liaison officers. Onsite 
engineer in this study refers to Indian engineers unless 
otherwise stated. 
Offshore engineer Engineers who are employed by Indian firms and work 
in Indian development centers in India. Offshore 
engineers are all Indian nationals in this dissertation. 
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration 
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Chapter I  
Introduction 
 
 The word “offshore” is often associated with call center operations in 
geographically distant places, where telephone operators with “exotic” accents 
answer enquiries and assist customers. Offshoring, formally known as offshore 
outsourcing, differs from outsourcing (the relocation of work to an external 
organization) in that work is relocated beyond national boundaries. 
 There is no doubt that the rapid expansion of information and 
communication technology (ICT) has played a vital role in the acceleration of this 
form of labor. Offshore outsourcing is one of the driving forces of global labor 
circulation, dissolving employment boundaries across geographical borders, with 
work being transferred to developing nations on a scale and at a speed that 
previously could never have been imagined. The connectivity that is facilitated by 
ICT technology gives a strong impression that the world is becoming flat and places 
are connected seamlessly, as the analyst of technologica  globalization Thomas 
Friedman (2006) argues. Examining software offshoring from this view highlights 




However, the portrait of offshore outsourcing as a se mless relocation of 
work becomes problematic when we examine the everyday workings and 
negotiations of offshore business and voices of people who are involved in the 
industry. Although the grand analysis of technological globalization helps us to 
understand the growth and future potential of the offsh ring business, such analysis 
also assumes the risk of concealing tensions and cotradictions deeply embedded in 
the social world of offshoring.  
This dissertation investigates this complex social world of offshoring: it 
examines how people struggle to make this ICT-supported labor function through the 
analysis of workers’ voices and observations of their workplaces by focusing on 
India-Japan software offshoring.  
Offshore collaboration is realized through a variety of activities, including 
marketing in clients’ home countries, sales negotiations to win contracts, and 
software development across geographic boundaries. Thi  collaboration is conducted 
through the work of offshore intermediaries who try to bridge geographic as well as 
organizational and social boundaries in different parts of the world. The work of 
these intermediaries reveals that offshoring involves complex negotiations and 
requires considerable effort. While people who are involved in this business manage 
to get work done in collaborative efforts, discourse of those who are involved in this 
business also reveals difficulties and frustrations. Such difficulties can be multiplied 
and lead to project failures not only due to technological problems, but also due to 
layers of linguistic, organizational, and societal factors. The analysis of offshoring, 
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thus, should be treated as a complex social phenomen that extends beyond the 
assumption that offshoring can be automatically realiz d through technology that 
acts as a “neutral” force as Pfaffenberger (1988; 1992) suggests.  
With strong business connections to American corporati ns, Indian software 
service companies have grown rapidly. The industry is known for its capacity to 
provide a large pool of cost-effective, technically proficient, English-speaking 
engineers. Yet the literature about the Indian offshoring industry tends to focus on 
the rapid growth of the industry as a software powerhouse, and the difficulties that 
the industry faces tend to be left unexplored.  
Past anthropological and sociological studies of offshore companies 
revealed unstable labor conditions of Indian software engineers who work across 
national boundaries (e.g., Aneesh 2006; Upadhya and V savi 2006; Xiang 2007). 
These studies serve as social critique of neoliberal pursuit of corporate globalization 
in search of cheap labor, and global labor management, and contributed to expand 
our understanding of various tensions and difficulties in Indian offshoring business 
in asymmetrical client-vendor relations. These studies have shown how engineers 
who work in India are supplied as controlled work forces and as flexible resources to 
OECD nations.  
These studies, however, mostly focus on the contradictions embedded in the 
software offshoring between Indian and American, Australian, and European-based 
firms; little is known about offshore Indian business with clients in other countries 
that have more gaps in terms of languages, organizational practices, as well as other 
factors. Past contributions also focus either on the labor circulation of engineers or 
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on workplace issues and few studies are conducted to a dress both issues together.  
Despite its rapid growth and success in the US market, the Indian software industry 
has struggled to penetrate the Japanese market. This study, building upon the critical 
lines of enquiries in past studies, investigates both labor circulation issues as well as 
communication issues by focusing on analyzing India-Japan software offshoring.  
As the title of dissertation, “Brokering Labor and Culture” suggests, this 
dissertation aims to illuminate how the Indian software workers are on one hand 
brokered labor contracted out to Japanese firms, but, on the other hand, they also 
struggle to broker information as mediators. It aims to highlight the corporate 
demands for flexibility in two layers: demands for being flexible in macro-labor 
circulations, to function as “labor buffers,” and being flexible in terms of 
micro-communication issues: they are required to mediat  linguistic, 
communicational, and organizational differences, and to broker information to fill in 
the gaps between the client and Indian firm. Various attempts at brokering will be 
examined in this dissertation at a number of levels: marketing, sales, and software 
engineers’ labor for or in Japanese firms. 
At the same time, this dissertation also illuminates that corporate control is 
not a monolithic and totalizing force, but a complex and contradictory process 
generated through the struggles and intense labor of both Indian and Japanese sides. 
In addition, it also captures workers’ efforts to distance themselves from corporate 
control, and their attempt to utilize the “onsite opp rtunity” to pursue their own 
interest. 
By highlighting the corporate demands for dual flexibility, as well as layers 
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of difficulties and contradictions in Japan-Indian offshoring business, this 
dissertation aims to add new insights to the sociolgical and anthropological 
understanding of offshoring as a complex, global social phenomenon.  
 
Organization of the Argument 
 This dissertation consists of the following chapters:  
 Chapter II explores the three theoretical approaches highly relevant to the 
offshore outsourcing business, in order to analyze this industry.  
 Chapter III presents methodological information relat d to the study. 
 Chapter IV aims to serve as an introduction to the ov rall flow of Indian IT 
engineers from India to Japan in the Japan-India offsh ring business. The chapter 
examines the flow of labor from a human broker persctive, and the first half of this 
chapter focuses on the circulation of labor and labor brokering, describing the 
various social boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in entering the Indian software 
industry. It then examines the transnational labor supply of Indian IT engineers in 
Japan and the contradictions involved in the process.  
 The organization of Chapters V through X is based on various corporate 
operations, such as marketing, sales, and engineers’ labor. Chapter V introduces the 
reader to the world of offshore Indian intermediaries operating in Japan. It also 
explores the image-building strategies used on their corporate websites and analyzes 
marketing strategy directed at Japanese clients.  
 Chapter VI examines the work of sales personnel and how one Japanese 
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office of a large Indian firm currently struggles to find “resources” for its proposed 
projects. The analysis in this section aims to demonstrate collaboration and tension 
between Japanese sales personnel and an offshore Indian center.  
Chapter VII moves the focus to Indian onsite engineers’ workplace issues in 
Japanese firms. This chapter analyzes engineers’ work and their workplace 
environments, and Chapter VIII analyzes struggles of onsite engineers who work in 
Japanese firms to communicate with their counterparts in India. 
 Chapter IX examines Japanese/Indian offshore labor from the perspective of 
Japanese firms. It first explores the labor context in large Japanese firms and then 
analyzes the Japanese firms’ perspectives as clients r garding Indian/Japanese 
offshoring business in three case studies. 
 Chapter X analyzes an offshore Indian development c er and presents the 
voices of the offshore engineers and managers who work for Japanese clients. The 
chapter aims to analyze how offshore personnel view the micromanagement and 
quality control of their Japanese clients during the work process. 








Chapter II  
Anthropological Analysis of IT Offshore Outsourcing 
 
This chapter presents the overall theoretical direction of this study. First it 
reviews the anthropological ways of analyzing technology, and shows the 
significance of analyzing technology as a total social phenomena. It then focuses 
upon the three theoretical approaches highly relevant to the offshore outsourcing 
business. 
 
Anthropological Analysis of Technology as Total Social Phenomena 
 Offshoring is the relocation of work to an external organization in another 
country. For instance, an American firm consigns a software development project to 
an Indian software service company (a “vendor”). The work is completed in India 
via an online connection to the client company. In such processes, information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) play a vital part in intra-organizational 
collaboration across geographical boundaries. ICTs permit the communication, 
transfer, and sharing of information across geographically and organizationally 
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separated workplaces.  
 One way, therefore, to examine this intra-organizational, transnational 
relocation is to approach it from the perspective of technology, to examine how ICT 
facilitates communication and the coordination of wrk across different regions, how 
it transcends differences and local idiosyncrasies, and how it generates a common 
platform for collaboration via “time-space” compression (Harvey 1989). Those who 
hold strong views about the impact of information technology argue that information 
technology changes the way we work, and that technological globalization, such as 
offshoring, is a driving force contributing to global connections and conversions. 
The portrayal of ICT technology as a central force behind the transformation of 
society can be corroborated by the arguments pursued by various scholars concerned 
with technology’s impact on society. Examples used by scholars in anthropology and 
related fields include a wide spectrum of technologies, such as the plow and 
irrigation, as well as modern equipment such as automobiles, electric media, and 
GPS (Goody 1976; Innis 1999; McLuhan 1994; Ong 1982; Wittfogel 1957). These 
arguments draw our attention to the complex influences of technology on society.  
 However, placing extreme emphasis on the impact of technology has been 
criticized as technological determinism. Treating technology as an autonomous 
factor that changes society and analyzing it from a cause-and-effect perspective is 
criticized by various SCOT (social construction of technology) scholars, who 
describe the complex interconnectedness of techno-social relations (Bijker and Pinch 
1987; Callon 1986; Hughes 1983; Latour 2005). These scholars argue that 
technology is not simply a monolithic force that changes society; instead, they claim 
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that technological impact is intertwined with complex social factors. As Marx and 
Engels argue, a mode of production needs to be analyzed as a concrete “form of 
activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life”(Marx and 
Engels 1970:42). While it is undeniable that technology has a profound impact on 
society, analyzing technology in the making reveals that it is interconnected with, 
and an integral part of, socio-economic and material p ctices (Garfinkel, et al. 
1981; Garfinkel and Rawls 2002; Gusterson 1998; Hakken 1999; Hughes 1983; 
Lynch 1985; Miller and Slater 2000; Suchman, et al. 1999). Those involved in the 
creation and development of technology and science are heterogeneous groups and 
individuals who function as translators, intermediaries, collaborators, as well as 
contestants (Latour 1987; Latour and Woolgar 1986). Various studies show that 
technological practices are conducted in a historically-constructed space, and that 
they are mutually generated by the everyday interactions of participants. To uncover 
the complex relationship between technology and society, technological practices 
need to be analyzed as a total social phenomenon, as Pfaffenberger (1988; 1992) 
suggests. 
 This study aims to analyze the process of Indian/Japanese offshoring as a 
complex social phenomenon. It examines transnational labor circulation as well as 
the actual workings and negotiations of offshore business through the voices of 
workers who work in a variety of business operations such as marketing, sales 
negotiations, and engineers’ labor, both at clients’ si es and in India. Indian software 
service companies have been struggling to penetrate the Japanese market, and this 





Three Major Themes 
 In order to analyze the various layers of difficulties in the Indian/Japanese 
offshoring business, this dissertation focuses on three major themes that are highly 
relevant to the operations of offshore outsourcing: 1) human brokering, 2) control 
perspective and its critique, and 3) communication.  
 
Labor Brokering and Flexibility Perspective  
 Several important anthropological studies of the Indian IT industry have 
analyzed the transnational supply of Indian IT engineers, including Xiang’s analysis 
of Indian firms’ “body shopping” (Xiang 2007) and Aneesh’s study (Aneesh 2006), 
which depicted both the practice of body shopping as well as offshore labor in India. 
These studies not only reveal how work and workers move beyond geographically 
separated places, but they also show that offshoring is governed by the flexible 
demands of client firms in OCED nations. Xiang analyzes the flow of Indian 
engineers from India to Australia, and Aneesh analyzes the interconnectedness of 
work and workers between the US and India. Both studies portray the Indian IT 
industry as a flexible supplier of IT engineers, and rgue that Indian engineers’ 
global mobility is shaped by the demands of volatile capital movement.  
 In the practice of body shopping, the term “body” implies the 
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labor-intensive nature of programmers’ work and “shopping” refer to “quick and 
easy purchases” of engineers as project-based contrators (Xiang 2007). Body shops 
take a portion of the engineers’ monthly salaries as a commission, and when the 
project is complete or when workers are no longer needed, these workers are 
discharged and either moved to a different company, put on a waiting list for their 
next assignment (referred to as “benching”), or else sent back to their home 
countries (Xiang 2007). By maintaining a reserve pool of programmers and 
supplying them on a “just-in-time,” on-demand basis to the clients, body shopping 
sustains its flexible labor management and serves to reduce corporate clients’ 
liabilities of employing and maintaining permanent workers (Aneesh 2006:45-47).  
 Many Indian software firms expanded their business ba ed on the body 
shopping practice in the 1990s, then shifted their main business to offshoring, 
software development in India. Now, many firms combine body shopping of 
engineers to clients’ countries and software development in India.  
 These IT programmers are, on one hand, viewed as privileged as part of an 
informational, global, networked form of capitalism, as participants of global 
financial networks; however, at the same time, many of these IT workers, or 
“knowledge workers” as Castells refers to them, are required to function as a 
“self-programmable”  labor force that is capable of updating themselves with 
continuous learning and information proficiency (Castells 2000). They are 
contradictory workforces who need to be highly flexible, responding to an 
individualized reward system based on technological meritocracy. The practice of 
body shopping embodies this tension of highly paid but highly unstable workforces. 
12 
 
Flexibilization of the labor market is not specific to IT, but it is part of a 
larger trend of labor flexibilization in a neo-liberal economy that emphasizes market 
autonomy and a flexible system of accumulation through global communication 
networks (Harvey 1989). Project-based software developments are organized and 
sustained by a highly flexible labor market, and offshore business is placed at the 
forefront of such flexibility by expanding through a flexible labor supplier using a 
pool of engineers as buffers against the unpredictable fluctuations of the economy.  
 Beck highlights the risk embedded in the contemporary world by pointing 
out that individuals who produce social and environme tal risks (such as pollution) 
are also exposed to such risks (Beck 1992). Carriers of isks cannot entirely escape 
from the risks that they are involved in producing, and the sense of uncertainty is 
magnified in the stagnated economic condition. India  IT workers, on the one hand, 
gain global mobility by taking part in the ICT networks of multinational corporations, 
but these engineers are also exposed to employment risks. The vulnerability of their 
employment condition becomes sharply visible when these “knowledge workers” are 
hit by a global financial crisis, as seen in the dot-c m bubble of the early 2000s 
(Aneesh 2006; Xiang 2007) or in the global depression that accelerated after 
Lehman’s fall.  
 This dissertation builds upon these analytical frameworks of body shopping 
as a system of flexible labor supply and its consequences for workers in Japan in 
2009. Many of past contributions focus on the movement of workers and work 
between India and English-speaking countries, or in Europe, but little is known 
about how they are sent to Japan through the labor supply system between offshore 
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Indian development centers and their Japan offices, and from there to clients’ offices 
in firms in Japan. Chapter IV analyzes Indian IT engineers’ transnational labor 
supply and their movement from India to Japan, and it aims to broaden the 
perspective in this area of research. 
 
Control Perspective and Bruno Latour’s Critique 
 Clients’ control is not only embedded in the labor supply system mentioned 
in the previous section. Clients (often called “project owners” by Indian engineers) 
influence both the way labor is supplied and how it is organized. Past studies of the 
Indian software industry draw our attention to the control and surveillance by 
overseas clients over Indian software engineers. This section first examines the 
arguments that highlight the control and surveillance carried out by clients’ firms. It 
then turns its attention to Latour and other counter-arguments illustrating the 
impossibility of total control and surveillance. I will show the theoretical direction of 
the dissertation by reviewing both arguments. 
 The Indian software industry has a strong tie with the US market and 
US-related businesses comprise more than 60% of the Indian IT business 
(NASSCOM 2010). The study conducted by Upadhya and Vasavi (2006) illustrates 
the strong control conducted by European clients over Indian engineers’ labor based 
on the asymmetrical relation between client and vender, and the division between 
what is called the “upstream” and “downstream” development process.  
 The software development cycle is often divided into the planning stage, 
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known as the upstream process (requirement, analysis, and design), and the 
implementation stage, known as the downstream process (coding, testing, and 
installation). Clients often retain the upstream process in their firms to protect 
intellectual property, and outsource (or offshore) the downstream process that is 
considered to be labor-intensive and more structured and routine (Upadhya and 
Vasavi 2008). From the client’s perspective, splitting work and distributing it to 
geographically dispersed locations generates difficulty in controlling the progress 
and outcome of outsourced work conducted in external organizations. In order to 
control outsourced work and workers, structured process management 
methodologies are generally used in software engineeri g between American 
companies and Indian offshore developers. Thus, many Indian software firms 
emphasize for marketing purposes that they are proficient with process-oriented 
development methodologies such as ISO 9000 and CMMI, which enables overseas 
clients to control the work processes of offshore personnel (Upadhya 2009).  
 Critical labor analysis argues that the modular system approach (splitting 
work into small pieces) employed in software development is a form of 
“Neo-Taylorism” (Upadhya 2009:9-10), i.e., a means to enhance productivity and 
efficiency that resembles the basic principle of Taylorism (also known as Scientific 
Management). As Ritzer’s analysis of McDonaldization (Ritzer 1996) exemplifies, 
the principle of scientific management is strongly connected with efficiency, 
predictability, and visibility of labor. Similar to the Taylorist principle, a modular 
approach of IT workplaces enables companies to make work processes more visible 
to managers, thus it is critically analyzed as an “electronic panopticon” (Upadhya 
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and Vasavi 2006:9).  
 The “panopticon,” as described by Foucault (1978) using the concept of 
Bentham’s 18th century prison design, refers to a system of surveillance and 
internalization of control among those who are observed. Foucault uses this 
metaphorical expression to present a model of coerciv  mechanisms exercised 
through a decentralized and distributed technology of surveillance in society. This 
panoptical surveillance system can be easily connected with the use of contemporary 
ICT technology. Combining the concept of a panopticon and surveillance with 
Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, Aneesh (2006) refers to the technological control of 
“alegocracy” and emphasizes the role of ICT technology in linking different places 
and its power to control both the physical movement of Indian IT workers and online 
labor in India.  
 
Bruno Latour’s Critique of the Panopticon 
However, it must also be emphasized that neither technology nor the 
controls exercised by clients’ firms will always succeed or generate successful 
software collaborations (success here refers to an increase in business volume in 
Japan). Indian firms’ difficulty to penetrate the Japanese market shows that 
Japanese clients’ control has not met its official goal. While overseas clients’ 
control of Indian engineers’ labor can never be underestimated, various factors 
make it difficult to achieve the official goals of fshoring. The concept of the 
panopticon is taken up and problematized by scholars such as Michael de Certeau 
and Bruno Latour. De Certeau (1984) argues that Foucault’s emphasis on 
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panoptical apparatus needs to be balanced by examining people’s everyday 
practices and spaces that are not necessarily completely controlled by panoptic 
machinery (De Certeau 1984:49). Foucault’s panoptical metaphor is also 
problematized by Bruno Latour, who questions the ida of the perfect panoptical 
system of Foucault’s as “a world of nowhere” that accommodates “the double 
disease of total paranoia and total megalomania” (Ltour 2005:181).  
Latour argues in his actor-network analysis that one should examine social 
structures, global forces, or world systems not as a given or total control, but in 
terms of connectivity and relations following people, ideas, and things (Latour 
2005). He argues that the analysis of social structures and local practices needs to 
be seen as connected and not as privileging one over the other.  
For Latour, technology provides fertile ground to analyze connectivity in 
such contradictory spaces, because the connectivity of social relations through 
technology can be more traceable than in less technological systems. Analysis of 
multi-cited ethnography, such as the studies of offshoring in Xiang and Aneesh 
follow associations of people in various geographically separate spaces, between 
India and the clients’ home countries, which illustrate both controlling 
mechanisms as well as various contradictions.  
Latour’s emphasis draws our attentions to heterogeneity and the potential 
instability of networks. Networks and associations have to be enacted and 
maintained repeatedly through daily practices, and in relation to people and things 
(such as network infrastructures and the physical se ting arrangements of 
engineers). However, he also warns that infrastructural connectivity alone does not 
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guarantee smooth social relations, that “network” can never be conflated with 
“work-net,” (Latour 2005:132, 143), and that connectivity and disjuncture should be 
analyzed. Maintaining associations is a joint accomplishment, conducted in 
interactions among many actors, and can be co-opted by heterogeneous groups in 
the pursuit of their needs and desires. Latour’s actor network highlights the 
importance of examining these heterogeneous intermediaries, and examining their 
unstable frames of references without privileging social structure, durability of 
connectivity, or local agency. His analytical frame draws our attention to the 
importance of examining the network being created. Examining the creation of the 
network highlights stability as well as instability. Latour states, “It is possible to 
trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way 
to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of reference rather than 
by trying to keep one frame stable” (Latour 2005:24).  
This attention to the degree of stability conversely highlights the instability 
and fragility of the network. Intermediaries’ efforts and dilemmas centering on the 
instability of the network are the central theme of this study. This dissertation 
examines people who function to bridge various gaps and connect the offshoring 
operations, and, through the voices and practices of offshore intermediaries, reveals 
the corporate control, collaborative efforts, and istability that emerge. Latour states 
those who function as mediators “transform，translate，distort，and modify the 
meaning or the element they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005:39).  
The instability of connections and disjunctions across geographically 
dispersed places cannot be fully explored by limiting o eself to observing a single 
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site. Following people and connectivity, and examining various business operations, 
this study reveals how heterogeneous actors are conne ted or struggle to connect 
with each other, and highlights the flow of the labor supply of these offshore 
intermediaries and their workplace issues.  
Building upon Latour’s argument, this dissertation attempts to analyze the 
overall flow and circulation of labor as well as various operational practices of 
offshoring business, and examines how different operations and spaces construct 
offshoring as a whole. The analysis of various busine s operations in this study 
aims to illuminate both the efforts and difficulties in maintaining associations 
across geographically separate spaces and how work gets done in heterogeneous 
associations. In so doing, this dissertation reveals that although the official goal of 
the offshore development as the “seamless” transfer of work is very strong, it is 
difficult to achieve. 
 This point has common ground with various studies in anthropology and in 
related fields that examine how people are shaped by and are simultaneously shaping 
the world in which they live. Many studies have shown that human beings are not the 
total victims of a panopticon or habitus: workers ae not necessarily brainwashed and 
manipulated by management controls. Workers, learners, and those who struggle in 
any learning context often try to find some way to manipulate the constraints for 
themselves (Hull 2001; Rancière 1991; Varenne 2007; Willis 1981). Varenne has 
argued that instruction is always at risk of being resisted, and that it involves 
potential movement across social fields (Varenne 2007). Everyday practices can 
neither be predetermined by social structure or “habitus,” nor by acting as though 
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one were free from these structures (De Certeau 1984). 
 Despite efforts to control work and create certain kinds of workers, there is 
always a possibility that people will find ways to transform work requirements to 
achieve their own ends (Hull 2001). Control in the workplace is interwoven with 
ambiguity and fluidity. Kleifgen’s work (2001) reveal d Vietnamese immigrant 
workers’ hybrid social and linguistic adaptations into the US workplace. 
 Building upon Latour’s critique of total surveillance and panoptical gaze, 
and the arguments in the other analyses mentioned, this s udy analyzes not only 
corporate control and panoptical gaze over engineers s nt by Indian firms, but it also 
attempts to illuminate the tensions and contradictions that such control generates 
through an examination of unstable frames of reference of offshore intermediaries.   
 
Communication Perspective (Chapter VII-X)   
 The difficulties of clients’ control over Indian engineers’ labor in the 
Indian development center is highlighted in the analysis of communication issues 
related to offshoring. This section further examines the studies conducted by 
anthropologists and communication scholars, and examines the difficulties 
surrounding ‘knowledge transfer’ in software offshoring.  
 Technologically deterministic views of offshoring tend to assume that 
virtual collaboration takes places seamlessly and that knowledge and work can be 
easily transferred across geographical boundaries using ICT. Yet studies that focus 
on communication issues problematize the simplistic notion of knowledge transfer 
20 
 
that knowledge can be easily transferrable across geographic boundaries. Studies 
have revealed that the transfer of knowledge is not simply a cognitive activity that is 
transferable as a skill. It is, rather, embedded within the relationships of the 
participants, and can thus be impeded by organization l and societal boundaries. 
Studies that analyze software offshoring also indicate that knowledge is deeply 
embedded in the local context (Nicholson and Sahay 2004; Sahay, et al. 2003). 
 Issues surrounding the transferability of knowledge ar  not confined solely 
to the software development process; these issues have long been studied in the 
anthropology of education, as well as in studies of chool and workplace literacy 
practices. As many studies have shown, learning is not simply cognitive, but is 
realized through practice and participation in social relations (Heath 1983; Lave 
1988; Lave, et al. 1984; Lave and Wenger 1991; Scribne  and Cole 1981).  
 Scribner and Cole (1981), cognitive psychologists, investigated literacy 
outside school and proposed a “practice account of li eracy” to approach literacy as a 
set of socially-organized practices. With their investigation of everyday arithmetic 
practices, Lave t al. (1984) also contributed to our understanding of the close link 
between cognition and daily social practices in specific settings. Furthermore, Lave 
and Wenger (1991) analyzed historical forms of apprentic ship, arguing that learning 
is domain-specific, situated in practice, and occurs th ough participation. Lave and 
Wenger’s concept of community of practice, which they d fined as a set of 
relationships among people, activities, and society over time, concerns relationships 
between people, particularly asymmetrical relationship  among people in a particular 
participatory field, such as master and apprentice. In their analysis of meat cutter 
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apprenticeships, Lave and Wenger noted that it is difficult for apprentices to learn 
when their labor is used as commodified cheap labor, and when their exchange of 
labor for participation was blocked. Their study illuminates the ever-present danger 
that learning or transferring information may fail, as ‘knowledge sharing’ is not a 
given, and it cannot be automatically, seamlessly, realized, by disembedding it from 
social relations or various social inclusion and exclusion practices. The issue of 
institutional boundaries and exclusion from learning is further examined in Lave and 
McDermott (2002) in their analysis of Marx’s estranged labor within the social 
practice of schooling.  
 In Japan-India offshoring labor operations, issues surrounding the 
difficulties of ‘knowledge sharing’ are expected to be solved by “onsite engineers.” 
or “bridge engineers” who are sent from Indian firms to coordinate between clients 
and offshore personnel as shown in the following diagram, Figure 1. 
 













Figure 1. The flow of labor supply from Indian firms to Japanese firms 
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between onsite and offshore workers (Gregory, et al. 2009; Krishna and 
Brihmadesam 2006; Sahay, et al. 2003). These “shock absorbers” are expected to 
provide a nuanced understanding of the embedded knowledge, and to distribute it 
with careful monitoring (Sahay, et al. 2003). However, this dissertation reveals 
onsite engineers face various difficulties when trying to coordinate between clients 
and offshore personnel. This study investigates the role of various offshore 
intermediaries and examines the potential instability and fragility in the 
intermediaries’ efforts to connect with each other. The research reveals the 
intermediaries’ role as continuous, ongoing struggles.  
 This dissertation analyzes the role of onsite engineers and examines their 
efforts and difficulties in offshore Indian/Japanese collaboration in Chapter VII and 
VIII. It also analyzes mediation efforts and difficulties that various other 
professionals face in the offshoring business, such as marketing (Chapter V) and 
sales personnel (Chapter VI).  
 Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate the various difficulties in 
Japanese/Indian offshoring in marketing, sales, development, and in offshore 
development centers. These complexities and contradictions will be linked to the 
three themes discussed here: communication, control, as well as the human 








Chapter III  
Entering the Field, Methods, and Procedures 
 
Entry into the Field 
 My entry into the field was not from the corporate offices of an Indian IT 
firm, but from the streets of a sleepy suburb one hour from the Tokyo metropolitan 
area. After moving from the US back to Japan, I moved into a small suburban town 
where many South Asian (mostly Indian) residents live. The Indian population in 
Japan is approximately 23,000 according to the Ministry of Justice, and many of 
these residents are IT engineers and their families (Sawa and Nanban 2003). 
 Initially, I was intrigued to see young Indian guys or young couples in shops 
and on the streets, and as I became interested in you g Indian women’s lives, I 
learned that they were in Japan on dependent visas and th t their husbands, mostly 
IT engineers from Indian IT firms, worked for Japanese or multinational firms as 
contractors on a project basis. I was introduced to their husbands and learned more 
about their work. I discovered that many of them were xpatriates from Indian 
software services companies, that Japanese firms consider them as project-based 
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contract workers, and that their duration of stay in Japan is primarily determined by 
their clients. 
 The contract-based labor arrangement of Indian IT engineers was a surprise 
to me, since foreign IT engineers are reported to be in great demand in Japan and the 
Japanese government is trying to increase the number of skilled foreign workers who 
will stay in Japan for long-term. Xiang, who initially intended to examine the 
embeddedness and networks of the Indian diaspora in Syd ey, changed his research 
topic to analyze the flexible labor management system within Indian IT agencies 
(Xiang 2007). Initially, I was interested in the same question, but because of my 
background as a language educator, I had a mixed int rest in labor management as 
well as in the communication issues and roles of intermediaries who serve as liaisons 
between Indian and Japanese firms. These interests ultimately led me to investigate 
the practices and voices of offshore intermediaries and various corporate operations, 
such as marketing, sales, and engineers’ labor. 
 
Access to Indian IT Consultancy Firms 
 Indian firms are loosely categorized into two types: 1) those focusing on 
business with Western-based multinational companies, and 2) those tailoring their 
businesses and specialties for Japanese firms, though many take a mixed approach. 
This dissertation mostly focuses on the latter type, those firms that have business 
relations with Japanese firms, since the focus of this dissertation is offshore 
collaboration with Japanese firms. 
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 Initially, I approached several large consulting companies located in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area via e-mail, explaining my interest in researching offshoring 
and cross-cultural business communication issues. I received positive responses 
from some of them; however, it took me several months to gain access to Indian IT 
firms. Like many other institutions involved in research and development, accessing 
Indian IT firms was very difficult due to security reasons. 
 First, I was given permission by one of the companies to observe their sales 
and back-office operations. In the course of the investigation, I became acquainted 
with people who introduced me to other firms. Eventually, the corporate executives 
of four firms allowed me to go inside their offices for observation purposes. The 
time they allowed varied from a couple visits to multiple visits spanning several 
months. In addition, other firms introduced me to some of their employees to 
conduct interviews. On various occasions, the people I became acquainted with also 
introduced me to friends working in India-Japan offshore businesses. 
 During my research, I visited ten Indian IT firms in total. The four firms that 
allowed me to observe their office work are all large software firms frequently listed 
as one of the top ten Indian firms in Japan, and all have more than 10,000 employees 
worldwide, with many overseas offices. All have more than 100 employees working 
in Japan (engineers, sales, and back-office personnel). 
 For instance, Satiyam Mahindra, one of the largest Indian software firms, 
which I did not study, has more than 28,000 employees (as of Q3, FY2010-11), has a 
presence in more than 75 locations across 34 countries with overseas delivery 
centers in the US, Canada, Brazil, the UK, Hungary, Egypt, the UAE, India, China, 
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Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia, and serves many firms, including Fortune 500 
companies. The company, like many other firms that I investigated, emphasizes its 
technological capability with quality certificates such as SEI CMMI Level 5 and 
ISO9001, BS7799 (website accessed on March 2, 2011). 
 Many of the firms that I investigated provide services for a wide range of 
industries: banking and financial services, insurance, telecommunication, automotive, 
consumer electronics, and manufacturing industries, s miconductor, medical and 
health, media and entertainment, and public services. Many offer services such as 
embedded system development (computer system embedded as part of the hardware 
such as mobile phone handsets), engineering services and R&D, application 
development maintenance, and package implementation. 
 The engineers I interviewed include not only those to whom I was 
introduced through the companies I visited. I also interviewed engineers I personally 
got to know and those with whom I became acquainted through informal 
introductions from various people related to the software industry. In total, I 
interviewed 90 people involved in the industry (sales, marketing, back-office staff, 
and IT engineers from various Indian IT companies; Japanese clients; and people 
who worked in an offshore development center in India) uring my research from 
October 2008 to February 2010. 
 
Difficulty of Participant Observation 
 During the course of my visit to Indian IT firms, the most difficult task was 
27 
 
to gain access to the engineers’ work. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was 
hoping to conduct direct observations of Indian IT engineers’ work at Japanese 
clients’ sites. However, observing engineers’ work requires permission from both the 
Indian firms and the Japanese firms involved. Although it was not difficult to acquire 
permission from Indian firms, since they are very interested in understanding the 
communication issues that Indian engineers often face inside Japanese organizations, 
my request was not granted by Japanese firms. The following negotiation shows the 
difficulty in accessing the IT workplace at Japanese sit s.  
 First, I obtained permission from the sales manager of an Indian firm for the 
observation of engineers’ work, and the manager (a Japanese person) contacted his 
Japanese client for approval of my visit and observation in the workplace. My initial 
contact was an engineer on the Japanese client’s side, and they were very interested 
because they too were keen to improve communications. The contact later informed 
us that the head of the compliance department does n t allow outside researchers to 
come in and observe their work because communication itself is a trade secret. 
Therefore, if researchers were to come in, every single word of the research results 
would have to be checked before publication. For a dissertation, which is the end 
result of my project, the results would consist of tens of thousands of words; 
therefore, they argued that checking the document would not be feasible for the 
company. They did, however, add a comment that they could give permission if I 
conducted research for the company’s internal use only.  
 After this response, the sales manager at the Indian firm once again went 
through the trouble of negotiating with the Japanese client. Their telephone 
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conversation was as follows: 
Sales Manager of Indian 
firm: 
There is a misunderstanding. It is not about researching 
technological details. It is a study of human behavior.  
Japanese side: I already explained it to you. Studying communication 
or management itself is a trade secret and cannot be 
taken outside. A doctoral dissertation will be published 
and that is the trouble.  
Sales Manager of Indian 
firm 
(after some negotiations) OK. I will give up. She will 
conduct interviews with our engineers outside your 
office… 
Japanese side: No, you cannot conduct interviews even outside our 
office. We want to control all information. We cannot 
give permission to interview engineers, even outside 
the office.  
 
 This conversation exemplifies the concerns that Japanese IT firms have 
about security, as seen in the strong comment, “we want to control all information.”  
 Obtaining permission to observe is difficult in certain types of workplaces. 
A software development site is one of these spaces, where security is often very tight. 
An example of research conducted in a field where scurity is extremely tight is 
Gusterson’s study, which was conducted in a nuclear laboratory (Gusterson 1998). In 
Gusterson’s project, it was impossible to apply a common method of ethnography, 
i.e., directly observing the daily work of nuclear scientists, because this is forbidden 
by national security laws. Gusterson instead conducte extensive interviews with 
scientists and lab staff members and collected his information by hanging around in 
the laboratory cafeterias to meet people. He utilized social opportunities to take a 
tour of the inside of the laboratory and consciously avoided asking questions 
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concerning the technical side of the scientists’ work because of its classified nature 
and to avoid being suspected of spying. Difficulties concerning workplace 
observations are shared by many researchers in addition to me. Although I gained 
various amounts of help and support from Indian IT firms, there was always a 
concern about protecting technical as well as business information, about corporate 
“compliance” issues, and about the extent to which employees could talk to outsiders 
about technological details. I thus made a conscious decision not to ask about 
technical details in order to reduce their concerns a d anxieties.   
 Davila (2001), who conducted an ethnography of the advertising industry 
for the US Latino market, also had difficulty in conducting direct observations in the 
workplaces because of the competitive and secretive nature of the advertising 
industry. In Davila’s case, she changed her original pl n of carrying out an internship 
in one agency, and shifted instead to a multi-site ethnography by visiting different 
advertising agencies and national conventions, combining these efforts with 




In my case, mixed factors, i.e., limited opportunities for direct observation 
at IT work sites, as well as the need to explore transnational labor flows as part of 
the analysis, led me to collect data from various organizations rather than focusing 
on a detailed analysis of a single organization. Multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 
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1995) is useful in analyzing intermediary activities across time and space, both 
onsite and offshore, as seen in Xiang’s study of body shopping and in Aneesh’s 
offshore study. This approach helped me to reveal workers’ efforts, difficulties, and 
contradictions in the flow of the labor supply system as well as the workers’ work 
issues.  
 Latour’s actor-network analysis highlights the importance of examining 
connectivity, and it resonates with Marcus’s multi-si ed ethnography that aims to 
cross cut the dichotomy of “local” and “global” by following people and things, and 
various other facets that are connected (Marcus 1995). This type of approach is not 
confined to technology-related research. In anthropol gy and education, in which 
traditionally school-based ethnography is dominant, Koyama (2008) problematizes 
the notion of school failure, and reveals its making, as the ongoing actions of many 
adults, by following people and institutions that attend at school failure. Koyama 
shows the potential of this type of multi-sited research as a useful tool for 
illuminating how such associations operate, and create serious consequences.  
 Although I experienced a tradeoff of breadth for depth because of my 
engagement with multiple organizations and sites, I believe that this study offers an 
important analysis that shows the complexities in the transnational labor stream of 
offshore Japanese – Indian business and illuminates the challenges and dilemmas 




Data Collection and Analysis 
 I visited several Indian IT firms periodically and spent time in their offices 
while observing how they worked. I introduced myself as a researcher interested in 
offshore business and communication issues, and was allowed to observe the daily 
flow of in-office activities and how staff members communicated. I was given 
opportunities to observe sales and marketing activities, and being in these offices 
gave me a chance to meet people for casual chats and informal interviews and to 
make appointments for more formal interviews. As mentioned earlier, I tried not to 
ask about technical details in order to reduce interviewees’ anxiety regarding 
security issues (some companies specifically asked me not to ask about product 
information or clients’ names). I talked with various people involved in the industry, 
in Indian firms (such as engineers, salespeople, and b ck office personnel at various 
managerial levels) as well as Japanese firms, and I conducted informal interviews to 
explore various topics, using semi-structured interview questions whenever possible 
for more focused data collection. When practical, I conducted group discussions 
with engineers and explored various themes amongst them. I tape-recorded about 
half of my interviews, when permission was granted to o so. All individual and 
company names used in this dissertation are pseudonyms. Sometimes the same 
companies or individuals appear under different pseudonyms to protect the 
informants’ privacy. Informants’ background information (such as their hometowns) 
has also been altered for the same reason when necessary.  
 In addition to my fieldwork in Japan, I conducted a one-and-a-half month 
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field trip to India and visited several software development centers. There, I 
interviewed engineers and those involved in offshore business with Japan.  
 Archival information was also collected from a wide range of sources: 
industrial research reports, newspaper articles, brochures, informational materials 
from IT firms, relevant blogs and e-mail corresponde ce, web pages of IT firms, 
magazine articles, memos, flyers, marketing materials, video clips, and TV 
documentaries.  
 To organize my data, I reviewed my observational notes and scripts, 
interview transcripts, archival analyses, and other materials and subsequently 
organized the data into categories such as “sales,” “marketing,” “engineers,” 
“onsite,” and “offshore.” Then, I identified patterns and themes that emerged from 
the data using Excel spreadsheets. The three themes mentioned in the previous 
section—communication, control, and brokering perspctives—were identified from 
the data collected.  
 The order of the dissertation is not based on thematic categories such as 
communication or control; instead, it starts by discussing marketing activities and 
gradually takes the reader to the worksites of India engineers, ending in India. The 
chapters are presented in the order and process in which my own journey of 
exploring and attempting to understand the offshoring processes was completed. 
These chapters were synthesized in the last chapter using the three themes identified 
in the beginning. Towards the end of my analysis, I used as many resources and as 
much information as possible to triangulate the analysis, cross-checking between 




Researcher’s Positionality in the Corporate World 
 Gaining access to and doing fieldwork in various corporations as an external 
researcher taught me a valuable lesson with which to reflect upon anthropologists’ 
positionality in the corporate world. The people who gave me access to their offices, 
mostly corporate executives and managers, were individuals who were looking for 
practical solutions to expand their business opportunities in Japan. Having an 
external observer may have been, for some companies, a form of marketing to send a 
message that shows the company takes communication and cultural issues seriously. 
Some managers were curious about my findings, and one c mpany asked if they 
could present my research results in one of their sales meetings. Sometimes, 
managers and staff members asked me how other Indian companies were 
performing. 
 Throughout my research, I knew I was doing something practical, as the 
results of this study can be used by participants to improve their business practices; 
yet this very “practicality” also proved to be a dilemma and constant source of 
frustration. I was unable to explain this dilemma until recently, when I found Lucy 
Suchman’s lecture notes (Suchman 2007) on corporate anthropology.  
 Lucy Suchman, well-known for her analysis of the ethnography of the 
Xerox research center, mentioned that anthropology has a peculiar form of “brand” 
appeal to the corporate world as something that can m ke the familiar “exotic” to the 
industry. Suchman’s critical enquiry of the Xerox center was intended to 
34 
 
problematize Xerox’s marketing technique, which portrays their machines as easy to 
use, but it was not intended to provide practical advice for creating a new function 
(“Green Button”), which was believed to be Suchman’s anthropological contribution 
to the industry. Suchman describes, through this epi ode of the Green Button, the 
irresolvable tensions between anthropological analysis of critical enquiry and 
corporate interest (Suchman 2007). She argues that anthropological work sits 
uncomfortably inside the process of analyzing something (i.e. consumers, in 
Suchman’s research) as “something prior, discovered through anthropological 
investigation and then addressed by design and marketing” (Suchman 2007:12).  
 My research was not meant to analyze consumer behaviors and then report 
back to corporations. However, tension between critical enquiries and a search for 
practical solutions was experienced in my research. Corporate executives’ requests 
to “give me the results of your research in an A4 bulleted report” were something I 
found difficult to comply with because of the descriptive and situated nature of 
ethnographic enquiry.  
 Toward the end of my research, I submitted brief repo ts to the corporate 
executives and engineers of the four firms that provided me help and assistance. The 
content of the report includes issues regarding lanu ge and communication, clients’ 
micromanagement, engineers’ relocations, and workplace conditions.  
 My fieldwork is indebted to many Indian IT engineers who helped me and 
took time out of their busy schedules in order to answer my questions and explore 
issues with me. Many engineers who contributed to this research mentioned that they 
were happy to help me because they found cross-cultural issues very important in 
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their workplaces. Because I usually introduced myself as a teacher of Japanese 
(which I am), and due to my fieldwork for my dissertation in anthropology, many 
assumed that I was interested in cultural and communication issues, and shared their 
experiences of communication difficulties. All engieers I talked to were great 
communicators, and it was not unusual for them to take a long time to answer a 
single question.  
 However, I do not intend to claim that my interviews and my positionality in 
interviewing IT Industry people were without problems. Some engineers and 
managers were very cautious as to the extent to which t ey should talk, and I did not 
have the skills to ease their tensions in the allotted ime for my interviews. 
Interviews based on detailed lists of questions were difficult to conduct because of 
time constraints, and I had to prioritize and adjust questions relevant to each 
participant on the spot depending on each interviewee’s experiences, roles in the 
industry, areas of interest, and many situational factors relevant at the time of the 
interviews. It was sometimes difficult to interview people after an introduction by 
senior management personnel (compared to more informal introductions based on 
personal connections), and some staff members were very cautious and asked me not 
to write certain things that they said in the intervi w (kore wa ofureko de 
onegaishimasu – “This is off the record, please”). 
 There was one particularly tense situation when I interviewed Indian office 
staff members following an introduction by the corporate executives of the company. 
The executives were new to the organization at the im , and I shared in the tension 
and nervousness of some of the staff members, who expressed their concerns as to 
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whether I would be reporting everything they might say to the executives, and 
whether such statements might affect their performance reviews. 
 Interactions with engineers of Indian firms provided various insights: many 
Indian engineers that I interviewed arrived at the m eting place on time or five 
minutes early; many even stated that they were strongly aware that they cannot be 
late for meetings with a Japanese person. Some, conversely, were deliberately late by 
five minutes and called my phone, asking, “Where are you?” The engineer showed 
up and told me, “This is the usual way that we Indias behave when meeting 
someone.” On another occasion, several engineers were standing at a meeting place 
thirty minutes in advance because I was introduced via their boss, and they looked 
very anxious while they were standing and waiting. Another engineer brought a 
small notebook, explaining that he always carried his notebook, a habit that he 
picked up from his Japanese colleagues: “Japanese people are so organized and I 
thought I should do the same to manage my time.” These experiences made me more 
explicitly aware of the controlling aspects of time anagement and provided me 
with some analytical insights regarding these employees’ work experiences in 
Japanese corporations (see Chapters VII and VIII). The issue of control that I discuss 
in the dissertation is indebted to these Indian engineers, who taught me about their 










Chapter IV  
Brokering Labor 
  
“My wife never understands what it takes to be here,” Rakesh, an Indian 
software engineer in his early thirties states in his apartment in Tokyo, sitting with 
his wife Amar. After graduating from an engineering college in India, Rakesh 
struggled for several years, changing jobs, seeking better career opportunities 
working abroad in a client’s firm, an “onsite opportunity.” One day, Rakesh received 
a call from a placement agency to which he sent a CV online. The agency told him 
that a Japanese bank was looking for a network engin er, and if he was interested. 
Japan was not a first choice of destination for Rakesh, since his brother, also a 
software engineer, was working in the US. Rakesh, however, thought the opportunity 
was great. It was a highly-paid job with free accommodation arranged by the agency. 
He immediately accepted the offer, and came to Japan  week later. Rakesh’s family 
was surprised by this unexpected relocation of their son, but they were happy for 
their son’s first “onsite opportunity.” Rakesh states that “Everyone wants to go and 
work abroad, and it is very competitive.” Rakesh gradu ted from an engineering 
college in India, which he refers to as “second-tier,” and he had to build up his career 
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by changing jobs, and accumulating work experiences as a software engineer. After 
working in Japan for several years, Rakesh saved up enough money to buy an 
apartment in India which he bought one year before tu ning thirty. “My father’s 
generation cannot even dream of owning an apartment in my age, ” Rakesh proudly 
comments on his financial success.   
An “onsite opportunity” refers to an overseas assignme t, and working 
“onsite” in or near clients’ firms located in their home countries such as in the US, 
Europe and, as in this study, Japan. An “onsite opportunity” signifies a better 
financial reward and global mobility, an opportunity of widening one’s career scope 
across geographic boundaries. It is sought after by many aspiring young Indian 
software engineers in their twenties and thirties lke Rakesh, who do not have to 
worry about children’s education and do not feel the ne d to settle down in their 
home country yet. Software engineers’ social prestige in India is strongly connected 
with global mobility, and gaining an onsite opportunity as Rakesh did is a dream 
come true for many Indians of the younger generations. However, the path to gain 
“onsite opportunities” and go abroad to work is notecessarily an easy one. The 
duration required of being “onsite” depends on the ne ds of the clients’ firms, and it 
requires Indian engineers to be “flexible” for relocation and in various other ways. 
Rakesh laments, “I want to be here as long as possible, but I don’t know how long I 
can stay here.” Rakesh changed jobs in Japan for better career opportunities, and he 
now works under a direct one-year contract with a Japanese firm. Rakesh states that 
he can’t sleep well these days, because the market situa ion is unpredictable. Rakesh 
feels depressed when he imagines the worst scenario. Many of his colleagues were 
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asked to leave Japan with two weeks’ notice, and he will not be surprised if he gets 
fired soon.  
Shiv, another Indian software engineer working in Japan, is dispatched from 
an Indian software services company, CBT Soft. He will be staying in Japan for six 
months only, and will return to India after his assignment. Shiv went through various 
filtering mechanisms from school to engineering college, and to one of the biggest 
and most prestigious Indian software firms. He is also proud that he worked hard to 
gain an onsite opportunity to work abroad. Engineers who are dispatched from 
Indian firms are different from engineers like Rakesh who find jobs through 
placement agencies in that they have a place to go back to after their overseas 
assignment. For Shiv, the duration of work in Japan is already fixed, and he is not 
anxious whether his contract is renewed. Shiv intends to enjoy the period already set 
for him staying in Japan as much as possible by traveling and exploring a new 
culture. However, Shiv also expresses a feeling of uncertainty towards the future. 
Shiv’s plan changes every time I talk with him. One day, he wants to work in Japan, 
and the next day, he wants to have a MBA degree for his future career development; 
however, the anxiety that Shiv has in any version of his dream is that he has to be 
“self-reliant” and has to design his career by himself. Shiv states “You have to rely 
on yourself. IT industry is very unstable, and you never know how the industry is in 
the next ten years. I’d better make money as quick as pos ible and move on.”  
Uday, an Indian project leader in his early thirties, also struggled to gain an 
opportunity to come to work in Japan. Uday studied software engineering in college, 
then joined an IT company in Chennai. There was a possibility to go to Japan for this 
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position, and he was asked whether he can speak Japnese. Uday, who wanted to 
have the job, lied, and said he could speak good Japanese. His lie was, however, 
soon found out since they had a telephone interview in Japanese, and consequently 
Uday’s salary was reduced. Eventually, however, Uday g ined an opportunity to 
come to work in Japan, and climbed his way up by changing jobs in search for better 
opportunities. Because he has been working for various firms in Japan for more than 
eight years, he and his wife are beginning to think that they can no longer go back 
home because they are so used to the way of work in Japan. Uday was confident in 
his employment situation because of his fluent Japanese language skill and 
experience of working with Japanese firms, yet his future also was exposed to the 
vulnerable labor market situation that I will discus at the end of this chapter.   
Engineers like Rakesh, Shiv, and Uday are in Japan through different routes. 
They all express a sense of pride and a satisfaction to attain socio-economic mobility 
through “onsite opportunity,” yet they share common ccerns about their future 
uncertainty because of the temporary and unpredictable employment conditions and 
software labor market both in Japan and in India. This chapter aims to provide a 
broad picture of Japanese-Indian offshore businesses from the viewpoint of the 
circulation of labor from India to Japan. The first half of this chapter examines 
recruitment in the Indian software service industry (Indian offshore industry), and 
the second half examines engineers’ “onsite” opportunities in the Japanese labor 
market. In so doing, this study aims to illuminate th various inclusion and exclusion 
processes, and the unstable labor market conditions surrounding Indian software 




Historical Background of the Indian IT Industry 
 Before examining the data, I will provide a brief historical background of 
the Indian IT industry. The Indian IT industry finds it  origin in the 1970s with Tata 
Consulting Services (TCS), which conducted outsourced application work for Indian 
organizations during the period. Tata started dispatching their engineers to the US 
for training for a joint venture (Bhatnagar 2006), and the practice of sending 
engineers for project-based overseas assignments (osite assignments) was expanded 
in the 1970s with the shortage of engineers in the US and Europe.  
 The supply of Indian IT engineers was facilitated by the Indian 
government’s investment in technical education, and the elite institutes in 
engineering and management (such as IITs and IIMs) founded by the government 
have produced highly qualified engineers. Many of these lite segments of engineers 
went to work in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, and they contributed to establishing 
the reputation of Indian engineers overseas (Bhatnagar 2006). The following 
expansion of engineering and management education in Ind a produced a large 
number of engineers. Indian educational institutions now annually produce 2.5 
million engineering graduates, a large pool of potential workers for the IT industry. 
 In the 1990s, the serious shortage of IT engineers b came a pressing issue 
for many OECD countries facing the growing demand for solving the Y2K crisis (the 
year 2000 software problem resulted from the practice of abbreviating a four-digit 
year to two digits). The Y2K crisis and the shortage of engineers helped Indian body 
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shopping agencies expand their businesses and strengthen ties with corporations in 
the US and Europe. The labor shortage accelerated the issuing of temporary work 
visas for skilled workers from overseas and enabled th  influx of Indian IT engineers 
to the US (Bhatnagar 2006). 
 Fixing the Y2K problem primarily involved labor intensive work with little 
creativity (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), which was suitable for outsourcing to 
external software labor forces on a temporary project basis. Indian IT software firms 
and placement agencies played a significant part as a global supplier of Indian 
engineers to overseas clients as project-based laborers through their network of agent 
chains (Xiang 2007:13), who functioned to respond to clients’ demands for flexible 
and inexpensive labor. The practice of body shopping a d its flexible labor 
circulation flourished, serving to absorb the fluctuation of capital movement between 
India and Australia, and India and the US (Aneesh 2006; Xiang 2007). Rakesh, 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, came to Japan through this type of 
transnational agency. The influx of foreign IT engineers was welcomed by the US 
industry as gaining inexpensive resources, but caused public concern regarding 
losing the jobs within one’s country in the search for cheap labor. The influx of 
foreign engineers at the time of the Y2K labor shortage was criticized as a scapegoat 
for hiring temporary cheap labor from overseas rather an training unemployed 
engineers in developed countries (Xiang 2007:16).  
 The IT bubble burst at the beginning of the 2000s in many OECD nations, 
leading to lay-offs of many Indian IT engineers in the U.S. and elsewhere, and the 
Indian IT industry subsequently transformed its focus from body shopping to 
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offshore development. Utilizing ties with the U.S. through the networks of Indian 
diaspora, Indian firms transformed their business ba es from early body shopping to 
offshore development, and thus expanded their busines es in the 2000s.  
 The accelerating process of offshoring from OECD nations to developing 
nations such as India and China is analyzed by Thomas Friedman as the parallel 
movement of economic pressure to look for virtual, less expensive labor in a 
flattening world (Friedman 2006). The Indian offshoring industry has been evolving 
to respond to the flexible demands of clients’ firms overseas with a large number of 
qualified, inexpensive, English-speaking engineers.  
 During the post-liberalization period in India, the Indian government 
recognized the potential of the Indian IT industry and played a role in supporting the 
growth of the industry by enacting various policies. For example, the government 
enacted telecom and computer-related policies such as duty free imports of computer 
systems, initiated software exports, liberalized import rules for facilities necessary 
for the sector, improved infrastructures necessary fo  IT, supported IT education, 
abolished entry barriers for foreign companies to establish subsidiaries, reduced 
taxes and tariffs, and more (Bhatnagar 2006). The close ties between the state and 
the industry promoted the IT sector greatly, and the government still includes the 
software industry in the policy making processes. The major industry body, 
NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Service Companies), founded in 
the late 1980s, has exercised its influence on India  government committees. The 
Indian government invested heavily in the ICT sector to facilitate rapid economic 
development. This government involvement with IT was conducted as part of a 
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national development discourse to “leapfrog” India over the stage of 
industrialization to the information society (Saith and Vijayabaskar 2005). 
 Today, Indian IT is a fast-growing industry, with estimated revenues of USD 
73.1 billion in 2010, with the IT software and services industry accounting for USD 
63.7 billion. The industry’s estimated revenue has expanded from 1.2% in 1998 to an 
estimated 6.1% in 2010 in terms of proportion of India’s GDP, and the increase in the 
share of IT related exports has expanded from 4% in 1998 to almost 26% in 2010 
(NASSCOM 2010). The point often stressed as the streng h or “the value 
proposition” of the Indian IT industry is discussed in the report of NASSCOM as the 
“availability of quality talent at cost effective rates, rapidly developing infrastructure, 
an enabling innovation environment, supportive regulatory policies, and a positive 
overall business environment—are all central pillars of India’s value proposition.”  
 
Inclusion and Exclusion in Indian Software Services Companies 
Selection Process 
 The Indian software offshore industry is known for its large pool of 
qualified engineers. Engineering colleges produce approximately 2,500,000 
graduates annually (Bhatnagar 2006), many of whom seek IT-related jobs. A large 
number of students thus have to endure the competitive recruitment processes of IT 
firms. The following describes this recruitment practice based upon interviews with 
a team of HR managers from a large Indian software se vice company in India. 
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 In this firm, the number of new hires is decided based on an annual revenue 
plan. This hiring is divided into campus recruitment (40% of total new hires), lateral 
hiring for middle level resources (30%), and senior level hiring; there is also an offer 
pool (labor reserve).  
 
Figure 2. Recruitment process of Indian engineers 
 As seen in Figure 2, applicants are first selected based on “soft skills,” such 
as communication skills and cultural fit, and 60% of the applicants are short listed 
and proceed to the technical interview. Only 15-20% of applicants are offered jobs 
(the firm offered jobs to 20-30% of applicants when the economy was in a good 
shape, but changed their hiring planning based on the economic downturn). Many 
Indian software service companies go to top colleges to conduct campus recruitment, 
and HR staff members conduct recruitment procedures on campus. Opportunities for 
engineers from less well-known colleges are limited in comparison to well-known 
ones, and many of these engineers have to start from small firms, until they acquire 
the experience to move up to larger, more prestigious firms with better employment 
conditions and future prospects with “onsite opportunities.” 
 Lacking soft skills becomes a boundary against entering the industry, and 
those who are not familiar with English-speaking environments have a disadvantage 
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according to the interviews conducted with the HR managers and engineers. One of 
the HR managers, Sanjay, stated that software companies re “service providers” 
who need to communicate with clients overseas, the majority of whom are 
English-speaking clients, and therefore, engineers n ed both soft and hard skills. 
Sanjay and other HR managers state that they check not only English fluency, but 
also look for candidates with clear English accents, for smooth communication with 
clients.  
 Some of the engineers interviewed mentioned that they were very worried 
about their English. Students’ fluency in English tends to be affected by the 
class-based divide between an English-medium education nd vernacular-medium 
education at school (Faust and Nagar 2001). Many of the engineers in this research 
went to English-medium schools, but some of the engineers with no or little 
exposure to spoken English explained that they had a hard time catching up.  
 
Social Background of IT Workers 
 Sanjay stated that the “recruitment of IT workers is based upon pure 
meritocracy,” and that IT jobs are open to all workers of any social background. 
While hard work and commitment lead many engineers to attain a high level of 
educational as well as social and linguistic capital, this meritocracy is problematized 
by Upadhya and Vasavi’s study (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), which shows that 
software engineers are primarily middle-class, educated, and of an urban background. 
Although the demographic profile of IT workers includes those from lower 
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socio-economic upbringings as well as individuals from small rural towns, there is a 
socio-economic divide in the selection process. Theresults of Upadhya and Vasavi’s 
study show that many IT workers are from solidly middle-c ass backgrounds based 
on the high percentage of parents’ occupations in ma agerial and professional jobs in 
the private and public sectors. The study concludes that an engineer’s father’s 
educational background is the most critical factor in terms of inclusion within and 
exclusion from the software industry. Krishna and Brihmadesam’s study also 
supports this analysis, that only a small percentage of the rural population in India 
can enter the IT industry because of factors such as generally lower educational 
standards and parents’ educational backgrounds (Kri hna and Brihmadesam 2006).  
 This research does not have comprehensive survey results to compare with 
these studies, but partial results show a similar tendency: many of the engineers 
interviewed have fathers with college degrees and with professional jobs, and family 
trees that some respondents drew showed the generational transformation from 
grandparents (mostly farmers), to parents (college graduates) to the present 
generation (mid 20s to early 30s, with college educations and professional jobs such 
as engineers, lawyers, and accountants).  
 
Indian HR Managers’ Perspectives 
 Besides these boundaries involved in entering the industry, there are also 
internal boundaries, both among full-time employees and between these individuals 
and contractors. Not all full-time employees are assigned to projects for clients, and 
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some proportion of workers is put into a labor reseve called a “pool” or “benching.”  
 Having a pool of workers and deploying them on an on-demand basis is not 
necessarily unique to the Indian IT industry, yet the difference lies in the scale of 
workers they reserve; as discussed earlier, the Indian software industry is based upon 
“number games” of deploying a large number of engineers to respond to clients’ 
needs (Ilavarasan 2008). According to Sanjay, the ratio of engineers on labor reserve 
in his firm is 18%, which is similar to Upadhya’s data (approximately 20%) 
(Upadhya and Vasavi 2006:46-47). These results suggest that about one fifth of 
employees are placed on reserve, waiting to be called, according to Vishnu, an 
Indian HR manager, a necessary “buffer” for the fractured labor demand, which 
illuminates the highly fluid nature of their employment at the time of the economic 
slowdown. Abhay, an HR manager, states, “We don’t manufacture anything. We are 
providing services. If we don’t have business, what is the point of having people? 
Everybody got this tension, especially they are not revenue generating. They are the 
first ones to go.” 
 Abhay and other HR managers use the phrase “utilization target,” and state 
that their corporate utilization target of resources is 75%, with 25% engineers in 
their pool. What this means is 25% of employees serve as a buffer and a flexible 
accumulation of labor to absorb the shock of fluctuations, and these workers are 
constantly at risk of being detached from a company if the economy and corporate 
performance decline. The economic downturn forced many firms to fire their pool 
resources in 2009. When I interviewed engineers in Japan who were about to return 
to India, they were very worried about future uncertainty; they were aware of the 
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lay-offs conducted by large Indian IT firms. The Indian IT industry is not unionized 
because of its rapid growth and a constant shortage of labor. One engineer, 
discussing the lay-offs in India, commented; “Now they are regretting that they don’t 
have unions, but it’s too late.” 
 While I visited one offshore development center in the spring of 2009, there 
was a rumor among engineers in the office that about 20% of the employees were 
laid-off from the company. I had an opportunity to interview a head of the HR 
department of this firm and asked about the employment situation. At first, the 
executive officer, Lakshmi, did not mention lay-offs, but when I asked about the 
rumors of lay-offs in the offshore development centers and explained the rumors, 
Lakshmi’s response changed. I explained that one of the engineers that I was 
acquainted with left the company soon after she came back from Japan. She was put 
into the pool, but many of her co-workers were laid off suddenly without notice, so 
she was afraid to be fired without notice and therefore decided to quit the company 
before this could happen, moving to a smaller firm. After hearing this story, Lakshmi 
stated, “oh, you are an interesting person,” and started explaining that it was true that 
the firm had urgent lay-offs the previous month, and that each department had to 
make a rush decision to reduce the number of their employees to fulfill the urgently 
set target by the end of the month, which created unnecessary tension and anxieties 
among employees. Lakshmi, however, stated that the firm is now trying to make 
more effort to give ten to fifteen days’ notice to employees, so they have time to find 
new jobs. Milind, an HR manager also stated that they usually do not lay-off 
employees with such short notice, but instead give warnings and provide a period in 
50 
 
which workers can improve their performances. Preeti, an HR manager of the same 
firm emphasizes the sudden lay-offs as follows: “It is particularly painful this year. 
Everyone is afraid. If this situation goes on, what will happen? You feel good when 
you are hired, but it is very painful when you are fird.”  
 Bharat, an HR manager, also stated that 20% of HR staff members were also 
fired because recruitment was reduced. Even an HR manager like Bharat stated that 
he wished now that the industry had a union. It is not that IT firms dispose of 
workers automatically or without any afterthought; these firms recognize that 
maintaining good resources is crucial for the growth of their companies, and some 
firms tried to retain their employees by reducing the salaries of all workers and 
allowing their employees to take long leaves for furthe  study or activities in NGOs. 
However, the business serves to provide a flexible supply of labor, and the software 
labor market continues to be highly unstable in India. 
 
Flexible Labor: Contractors Offshore 
 Apart from regular employees, there is also a large portion of contract 
workers working in offshore development centers. These workers are utilized when 
there are no in-house engineers available for a particular technology or domain. The 
proportion of contractors is 10% in the firm investigated, but they are planning to 
increase the ratio to 25% because of the deteriorating economic conditions. Most of 
these engineers are hired through placement agencies, on a temporary basis. The 
“utilization” of these “external resources” gives flexibility to Indian software service 
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firms in addition to the engineers in the buffer pool. The firms thus have a layer of 
workers from core to pool to contractors, although the boundaries are fluid and 
contractors are generally better paid because of their temporary nature. Contractors 
have, according to an HR manager of this firm, a 50% chance of being hired, 
depending on their performance, skill set, and the economic situation, and the 
boundary between regular workers and contractors is not necessarily rigid. However, 
the utilization of external labor in offshore development centers is not appreciated 
from clients’ perspectives, for security reasons, and some clients specify that only 
regular employees can be assigned to their projects. Therefore, chances of getting 
assigned to onsite projects are limited, and employees who do may be fired with very 
short notice. 
 Contractors are situated in the most peripheral part of the firm, as highly 
flexible labor hired on an on-demand basis. Although they are paid more on a short 
term basis (1.5 times, including the margin of 20-25% and 10-15% during the 
economic downturn) by their placement agency (approximately 3,000 Rupee per 
day), their employment is highly unstable, and their contracts can be terminated with 
only five days’ notice during the first ten days of employment, and there is no 
guarantee of employment, even for a short project priod of 2-3 months. 
 One HR manager, Rajiv states, “The engineers may have to leave on the 
next day if his service is no longer needed.” Rajiv states that these workers are 
young and open to relocating and project deadlines, even more so than regular 
employees due to the volatile nature of their contracts. Rajiv states that these 
contractors’ English social skills are also checked as part of their “background” 
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check—whether they are able to communicate with clients—and here too, engineers 
are screened both in technological skills and social and linguistic capital. The 
economic downturn of 2009 has increased the demand for this type of worker, state 
the HR managers. 
 To my questions whether some people prefer to be contractors rather than 
regular employees because of the pay they receive, Rajiv answered, “Who wants to 
be a contractor? You can’t marry if you are a contractor in Indian society. It’s too 
unstable.” Although the IT industry requires a fluid labor market, and there is no 
security, even for fulltime workers, contracting jobs are the most insecure and 
vulnerable as a flexible accumulation of labor. 
Appraisal and Attrition Rate 
 Rajiv stated that the appraisal of personnel is based on individual 
negotiations with managers, but that the salary structu e is loosely based upon ranks 
(IT firms have step to step ranks, from junior engineers to project managers, and 
from there to senior management positions). Salary is also affected by other factors, 
such as education, years of experiences, skill sets,na ure of projects, and location of 
work (depending on the cost of living). Onsite engineers are evaluated by their 
managers in offshore development centers, which makes their negotiations with 
offshore personnel challenging. 
 During appraisal season, in one Japan office of a large Indian firm, Garuda 
Soft, I observed back office staff members comparing their pay raises and wondering 
why someone got more of a pay raise than others. Negotiations are conducted 
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individually, and they were not supposed to discuss or compare their salaries with 
other employees, but some were busy emailing and trying to getting information 
from the engineers who are in the same rank as they are. Kato, a Japanese onsite 
engineer employed by this Indian firm complains that “engineers who were hired in 
Japan are not fairly evaluated, because we do not have opportunities to get to know 
the people who evaluate us. I have never seen the person who is supposed to be my 
supervisor in India.” 
 Many studies argue that the IT industry emphasizes “individualization,” 
self-reliance, and “career development,” and workers are taught to manage their own 
careers (Aneesh 2006; Upadhya 2009; Upadhya and Vasavi 2006; Upadhya and 
Vasavi 2008; Xiang 2007). The emphasis on individualism and career management 
works both positively and negatively in the software industry. For many engineers, 
like Shiv’s case presented at the beginning of the chapter, career aspirations and the 
desire to be self-reliant need to be understood within this context of the software 
industry. On one hand, the industry consists of highly flexible labor management 
practices, with a large pool of engineers and contractors, but it also need to retain 
resources in a high growth period.   
 IT engineers’ attrition rate is high in India. In the firm interviewed, it is 
between 20-25%, but drops to 10-15 % during an economic downturn. The Indian IT 
industry has been suffering from the negative image of its resources’ high attrition 
rate because a change in resources hinders knowledge accumulation and tends to 
negatively affect project outcomes (see Chapter X). Many engineers are keen to 
learn new technology and explore better opportunities—jobs with more onsite 
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exposure. Raj, an HR manager, stated that changing jobs is inevitable for young 
engineers who want to move up to large, more highly-paid jobs, and engineers also 
move because of family, marriage, and for further study.  
 At the same time, Raj stated that the “high attrition is already built-in our 
recruitment process,” and while they want to retain good resources, they create 
distance between themselves and “incapable,” lower-than-average workers. An HR 
manager of a large Indian software company states that they lay off 10% of their 
employees due to low-performance ratings annually. There is also a career ceiling, 
because managerial jobs are limited. IT firms provide various ranks, from a junior 
software engineer to project managers, and many young engineers in their twenties 
strive to become project managers in ten years’ time. Yet the number of managerial 
positions is limited, and the low rate of promotions makes engineers anxious. Raji 
states, “Those people who do not get promoted becom anxious, and leave the 
company,” which is one of the reasons for the high attrition rate. One manager states 
that engineers want promotions every two years, and that they need to see growth in 
their careers. Many engineers stay in a firm for at le st two years, because they have 
to pay a bond if they leave within two years, yet if they do not get promoted after 
two years, they start worrying about their career prosects in the firm. Raji stated 
that only 20-30% of engineers can become team leaders in his company, and that the 
20-30% who do not get promoted start to look for new opportunities. With the 
current sluggish economic conditions, he stated that the attrition rate is very low in 






Moving In and Out of Japan 
 The inclusion and exclusion process in India also continues to take place 
when engineers cross national boundaries from India to overseas onsite opportunities. 
The ratio of onsite engineers compared to offshore is much smaller, as discussed 
earlier. Therefore, those who gain onsite opportunities are proud to have such a 
chance. Engineers who go onsite are generally considered to be successful mobile 
professionals with high salaries as one can see in the cases of Rakesh, Shiv and Uday 
presented at the beginning of the chapter. Onsite opportunities are an important part 
of working as IT engineers, and many strive to gain these opportunities, particularly 
young single engineers looking for global opportunities and financial rewards. 
 However, as discussed in regard to the IT industry in India, the client-driven 
nature of the IT offshoring industry has a profound i fluence on work, both in India 
and in clients’ countries. The following section examines both the opportunities and 
volatile conditions generated by placements in the Japanese labor market at the time 
of the economic slowdown, the fall and winter of 2009, and how engineers function 
as “buffers” against labor demands and capital movement. Furthermore, it analyzes 
how a small portion of workers circulate between India and Japan, along with an 





Japan’s Immigration Policy Toward Foreign Skilled Labor 
 Getting a work permit is not difficult for IT engineers who belong to Indian 
software service companies. Compared to more restrictive US immigration policies 
for skilled foreign workers, Japan has a relatively open policy in that the policy does 
not restrict the number of work permits that can be issued annually.  
 While Japan’s current immigration control policy excludes unskilled foreign 
laborers from working in Japan, highly skilled workers, including IT professionals, 
are considered very able to contribute to the Japanese economy, so for these workers, 
the doors to employment opportunities are open. There is fi rce global competition 
to attract highly skilled foreign professionals (scientists, engineers, etc.), and the 
Japanese government is trying to increase the number of fo eign skilled workers 
coming into the country. 
 While such government initiatives will help provide wider opportunities for 
skilled workers to come and work in Japan, the debate about how to increase the 
number of skilled foreign workers assumes that skilled workers are primarily regular 
employees of firms based in Japan. In policy discussion, there is an implicit 
assumption that skilled foreign workers do not choose to work in Japan, or do not 
stay in Japan long-term. Policy discussion tends to focus, therefore, on how to 
improve working conditions and the living environment to attract more skilled 
workers. However, such discussions often pay little a t ntion to the conditions 
surrounding project-based contract workers who are struggling under contract-based 




 Indian engineers dispatched from Indian firms are mostly fulltime 
employees of the company, but in the context of the Japanese labor market, they are 
project-based contract workers. They can easily obtain work permits through the visa 
arrangements of their firms (usually three years), but their stays and work in Japan 
are shaped by the length of the projects they are assigned to, and not the duration of 
their visas. Their duration of stay in Japan depends on clients’ budgeting of projects, 
and it is difficult to establish a long-term plan. If their projects ends, or is cancelled 
with a short notice, and if there are no new projects available for them, they have to 
leave Japan immediately, because the cost of living in Japan is high, and it is much 
too risky to stay on in Japan without a project. Many Indian engineers state that 
US-based projects are longer compared to those in Japanese firms, which is one of 
the reasons why they prefer going to the US. 
 Highly-skilled workers are considered necessary to stimulate Japan’s 
national economy, and they are welcomed as legitimate p rticipants in society. 
However, Indian engineers who participate as legally “legitimate” participants often 
find it difficult to deepen their participation because of the contract-based type of 
labor, the division of labor and other boundaries (see the examination of their 
workplaces in Chapter VII-X). 
 The unstable and unpredictable conditions surrounding project-based work 
are similar both for skilled and unskilled workers. Most studies of foreign workers 
in Japan choose to analyze factory workers, and very little is known regarding 
highly-skilled contract workers. Studies of transnational labor of 
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Japanese–Brazilian workers illustrate the systematic me hanisms of the labor 
placement system, as shown in Figure 3, and this placement system affects and 
constrains the ways in which these individuals work and stay in Japan (Kajita, et al. 
2005; Tanno 2007). In Figures 3 and 4, below, the commonalities can be seen 
between the Japanese–Brazilian transnational placement system and Indian 
engineers’ placement system. Examination of the labor flow reveals that the 
movements of both groups are realized through an international labor placement 











Figure 3. Transnational flow of Japanese and Brazilian workers  
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Brazilian workers come to Japan through a “market mdiated migration system” 
(Kajita, et al. 2005:138). This type of system is conducted on a corporate level in the 
Indian situation instead of through a chain of small brokers, as in the 
Japanese–Brazilian situation. Although the details of the systems differ, both provide 
a commercial channel for workers to move to Japan in response to the flexible 
demands of clients. Both systems have labor reserves, either in their countries or for 
“just in time” delivery for their clients in Japan.  
 In both systems, the commodification of labor is baic lly the same, and 
Japanese–Brazilian workers are treated as service commodity rather than workers; 
they are treated as an invisible, faceless workforce n Japanese shop floors (Tanno 
2007:6-7). The same issue can be seen in the training of engineers based upon an 
abstract man-month rate discussed earlier in reference to IT engineers, and in the 
practice of “body shopping” (Xiang 2007). 
 While factory workers and software engineers display differences in their 
incomes, both groups share a sense of insecurity in their working conditions. Indian 
engineers’ labor in Japan may be analyzed as a “win-win situation” for both 
engineers and firms in Japan, since engineers gain much higher incomes, compared 
to offshore laborers (six times more according to my data), and firms also have 
cost-effective labor forces. Nonetheless, their project-based labor affects the ways 
they work and stay in Japan, since their contracting work is governed by 




Japan’s Software Service Industry 
 The Japanese software industry is the second largest in the world, next to the 
US (USD108 billion), yet outsourcing has largely been underpenetrated by foreign 
vendors, as offshore outsourcing consists of only 10% of total software development 
(NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008; Soomushoo 2006). Furthermore, 
even within the small proportion of offshore outsourcing, Chinese vendors take up 
more than half of the business (55%) because of their geographical proximity, 
linguistic and cultural similarities, and cost considerations. Indian firms lag behind 
(25%) and have been struggling to expand their businesses.  
 NASSCOM, a major Indian software industry body, analyzes one of the 
major difficulties of getting into the Japanese IT market as the Japanese IT industry’s 
existing hierarchy. The hierarchical structure of the Japanese software development 
industry is often called an “IT pyramid,” which refers to vertical strings of 
subcontracting systems controlled by large prime contracting firms (see Figure 5 
below). NASSCOM states that the introverted industry ucture creates a challenge 
for offshore vendors, and that foreign vendors, such as Chinese and Indian software 
service companies, occupy only a small portion of this IT pyramid, in the third and 
even lower layers of this Japanese IT pyramid (NASSCOM and 











Figure 5. Japanese IT hierarchy 
(NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:28) 
 Being placed in this industrial structure as subcontractors in the lower tier of 
these chains, Indian vendors are competing with other Japanese subcontractors. 
These Japanese subcontractors who work under the supervision of prime contractors 
are shitauke companies (shita means “below” and uke means “to receive”). These 
shitauke companies are placed in a vulnerable position, because their business 
depends upon clients’ decisions.  
 As Sugimoto (2003) points out, working hours of subcontractors tend to be 
longer, and medium and small-sized companies have less job security compared to 
the large corporations, where long term employment is still prevalent. These 
shitauke companies are expected to function as buffers to protect the secure 
employment systems of large corporations, and they are, as Kondo (1990:53) states 
in her analysis of a small factory, a “floating labor force necessary to the 
preservation of benefits and security for full-time (usually male) workers in large 
62 
 
firms.” Indian engineers are, similar to shitauke companies, placed in the vertical 
subcontracting structure of the IT industry, and have to compete with other 
subcontractors for downstream design and coding, although using offshoring 
includes other factors such as obtaining cutting-ede skills not available 
domestically and as a means to explore the global market. 
 The following section of this chapter examines the ways in which Indian 
workers were detached from Japanese firms at the tim  of the financial crisis in 2009, 
and also discusses what workers do to take control of their stays in Japan. Previous 
studies show vulnerable situations surrounding India  workers in the US and in 
Australia, as seen in Aneesh (2006) and Xiang (2007), but one thing that is clearly 
different from these studies is the language issue. Th  issue of linguistic barriers and 
lack of social capital will be discussed in this section too. 
 
Sending Engineers to Japanese Firms 
 Indian firms are oriented towards the US market, where the majority of their 
business is generated. Engineers’ preferred onsite destinations are the US and other 
English-speaking countries, and Japan is much less popular due to the language 
barriers and different dietary practices (i.e. difficulties finding vegetarian food in 
Japan). Yet the economic rewards are high because of the high exchange rate of the 
yen, and most engineers in the interviews stated that they welcomed onsite 
opportunities in Japan. Many new engineers who are exp cted to function as onsite 
engineers learn the Japanese language before their departure from India, and 
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continue to practice via on-the-job training or week nd language classes. However, 
to be proficient in a language takes time, and it is difficult for most engineers to 
acquire business-level Japanese proficiency.  
 Engineers who were dispatched from offshore Indian evelopment centers to 
Japan did not go to their Japan office. Instead, most engineers in this research went 
straight to their clients’ offices, because they were “billable” immediately upon their 
arrival in Japan, according to the HR manager of a Japanese office of a large Indian 
firm.  
 The average monthly income of Indian engineers in Japan is ¥470,000 
according to my data, which is six times more than they receive in offshore Indian 
development centers. Most of the engineers in this research stated their reason for 
taking onsite assignments as financial merit. India software engineers working 
onsite cost the same or are more expensive than Japanese contractors, because of the 
costs of their transportation to Japan, accommodatins, and communication aids, yet 
they are a less expensive labor force in that they ar utilized as part of an offshore 
development team, in combination with a large number of much less expensive 
offshore team members.  
 From clients’ points of view, Indian engineers can provide technical skills 
that are in short supply in the Japanese market, and they can be used on a project 
basis without incurring extra costs for basic training or social insurance. Indian firms 
charge a 30-60% margin for their replacement engineers, and all parties—Japanese 






 However, they are, as Aneesh (2006:45-47) analyzed, project-based flexible 
labor, supplied “just in time” for a period determined by a client’s needs. The 
purpose of the “just-in-time” technique (well known in Toyota’s production system) 
is to eliminate excess stock. Indian software companies’ transnational placement 
systems enable them to keep excess stock/workers in an offshore labor reserve at 
little cost and to deploy workers just in time on an on-demand basis.  
 In this system, clients can utilize external resources whenever they need and 
detach them whenever they want, and offshore Indian firms have grown in response 
to such flexible needs of clients. Both physical temporary labor migrations and 
virtual migrations in offshoring share the underlying principle of the industry, i.e. the 
commodification of software engineers. 
 Engineers in this operation are dispatched to Japan with a minimum of two 
weeks’ notice (to arrange a work permit). However, if engineers are urgently needed, 
they come on a tourist visa and change their status in Japan. Sometimes a client’s 
request is so urgent that engineers do not have enough time to prepare. In one case, 
an engineer, his wife, and his two small children arrived at Narita Airport not 
knowing where they should go until the engineer picked up a cell phone that the firm 
rented out for him and contacted the Japanese office of the Indian firm. In another 
case, one engineer who did not have information of his destination disappeared for 
nearly two days, and he was discovered in a hotel near th  client’s firm. In yet 
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another case, engineers who were supposed to arrive did not come due to delayed 
visa processing on the Indian side, and the client was extremely annoyed. A sales 
manager of the Japan office who was in charge of the project was blamed for the 
delay, and was actually yelled at by the client over th  phone. Clients’ requests for 
projects sometimes come with very short notice, but Japanese clients become upset 
when engineers do not arrive “just-in-time” they need. If something goes wrong, 
Japan offices of Indian firms are the first ones to be blamed. 
 An example of the movement of engineers is shown below in Table 1. This 
is an example of the number of engineers who were dispatched from an Indian 
software firm in 2008. 
 
Table 1. Number of Indian engineers working in Japan 
Engineers who arrived in 2008 183  
Average duration of work 6 months 
Engineers who came more than once 9（5%） 
Intervals before coming back 3.4 months 
 
 As the table shows, the total number of engineers who came over to Japan 
was 183, many of whom worked short-term, with an aver g  duration of six months. 
Only 5% of the engineers visited more than once. As the table shows, the 
“just-in-time” system works in such a way that engineers are eventually sent back to 
India, because letting workers wait in Japan for the next assignment is costly unless 
it is a short period of waiting. The duration of work in Japan was analyzed as shorter 
than that in the US in the case study of Sahay, et al. (S hay, et al. 2003).  
 From the workers’ points of view, the short periods of assignments typical of 
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the Japanese situation are not appreciated, and many of the engineers interviewed 
mentioned they wanted to spend at least a couple of y ars in Japan. Sahay, et al. state 
that the duration is a critical factor that influenc s their preference of onsite 
destinations.   
 When a project is over and there is another assignment for an engineer in a 
short interval, engineers can, in theory, stay and wait in Japan as “benching” staff. 
This benching of engineers in the clients’ countries (in Australia and in the US as 
well) is analyzed in Xiang (2007) and Aneesh (2006), yet it is not common in Japan, 
presumably due to cost considerations, and there wernot many cases that I 
observed. Without creating revenue, it is too costly to keep engineers in Japan, 
providing accommodations, salaries, and social insurance premiums. The back office 
staff of a large Indian firm stated that engineers do not prefer to be on the bench 
because their skills become obsolete and their market value decreases. Benched 
engineers in India are the first ones to be laid-off, and they are thus vulnerable both 
in India and in clients’ countries.   
 
Detachment 
 The just-in-time supply of offshoring helps clients to reduce the costs of 
maintaining a large number of regular employees, and the system enables clients to 
dispose of surplus stock (labor force) whenever they want. Engineers who are placed 
in this flexible labor system are susceptible to economic conditions and fluctuations 
of corporate profit and loss. Onsite engineers are not simply a privileged group of 
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people who can gain higher incomes and social prestige in India; they carry risks of 
being exposed to and excluded from the labor market during an economic slowdown. 
In Japan and elsewhere, onsite engineers are exposed t  vulnerable conditions. Sahay, 
et al. states, “Global risks are just the part of everyday existence of GSAs (offshore 
outsourcing) that cannot be avoided and must be confronted on a continuous basis” 
(Sahay, et al. 2003:2.3). 
 The financial rewards of onsite opportunities were important for many 
engineers in this research, and most of those who work in Japan prefer to stay at 
least a couple of years before returning to India. Engineers who spend a few years in 
a country often purchase land and properties, and those with financial resources, 
with savings from onsite assignments, may spend a considerable amount of money 
on their families. Yet it is not simply a matter of financial resources; many engineers 
in this research expressed their interest in gaining exposure to a wider world and 
experiencing life in different cultures. Many also enjoy traveling while onsite.  
 However, because of the client-centric system of the industry, engineers 
cannot take control of their durations of stay in Japan. Many Japanese firms decide 
future plans based on a short-term basis as expressed as a “quarter mentality” (not an 
annual basis), and it is difficult for engineers to foresee a long-term plan (or even an 
annual plan) for themselves and for their families (See Chapter X). They may 
express their wishes to stay to their clients, but this can easily be changed because of 
client-side budget conditions. Anoop, an Indian project manager with considerable 
experience working with Japanese clients, states that his clients in Japan do not want 
Indian engineers to stay for a long time due to cost nsiderations, and that the firm 
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he worked for requested that Indian engineers not bring their families to Japan. 
Anoop also stated that he surprised his Japanese clients by obtaining a driving 
license in Japan, because their expectation was that engineers worked only on a 
short-term basis. He explained that offshoring is still new in Japan, and therefore it 
takes time to change clients’ attitudes.  
 When projects are over or cancelled, onsite engineers are expected to leave 
in two weeks’ time. Some of the engineers interviewed were in panic mode because 
they received sudden, unexpected instructions from their company to go back to 
India because their projects were cancelled.  
 The global financial crisis and the economic downtur  in Japan in 2009 
particularly illuminated the vulnerable conditions of engineers in Japan. Many of the 
engineers that I interviewed went back to India during the research period because 
the projects they were assigned were cancelled or reduced. In terms of work permits, 
they are allowed to stay for a maximum of three years on the condition that their 
employment continues. Therefore, unless they find a new job in Japan in a short 
period of time, they have no choice but to return home. The cost of living in Japan is 
too expensive to stay without an income, as mentioned earlier. The financial crisis 
severely affected both MNCs as well as Japanese firms, and many projects were 
cancelled or postponed, and engineers on these projcts were forced to leave.  
 Because of this situation, the number of engineers ntering Japan decreased, 
and the number of workers who were issued visas decreased by 23.3% in 2008, and 
62.8% in 2009, according to the report of the Ministry of Justice (2010). There was a 
sudden increase in posting “final sales” of household g ods in the mailing lists for 
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Indian residents, which also illustrates the ways they were suddenly detached from 
their work in the Japanese labor market. Many engineers in this research hoped to 
come back and work again in Japan, so they left without cancelling their alien 
registrations. The labor market conditions in India at the time were also very 
unstable, and those engineers returning to India were soon worried. One project 
manager who was going back to India after a six month site assignment stated, 
“Good engineers do not have to worry. They all have projects,” but if engineers are 
placed in the pool, they may be the first to go.  
 
Circular Labor 
 Expatriate engineers are often analyzed as “itinerant workers” or “nomads” 
with geographic mobility, people who move from company to company and from 
place to place across national boundaries (D'Mello and Sahay 2008). Yet such 
transnational movement is not necessarily realized out of one’s free choice, but as an 
outcome of clients’ demands.  
 However, some engineers circulate between India and J pan on a regular 
basis. These workers are invited to come back for onsite assignments by clients 
repeatedly due to their social and technical skills. Dinesh, an Indian team leader, 
who circulated between Japan and India four times, is highly trusted by his Japanese 
client, as he is capable of balancing the needs of clients and the limitations of 
offshoring; Dinesh’s coworkers explain that he can s tisfy both the Japanese clients 
and the offshore team. Figure 6 shows this team leader was invited to onsite projects 
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four times by the same client’s firm, and circulated between the two countries: 
 
Figure 6. Example of circular labor between Japan and India 
 This engineer alternates between India and Japan every six months, on 
average. Dinesh is happy with this cycle of employment because he can enjoy the 
best of both worlds and a higher income while pursuing an onsite assignment, and he 
also has regular opportunities to see his family and friends in India. He stated that he 
could happily alternate between two countries for another three or four years. He had 
already saved almost JPY3,000,000 (USD24,000) from his onsite assignment and 
was planning to purchase land in India. He was not o ly satisfied with the financial 
rewards of circular labor, but for him this was a good opportunity to deepen his 
understanding of Japanese clients’ ways of working as well as learning corporate 
Japanese practices. However, Dinesh also had aspirations to work in Japan for a 
longer period of time, so he was exploring longer career opportunities as well. At the 
same time, he felt family obligations were very important, and wanted to settle down 
after getting married, in accordance with his parents’ wishes.  
 Another example of worker circulation is Ketan, an Indian project manager 
who has travelled back and forth between Japan and India for the past twelve years. 
Ketan first came over to Japan in 2000 and worked for three years there, then 
returned to India, and then came back to Japan “numerous” times because of his 























he has moved between India and Japan. He changed companies and is now working 
in the Japanese office of a large Indian IT firm due to being directly hired (not 
expatriated), and he can now control how long he will stay in Japan without 
worrying about project conditions.  
 These examples illustrate the circular labor of India  IT workers moving 
between India and Japan, and for these engineers, transnational labor is an 
opportunity for higher income while still belonging to the Indian firm. However, the 
latter project manager also states that his career opportunities are limited as a 
Japanese specialist. Indian firms are US-oriented, thus building a career in the US is 
necessary for engineers and sales personnel to move up the corporate ladder. Being a 
Japanese specialist creates opportunities to come and work in Japan, but at a higher 
level, it also has a limiting effect on engineers’ wider global career opportunities, as 
Tsukasaki argues in her studies of professional foreign workers’ career development 
(Tsukasaki 2008).  
 
Staying in Japan 
 If engineers wish to take control of their duration f work and stay in Japan 
as long as they want to, they need to change their status from expatriates of Indian 
firms to direct employees of firms based in Japan. In the Indian IT industry, 
changing jobs is considered to be part of the “life cycle” (See Chapter X), and most 
young engineers, particularly those with some level of Japanese knowledge, show 
interest in finding direct employment in Japan. Many of these engineers state that 
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they regularly check their market value and send resum s to other firms in Japan to 
explore career opportunities.  
 However, engineers need to have a high level of Japanese language 
proficiency (with the exception of MNCs that requires English only) to find 
long-term positions in Japanese firms, which consequently limits the opportunities 
for most Indian engineers. Acquiring business-level oral proficiency in the Japanese 
language is possible over a few years of work experience in Japan, yet writing and 
reading the Japanese language is time consuming, and only a small portion of Indian 
engineers reach an advanced level of Japanese language mastery. 
 Although Indian engineers are known as frequent job-h ppers and the 
industry is plagued with a high attrition rate, changing jobs is not easily achieved in 
the Japanese labor market. Being a “bilingual” engineer is necessary to access a wide 
range of opportunities. Table 2 below is an example of language requirements 
specified in a job ad database: 
 
Table 2. Japanese language requirements in the job ads for IT programmers  
Required Japanese Level Number of ads  % of ads 
Native 55  48.6％ 
Fluent  31  27.4％ 
Business 18  15.9％ 
Conversational  1 0.8％ 
Basic   1  0.8％ 
None  7 6.1％ 
(Daijob.com, accessed September 5, 2009) 
 As shown in this table, those who do not have lingu stic capital have limited 
mobility in the Japanese software labor market. India  IT engineers with technical 
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and linguistic capabilities have grown to exercise considerable power as 
newly-emerging Asian “power immigrants” in Australia (Ishii, et al. 2009), yet 
outside English speaking countries, things are different. The Japanese labor market 
is much more difficult to penetrate because of linguistic barriers.  
 
Commodities that have Wings 
 Linguistic capital, however, can play an interesting role in finding 
employment, as engineers with little experience, but with bilingual skills sometimes 
have better job opportunities and career prospects in Japan than engineers who are 
technologically proficient. Because bilingual engineers are in high demand, certain 
engineers are hired not based on technical skill sets, but based on their linguistic 
skills. Manu, an Indian sales manager of a medium-sized Indian firm, stated that they 
make an investment in training engineers with language education, but those 
engineers leave the firm in one or two years’ time and move to larger Indian firms in 
Japan. Many of these engineers are not technically proficient and have little 
experience, but they utilize their linguistic capital to their advantage and gain 
mobility in the Japanese labor market as onsite engineers who can coordinate work 
with Japanese clients. Manu mourns that these bilingual engineers become, 
“commodities that have wings.”  
 Engineers’ mobility goes hand in hand with the flexible supply of labor, and 
offshore engineers gain transnational mobility precis ly because their labor is 
temporary project-bound. There is only a small percentage of engineers who manage 
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to escape this system using linguistic capital and fi regular employment. The 
following is a case study of Uday, the Indian project l ader in his early thirties, 
introduced at the beginning of the chapter. Uday changed companies five times in 
Japan using his technical, as well as linguistic, capital. This case study is not 
intended to generalize the patterns of career development of Indian engineers who 
move up by changing companies; this study does not have the comprehensive data 
necessary to analyze career paths or career patterns of engineers. This section is, 
however, an attempt to provide an instance of India engineers’ career aspirations 
and struggles to acquire linguistic capital. (The definition of career in this paper does 
not refer to workers’ choice of work, detached from social constraints, but rather 
refers to the dialectics of workers’ aspirations and social constraints.) 
Uday’s Case 
 I met with and talked to Uday about his work and career plan regularly for 
more than a year. After studying software engineering in college, Uday joined an IT 
company in Chennai, and came over to Japan eight years ago on a project basis. He 
gradually learnt Japanese, and moved up by changing companies—both Japanese 
and Indian firms. He has a good command of Japanese and is now employed as a 
direct regular employee of a Japan office of an India  based software service 
company, and his income is close to USD125,000. 
 Uday states that he managed to move up to his current position by changing 
companies using his technical capabilities, management skills, and social skills, 
including Japanese language proficiency, to market himself. He works hard to obtain 
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various qualifications and technical certificate. For instance, Uday studied hard to 
pass the highest level of JLPT (Japanese Language Proficiency Test) to prove his 
proficiency of the Japanese language. Uday believes that this certificate will enhance 
his career opportunities and bring higher income. The JLPT exam was considered to 
be an important economic capital for many engineers interviewed.  
 For Uday and many other engineers interviewed, like Shiv discussed earlier, 
constantly upgrading technical and language skills is extremely important because 
this will enhance their market value and create more stability in their employment 
condition. After passing an important exam, Uday stated, “It is a relief. If some 
problem arises, I can always move. I’m confident with that. Lay-offs are 
everywhere.” There is a reason that Uday works hard to take as many qualifications 
as possible: his company works under a prime contracting firm that requests 
engineers who have certain qualifications. Uday’s constant effort to upgrade his 
skills by taking qualification exams reflects not just his aspirations to become a 
better engineer or to learn new technology, but is also influenced by corporate 
pressure and unstable employment conditions. He invests money and time and 
sacrifices his personal life with his family to prepare for qualification exams, and 
spends considerable spare time learning new skills.  
 Engineers’ career management is often emphasized by offshore Indian firms 
(Upadhya and Vasavi 2006; Xiang 2007), and the corporate management technique 
places the responsibility of career development and risk management on individual 
workers. 
 Language skills are considered important from corporate perspectives 
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because engineers without language skills are more c stly due to arranging a 
translator. Besides the extra cost, engineers who lack language skills cannot interact 
directly with clients, tend to generate communication difficulties; clients feel 
frustrated that they have to make extra effort in facing and overcoming these 
communication barriers. Uday explains that he feels a glass ceiling exists because of 
the language issue. The CEO of the firm he works for told him that he cannot 
become a project manager because he cannot write documents in Japanese, which is 
essential to manage projects.  
 
Learning from the Periphery 
 Uday finds the relationship with his supervisor at the second Japanese 
company most useful, and thinks this is the turning point of his career in Japan. 
Uday was still struggling to learn basic Japanese at the time, and his supervisor, 
Suzuki, constantly put pressure on him to learn Japanese. For instance, Uday used 
English in e-mails, but after a while, Suzuki wrote e-mails in all Japanese and 
expected Uday to reply in Japanese. Uday spent hours writing e-mails in Japanese, 
but Suzuki would return them with the comment “rewrite.” E-mail correspondence 
with Suzuki took up most of Uday’s time in the office, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. It was 
necessary for Uday’s firm to train a bilingual engineer, and Suzuki functioned as 
both a gatekeeper and a language trainer for Uday. Suzuki told Uday, “I can’t sell 
you if you don’t know Japanese.” After one year, Uday was offered only a small pay 
raise since he could not talk to clients in Japanese. Uday tried to negotiate, and he 
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was told, as a trial run, to take charge of one project and communicate with the 
Japanese clients on his own. Uday tried, but he faild miserably. Uday recalls 
Suzuki’s comment: “I knew you couldn’t. That’s why your pay raise is ¥10,000.” 
Uday then recognized that learning the language would be an essential tool for his 
career mobility, and he has since striven to learn Japanese.  
 
Risks and Opportunities 
 For Uday, changing companies enhances risks, yet also poses a positive 
challenge for him. Uday feels that changing jobs and increasing income is a natural 
cycle, like that experienced by many other Indian engineers. He has been working 
for his current company for three years, and his India  friends often ask him why he 
does not change companies. Uday states that Indian engi eers feel anxious when 
they are not learning a new technology, and that they ar  constantly worried about 
their skills becoming obsolete. Uday regularly meets wi h head-hunters to check his 
market value. For him, language qualification is hipassport to becoming a project 
manager for a Japanese client. 
 Uday’s case may be considered an example of an engin er’s successful 
career development in Japan, but his efforts are also closely connected to the issues 
of unstable employment conditions and fears of being u marketable. Language skills 
add to one’s employment value, because engineers without Japanese language skills 
are more expensive due to unforeseen communication costs. On the other hand, 
Suzuki’s training for Uday was subverted by Uday changing companies, and 
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 Uday’s career is generated as an amalgam of his own choices and aspirations, 
as well as corporate pressures and vulnerable employ ent conditions. Uday works 
for his current company as a regular employee, and he is in a position to take control 
of his duration of stay in Japan. Although his co-workers were getting laid off 
one-by-one because of the sluggish economic conditios in Japan, Uday was 
confident that he would not be laid off. 
 However, a few months later, he was suddenly laid off by his company, and 
he has no choice but to return to India. Uday had already saved a considerable 
amount of money and owned three apartments in Chennai, South India, so he says he 
will survive no matter what happens. Yet he was very upset when he got this news 
from the company. The firm told him that it was a temporary solution, and that they 
would call him back as soon as the situation improved, yet the future is uncertain, 
and even his constant upgrading of skills and qualific tions did not protect him from 
the risks generated by the volatile employment conditions of the current market.  
 
Summary  
 This chapter analyzed Indian workers by following their movements from 
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entering the IT industry in India, and their movements i to the Japanese labor market 
through the transnational labor supply system. The first half of the chapter 
illuminated the inclusion and exclusion of software engineers in the Indian IT 
industry, showing that onsite engineers are a privileged group of people, selected 
through different levels of inclusion and exclusion at their recruitment, during 
employment, and in onsite assignments.  
 Yet, the latter half of the analysis illuminated that although these employees 
are highly paid they are also highly insecure, easily detachable from the Japanese 
labor market. Past contributions, such as Xiang (2007) and Aneesh (2006), showed 
the engineers’ successes, struggles and insecurity in Ind a–US or India–Australia 
movements. This chapter contributed an analysis from the Japanese context, and 
provided insight in relation to Japanese immigration p licy and the different labor 
management practices in Japan (e.g. lack of benching in Japan), as well as local 
constraints related to language, exploring how workers face various boundaries and 
examining an instance of workers taking control of their own lives in Japan. 
 Uday, in this last section, explored career opportunism in Japan. He started 
as a peripheral project-based worker and then worked his way up, but he was 
detached again from the Japanese labor market in the end. His case illuminates both 
a success story of an Indian engineer with linguistic capital, and at the same time, 
engineers’ high-risk / high-return situation and highly insecure lifestyles.  
 Past contributions such as from Aneesh and Xiang illustrate Indian 
engineers’ movement between India and English speaking countries, but the 
linguistic boundary added in the Japan-Indian collabor tion and immigration 
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boundary system provides a different context from the previous studies. The analysis 
of the government’s led policy discussions reveal contradictions between the 
idealistic images of “highly-skilled workers” as long-term labor resources and the 
actual employment situations that are project based nd temporary. 
 Japanese immigration policy discussions regarding highly skilled workers 
tend to focus on agendas such as “how to provide a s cure environment for skilled 
workers,” but such discussions assume full time positions or contract-based labor 
based on their own preferences, and they rarely analyze the vulnerability of 
project-based contractors or the flexible labor supply system through which the 
India-Japanese offshoring business operates. This chapter described why 
project-based Indian engineers should be referred to as highly skilled and highly 
vulnerable workers. Their participation in the Japanese labor market is situated in the 
same continuum of other subcontractors and regular workers, and their duration of 
stay in Japan is strongly affected by fluctuations of the economy. 
 Three engineers that I introduced at the beginning of this chapter, Rakesh, 
Shiv and Uday were all proud to gain onsite opportunities, but they were all trying to 
overcome job insecurity in various circumstances. Among these three engineers, 
Uday and Shiv left Japan. Shiv went back and is now working in his original 
workplace. Shiv is planning to come back to Japan for another onsite assignment, 
and after the assignment, he intends to leave the company to pursue graduate study. 
As seen in the case study, Uday, who went back to India, after being fired, 
spent some time with his parents, but he is determined to come back to Japan. Uday 
has a cousin who is now working on a project basis in Japan, and he intends to join 
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her. His visa is not expired yet, and he is confident that his qualification and 
language skill will get him a better opportunity. He is now communicating with a 
Japan office of a US-based multinational corporation, and is waiting for an interview. 
Rakesh who had difficulty sleeping because of insecurity about his job is still 
working in Japan, and his wife is expecting a baby. It is not clear how long Rakesh 







Chapter V  
Marketing: Creating Images of India and Indian IT in Japan 
 
Difficulty of Promoting Indian IT in Japan 
 When I met Mishima, a Japanese marketing manager of an Indian software 
services firm, AKC India, for the first time, he enthusiastically expressed his plan to 
expand AKC India’s business utilizing his previous experience and connections. 
After experiencing a variety of sales and marketing jobs in American corporations in 
Japan, Mishima had just moved to AKC India’s Japan office one month earlier. He 
sees a bright future in AKC India. Mishima emphasize  the strength of his offshore 
company in contrast to the ignorance of Japanese firms that still do not understand 
the value of Indian offshore. “I am here to enlighten Japanese firms.... I am an 
offshore missionary.” Mishima passionately showed anexplained to me the photos 
he took in India the month before on his first business trip to AKC head office in 
Bangalore. “This is the offshore development center I visited. It is very impressive. 
The infrastructure is terrible, and the poverty is everywhere, but the development 
centers are very modern.”  
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I still remember Mishima’s face, full of excitement and hope for the 
company. However, half a year later, when I met Mishima again, his face was pale 
and exhausted. While chain-smoking, he lamented in a crestfallen tone of voice that 
major Japanese firms do not want to work with anything less than top companies. 
Comments similar to Mishima’s were also heard from ther sales managers of this 
company. Their struggle was evident in AKC’s marketing activity at an IT 
industry-related expo in Tokyo where they had a small booth, trying to distribute 
corporate brochures and collect business cards fromvisitors passing by the booth. 
AKC’s booth was dark and very plain, much smaller compared to other booths such 
as Microsoft and Oracle, which were full of campaign girls in miniskirts and skimpy 
costumes. Some visitors took interest and talked with sales and marketing people of 
AKC, but most passed avoiding the sales staff. Some showed their disinterest in such 
comments as “AKC? Never heard of it.” Engineers andsales staff of AKC were 
obviously disappointed. Not just AKC, but other Indian firms at the expo were in 
similar situations. 
 As in Mishima’s case, Indian companies hire Japanese sales people on a 
regular basis, because Japanese sales managers and staff have an advantage in 
language skills, and they are also familiar with Japanese business practices. These 
Japanese salespeople, as well as their Indian counterpar s who have lived in Japan 
for a long time, function as intermediaries who explain to corporate Japanese clients 
the characteristics of Indian business and the advantages of offshoring. Mishima 
expressed his frustration and exhaustion of being a “missionary” after six months of 
difficulty selling Indian services in the Japanese software market.  
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 Tanaka, a Japanese sales manager of another large Indian IT firm, KBC 
IndiaTech was not as enthusiastic or hopeful as Mishima when he joined KBC. 
Tanaka stated, “I was a little embarrassed to join KBC.” After working at an 
American firm as a marketing manager for a long time, he was invited to join KBC 
India Tech, but Tanaka knew very little about the company and about India. Many 
Japanese staff members of Indian firms’ Japan offices show similar tendency: many 
whom I interviewed had study or work experiences in the U.S., and many speak 
English, but they also express their lack of interest in Indian culture or society 
beyond the knowledge they think they required in busine s relations. Tanaka stated 
that an Indian firm was not something he dreamt of w rking for, and that when he 
was invited to join KBC he thought, “What? India?” Tanaka states that this would 
have been unthinkable when he was young, although it is not unusual nowadays for 
young people to join an Indian firm because of the growing recognition of the 
industry through the media. Tanaka added that negative nd backward images of 
India still exist and that is still in the mind of many of the Japanese sales people.  
 Indian managers are also struggling to sell Indian services to Japanese firms. 
In order to succeed, Indian managers need to learn corporate customs and 
organizational differences in Japan. Chandra, a corporate executive of Mani Softech, 
looks back to the days he established a small office with two other staff members in 
a small apartment room rented in central Tokyo in the mid-1990s, recalling 
difficulties he had when he started business in Japan. The first year was a real 
struggle for Chandra and his team. No one on his team spoke Japanese, and they 
knew very little about Japanese corporate customers and the Japanese IT industry. 
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Chandra expected Japanese business customers to be similar to US customers; thus, 
by explaining offshore business as an effective means for cost reduction, he tried to 
promote offshore Indian outsourcing as he did in his experiences working with US 
clients.  
 After a while, however, Chandra and his team came to r alize that Japanese 
clients had completely different understandings of outs urcing in the 1990s. While 
outsourcing (domestic relocation of work to an external organization) was a common 
practice in Japan, the relocation of software development abroad seemed too risky a 
practice for many Japanese firms, and they were wary of foreign software companies. 
The favored method of cost cutting for Japanese clients was not a drastic one, such 
as offshoring work outside Japan; rather, Chandra rec lls that they preferred to cut 
down in-firm costs by reducing salaries across-the-board or saving electricity 
expenses in-office. Japanese firms were also weary of foreign vendors because of 
communication issues, language barriers, socio-cultural differences in business 
customs, and organizational differences as well as geographical risks and 
unpredictability. The concept of offshoring as well as the corporate image of Indian 
IT was not well-established, and they had to struggle in communicating with 
Japanese clients. Chandra recalls that in the 1990s, many Japanese firms were 
skeptical of the capabilities of “foreign companies” such as Indian ones.  
 Chandra has been struggling to expand business in Japan since the 90s, and 
he still feels that the situation has not improved drastically. Like Mishima, Tanaka 
and Chandra, many sales and marketing managers of Indian software service 
companies operating in Japan find that it is difficult to break into the Japanese 
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market because of the existing industrial hierarchy that consists of chains from prime 
contractors down to contractors. Chandra often meets with other corporate 
executives of Indian firms in Japan, and discusses why it is difficult to expand 
business in Japan. He laments that “everyone is talking about why we can’t succeed... 
We are very frustrated.”  
 This chapter introduces the reader to the world of offshore Indian 
intermediaries operating in Japan: it explores both their efforts and struggles to 
expand their business by examining their image building strategies, taken from their 
corporate websites and their marketing activities for Japanese clients. This chapter 
documents the marketing operation of Indian firms in Japan by focusing on Tanaka’s 
struggle to promote his company. The analysis of the Tanaka’s firm’s marketing 
activity is not intended to generalize all marketing activities of Indian firms, but 
evidence from interviews with sales and marketing managers suggests that the 
problems Tanaka’s firm faces are also frequent concerns for many firms1.  
 Japanese firms often outsource their work to their direct subsidiaries or 
firms with which they have long business relationship  (see Chapter IX). Thus 
Indian and Chinese offshore vendors struggled to establi h direct business relations 
with large Japanese firms. The chain of subcontracting and the control of large-scale 
prime contracting firms was not something they were accustomed to from dealing 
with companies in the US, as US firms that have intr al IT resources often have 
                                                       
1 Many Indian firms established subsidiaries in Japan in the 1990s and have been 
trying to penetrate the Japanese software market since then. There are more than 
fifty Indian firms currently operating in Japan, rangi  from larger firms that operate 
across the globe, to smaller agencies, many of which are located in Tokyo, the 
business center of Japan. 
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direct communications with outsourcing companies without going through chains of 
intermediary firms. Chandra also states, “Gaining trust is very important when 
working with Japanese clients. Once the trust is established, it’s much easier to work 
with them.”  
 Establishing trust requires a long process of relationship-building by regular 
visits to clients and cultivating an understanding of their businesses. The 
decision-making process of Japanese firms was slow and painstaking according to 
Chandra and his team, especially compared to their experiences with many US 
clients. Chandra’s firm gradually started to gain small projects from Japanese firms, 
and now have more than one hundred engineers working in Japan as “onsite 
engineers” or “bridge engineers,” programmers and liaison officers who coordinate 
work between clients and offshore development centers in India.  
 The situation has slowly changed, and Indian firms have been gradually 
establishing positions in the Japanese software market, but many Indian firms still 
perceive that it is a challenge to become a significant player in this market, as 
Chandra and his team feel. Within this industrial climate, Indian and Chinese IT 
vendors have been generally operating in the lower layers of subcontracting chains 
(NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:28).  
 The Japanese software market is the second largest in the world, but the 
share of offshoring in Japan is limited to less than 10% of the total market, and 
within this 10%, India is lagging behind China, a country with geographical, cultural, 
and linguistic advantages (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). 
Although Indian firms are seeking to expand business with Japanese firms, many 
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sales managers express that it is difficult to become a significant player in this 
market.  
 
Analyzing Indian Companies’ Marketing Activities 
 Indian firms’ marketing strategy is to build their corporate reputations as 
global IT players with strong ties to the US, proficient in standardized development 
methodology; this can be seen in the fact that more than half of the companies that 
hold CMMI Level 5 certificates are Indian firms. The marketing practice of 
image-building India as an IT nation is important i the Japanese market because 
Indian IT, although it is becoming better known, still needs to create a brand image 
of India as a reliable IT partner. As Mishima, the manager of AKC India states at the 
beginning of the chapter, marketing activities are important to educate and 
“enlighten” Japanese clients who are not aware of offsh re Indian business models 
and their advantages.  
 Image building of Indian IT can be analyzed as a process of 
commodification of images, as discussed in Davila (2001), which analyzes the 
marketing of Latino-American images and Latino identity. Davila illuminates the 
process of the commodification of Latino-American images using idealized 
“Mediterranean” looks in the production of advertisements by Hispanic agencies 
themselves, created by erasing the historical context of US Latinos and by excluding 
the diverse ethnic realities of the Latino population. Davila’s work shows how 
marketing functions as a way to promote a particular type of cultural identity and 
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how people in the industry are involved in making this identity to pursue their own 
agendas.  
 Promoting the brand image of Indian IT and its workers also shows a 
particular image-building strategy. Many Indian firms are trying to promote a 
particular image of the industry as a whole, as well as that of an elite group of people. 
Upadhya argues that Indian software companies utilize a distinctive representation of 
corporate culture to attract the best employees and for marketing purposes, and that 
these values, promoted by companies, incorporate “global” management theories 
such as teamwork, customer service, and best practices (Upadhya 2009:6-7). These 
image-building strategies will be examined in an instance of marketing activities in 
this chapter. 
 Another important element in marketing is the use of “India.” Corporate 
promotion of traditional Indian values is used to enhance engineers’ national image. 
In one particular case, identification with a company created a sense of belonging, 
and it succeeded in keeping the generally high attrition rate of Indian engineers 
considerably lower than other corporations (Sahay, et al. 2003). The analysis 
examines the two images, “global” and “traditional,” which are combined in 
marketing activities in the Japanese context, and it shows an instance of how Indian 
firms mix such global images with local Indian culture to appeal to clients, 
emphasizing common “Asian values.” Equally important re the ways in which 
marketing activities are mediated through onsite personnel. It is not only onsite 
engineers who function to mediate clients and offshoring in India; rather, marketing 
activities reveal how marketing managers function t mediate conflict between the 
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Indian business style and that of the client’s side. 
 
Analysis of Corporate Websites 
 “Look at the website, and you see the chaotic situation in the Japan office.” 
Nihar, a sales executive of a large Indian IT firm, laments over the ways in which 
their Japan office corporate website was designed. H  claims that “we don’t even 
have marketing personnel.” Corporate websites are an important means to 
understanding official versions of corporate visions and image strategies; however, it 
is not always the case that Indian firms have resources to organize their sites. Similar 
comments were made by Takenaka, a Japanese marketing manager of another large 
Indian firm. Takenaka states, “whoever made this websit  must have done it without 
much thought.”  
 Analysis of the corporate websites of three well-know , large-scale Indian 
IT firms shows similar concepts. All emphasize their global appeal: one firm, for 
instance, states in Japanese that their company can become a global interface for 
Japanese clients, and that it can manage clients’ overseas projects through their 
global networks. It continues, stating that their svices and scientific project 
management methodology will realize coherent high-quality and cost-effective 
solutions for any region, any language, any domains, ad for any business process 
management. Another company accentuates global and local appeals by emphasizing 
that they have both Japanese local staff with a deep understanding of the Japanese 
market, as well as the company’s globally-recognized software development process 
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and quality of deliverables.  
 However, these Indian firms’ corporate websites often do not operate well in 
the Japanese language; some links on these web pages, even though the titles are 
written in Japanese, jump to English websites, where there is no Japanese translation 
available. Contact e-mails are not necessarily replied to when queries are sent in the 
Japanese language, but are replied to when inquiries a  written in English. 
Contacting Indian firms via e-mail in Japanese, I discovered that there were very few 
replies to the e-mail queries, but more responses were received when the queries 
were written in English. One of the firms that I sent an enquiry to replied from India, 
because the marketing personnel in charge works out of the Indian office, not an 
office in Japan. One of the websites written in Japanese cut off many statements in 
the middle of sentences, which reveals that the technical person did not possess the 
language skills needed to check the content in Japanese.  
 People who work in Indian firms are not necessarily satisfied with their 
websites either, but Japan offices of these Indian firms are still small in scale, with 
employees of less than fifty sales- and back-office staff members, and they struggle 
to incorporate bilingual personnel into the various facets of their business activities. 
 Most websites emphasize their localizing efforts, such as hiring local staff 
members. For example, one firm’s website states that the company provides six 
months of intensive Japanese language cultural training to their selected engineers 
with business experience, to help them understand Jpan’s unique business 
customers and respond to clients’ needs in a prompt, flexible manner. This firm also 
states that they make localization efforts by hiring 30% local staff and training 
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non-Japanese engineers in the Japanese language. Although firms who mostly target 
Western-based multi-national firms tend to place less mphasis on localization, 
companies that seek to expand their businesses by providing strong bilingual and 
bicultural interfaces take localization very seriously.  
 The corporate website of one Indian firm’s Japanese office emphasizes both 
“Global and Local Experience,” and states the following (written in Japanese and 
translated by the author, accessed August 2, 2010): 
 However, the corporate website also illuminates an instance of their 
frustrations towards Japanese firms that do not try to utilize offshore Indian services. 
Although the expressions outlined below were not observed on other corporate 
websites, the following was a common comment heard in my interviews with sales 
executives of Indian software service companies in Japan. The website compares the 
Japanese business style with that of the West, and argues that it is becoming common 
practice for Western firms to utilize offshore, optimized resources for high-end 
upstream design services as well as more routine programming. The greeting from 
the president of this firm states the following: “Japanese clients should grow out of 
the use of offshoring for cost cutting…Offshoring in Japan is considered to reduce 
costs by utilizing cheap overseas labor for low-end programming services.” He goes 
Our company can flexibly provide optimized global services 
with more than 10 years of experiences in Japan with
understandings of Japanese business environments and 
development methodologies, together with global experiences 
accumulated as pioneers of offshore development with networks 
connecting 55 countries.  
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on to criticize the traditional mindset of some Japanese companies: 
 The website then urges Japanese firms to use global resources and 
emphasizes the firm’s efforts to provide localized services for Japanese clients. It 
stresses that the company can offer a reliable means to overcome linguistic as well as 
business practice differences by providing, “resources that can understand both 
Japanese society and global trends, and that can communicate beyond linguistic 
barriers,” a statement similar to one made by the firm mentioned earlier.  
 The message expressed on the corporate website illuminates their 
frustrations as well as the efforts of marketing and sales personnel of Indian firms 
operating in Japan.  
 
Media Images of India in Japan 
 The dominant media images of India in Japan used to be stereotypical ones, 
such as curry, the Taj Mahal, the Ganges River, yoga, Gandhi, poverty, caste 
inequality, and so on. Ravi, an Indian-American corporate executive, who lived in 
Japan in the 1980s, recalls that in the past, he was often asked by Japanese people 
Unless Japan overcomes the belief that Japan is special, it cannot 
win the global competition. As in Thomas Friedman’s “The 
World is Flat,” the utilization of optimized resources across 
national boundaries has become a general practice in the past 
few years…Japan has lagged behind in the global trend in 
offshoring. Why can’t Japanese firms utilize offshoring as 
Western firms do. Many Japanese believe that their language, 




whether he was a cook at a curry restaurant, but that now he is often asked whether 
he is an IT engineer and if he can multiply two digit numbers in his head. Being 
good at math and science is becoming the new image associated with India in Japan 
because of the recent media fads showing India as an emerging IT nation. Japanese 
national television, NHK, broadcast a series of programs highlighting India as an 
emerging IT powerhouse under the title Indo no Shoogeki (Indian Impact) in 2007, 
which exemplifies the ways in which India is portrayed in Japanese media (NHK 
2007). The first show of this series, titled Afuredasu Zunoo Pawaa (Emergent Brain 
Power), illustrated how India is transforming itself from a developing country with 
poverty issues to an emergent IT powerhouse with a rising middle class by showing 
hundreds of Indian students studying for university entrance exams. The program 
narrates that these young people’s path to future success is by using their brains.  
 The program also introduced Indian scientists and e gineers who have 
achieved considerable success in the US and a prestigious Indian educational 
institute, IIT (Indian Institute of Technology), as a successful science education 
facility. The program also shows elementary school kids learning math with 
enthusiasm. Infosys, one of the best known Indian IT service companies, with a 
modern development center and 3,000 engineers working in cubicles, was also 
depicted onscreen. The show narrated that the rapid economic growth of India is 
predicted to surpass the Japanese economy in 25 years’ time due to their young 
population, half of which is under 25 years old. The biggest resource that India has, 
the show narrates, is “brain power.”  
 The series received great reviews (NHK 2007) and drew the attention of 
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those involved in IT offshoring in Japan as well. Some engineers state that they were 
asked questions about India by their Japanese co-workers who watched the program. 
Also, various publications concerning India as an emerging nation were published 
during this same period, presenting additional positive aspects of India as an IT 
nation with great future economic potential. These positive media images overlap 
with the image-building strategy of the marketing activities of Indian IT firms. The 
following section analyzes one such instance. 
 
Marketing Workshop 
 Indian firms offer various workshops for prospective clients. Tanaka, the  
Japanese sales manager of KBC IndiaTech introduced at the beginning of the chapter, 
visited a medium-sized Japanese software subsidiary, Y zawa-Japan Soft, located in 
a quiet rural area a few hours away from Tokyo. Tanaka and the Indian team of KBC 
IndiaTech had been there since morning, and had already made a presentation to the 
company’s executives.  
 The workshop, observed in the afternoon, was mainly for the engineers of 
the client’s firm to learn about offshoring, in case the company decided to make a 
deal with the Indian firm. In the conference room, the Japanese engineers of 
Yazawa-Japan Soft and Indian team exchanged bows and business cards in a very 
courteous manner. There were twelve people in the conference room—three Indian 




 The following is a summary of the workshop, which illuminates Tanaka’s 
“bridging” efforts and his attempts to mediate the gaps between his firm’s marketing 
personnel and their clients.  
 First, Yoshida, the manager of the Japanese firm, started the session with a 
short introductory speech to his employees, stating that they were attending to learn 
about offshoring from the Indian firm. Yoshida said that the Indian firm was much 
bigger than theirs and operated on a global scale. He stated that “a local company 
like us” needs to learn many things from this Indian firm, and that, “if we have a 
deal with them, we need to understand their culture, ways of working.” Tanaka and 
the Indian team then started their presentation, with Tanaka stating the following: “I 
want to introduce Indian culture to you as a Japanese p rson, because you may not 
trust Indians talking about their own culture.”  
 Tanaka started by introducing Indian geography, explaining the ethnic and 
regional diversities in India, a country with twenty-two official languages. He then 
explained briefly about Indian religious diversities, mphasizing similarities and 
differences between Indian and Japanese cultures thoug  explanations such as, “We 
both respect Buddhist ways of thinking and respect for elder people.” He then 
explained Indian IT engineers as representing an elite group in their society, 
projecting the image of successful Indians in the US. He stated that a large 
proportion of Indian scientists, engineers, doctors, and CEOs live in the US, many of 
whom work for well-known US corporations. He next addressed the issues of 
infrastructure generally considered to be a problem when working with India, stating 
that energy supply is improving, and introducing emergent sectors such as the 
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pharmaceutical industry. Tanaka then showed the cover f a Time magazine with the 
title Indian Inc, accompanied by an Indian call center girl’s face with a headphone 
(Time 2006:cover), mentioning that India is entering the global market with women’s 
active participation in society and in the workplace, stating that “even though 90% 
of the population is under poverty zone, we have top 10% who have the same or 
better standard of living than ours. They are more westernized than us.”  
 Tanaka then explained the strength of the Indian IT industry, citing diverse 
factors such as the rapid development of infrastructures, a large number of skilled 
resources from engineering colleges, state support for the IT industry and science 
and technology education, and low staffing costs, as shown in the NHK program. 
Tanaka then began explaining Indian ethos based on the information sheet that his 
company made to explain Indian culture to Western clients.  
 He explained that Indians are family-oriented and have common ground 
with the Japanese in putting value on personal relationships and respecting the social 
hierarchy. He stated that Indians respect people of higher social rankings and ages, 
commenting that “they are similar to the Japanese in that respect…they start from 
their social rank then their name when introducing themselves, as Japanese do.” He 
then explained that Indians respect social ranks in business relations similar to the 
Japanese, and he explained that caste is something naturally accepted in Indian 
society. Tanaka further compared and contrasted Indians and Japanese using “they” 





 They are not good at saying no... 
 They are considered to be quiet and indecisive.  
 That is similar to the Japanese...  
 They may discuss, but do not oppose... 
 They do not insist on their ways...exactly like us... 
 They value silence like us, and value good manners.   
 
Tanaka concluded that it is difficult to find negative factors to working with Indian 
companies considering the Indian population’s growth rate and available manpower, 
their economic growth and potential, and their strong bond with the West.  
 
“Japanese firms are still primitive” 
 Tanaka’s presentation was followed by the Indian marketing and sales 
managers’ presentations. Amit, an Indian sales manager in his early thirties, 
explained how Japanese and Indian firms differ in terms of vendor selection criteria, 
using a report written by a Japanese research organization. Amit started with the 
following comments, “As you know, outsourcing in Japan is in a primitive stage.” 
He explained that offshoring makes up only 8% of the Japanese market, but more 
than 50% in the US. He continued by saying that he would explain why Japanese 
firms have problems selecting offshoring, then apologized: “I’m sorry. I may be 
wrong. Your company is doing all right in various points, so you may not like this 
report. Please excuse me if that is the case.” After this, Tanaka cuts in and added that, 
“whether all outsourcing is good is debatable, but I want you to understand that 
Western firms are heading in that direction. Please understand that we are simply 
comparing the practices.” 
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 Amit followed this by stating that many well-known U.S. firms outsource 
more than 50% of their work, and in comparison, Japan “do best practice” for only 
approximately 15% (literal translation of what Amit said in Japanese). He then 
pointed out the problem of Japanese firms’ vendor selection process, that Japanese 
firms choose vendors based on vague criteria, such as how often sales staff visit 
clients, compared to the more explicit parameters used by U.S. firms. Amit stated, 
“That is why Japanese firms are still primitive.” After this comment, Yoshida, the 
Japanese manager of Yazawa-Japan Soft, cut in and aske  what the source of this 
data was, mentioning that he found it hard to believ  that large scale Japanese firms 
did not have parameters; the conference room was then filled with laughter. Without 
directly answering Yoshida’s question, Amit continued, reiterating that Japanese 
firms do not care about parameters. Tanaka cut in again and said, “It does not mean 
that Japanese firms don’t care.” 
 Amit further explained the problem in Japanese firms’ offshoring, stating 
that issues such as frequent specification changes and ambiguous role specifications 
and contracts need to be changed. At the end of Amit’s presentation, Tanaka 
commented that the reason why they presented the differences between US and 
Japanese offshoring methods is that the company was struggling to develop business 
in Japan using the American method, that they were thus interested in the US-Japan 
difference, and that this survey was therefore useful for both Indian and Japanese 
firms. Tanaka added the following comments at the end of Amit’s presentation: 
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 Tanaka emphasized that there is no right answer to whether the American 
way or Japanese way is better. As part of their process, Tanaka and Amit 
co-constructed their presentation with Amit playing the role of critiquing Japanese 
practices and Tanaka mitigating Amit’s criticism, providing a more moderate view. 
Following Amit, Rama, another Indian sales manager, explained that the Indian firm 
had longstanding business relations with the Japanese firm and its group companies, 
emphasizing a “partnership” rather than client-vendor relation. He stated that his 
company operates globally—not as “time and material” labor, but to achieve total 
solutions. “We do not do business as a contractor, but we work as a partner, 
collaborate with clients…we think we have become a str tegic partner in Japan after 
ten years of working in here.”  
 Amit emphasized a partnership that shares “long-term goals, not a small 
piece of work,” but the Japanese side was more interes d in small pieces of work, as 
can be seen in the following Q & A session. 
  
Missing the Points 
 Yoshida, the manager of the Japanese firm, opened up the Q & A session by 
stating that Indian firms have CMMI Level 5 certificates (the highest level of 
Of course it is not without a problem to rely on outsourcing 
entirely, and Japanese firms conduct business with their own 
know-how, but I want you to understand that we are based on the 
belief that outsourcing is useful. 
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process management certificates), asserting that their company should learn from 
Indian firms and encourage young engineers to ask questions to the Indian personnel. 
Yoshida has been a supporter of offshoring and he hosted this workshop as an 
opportunity for young engineers to learn from the India  team.  
 However, Yoshida’s team member started the Q & A by asking how small a 
project the Indian firm could accept. This question exemplifies how Japanese firms 
evaluate vendors through small projects to minimize r sks of failure. Raj, the 
manager of the Indian firm, answered that small projects do not generate cost merits, 
stating, “We want a long-term business relationship. A short-time small-scale project 
does not produce any merit, and without continuing kowledge accumulation, there 
is nothing to add value to the project.”   
 A common problem with Indian firms is that they take on small pilot 
projects that do not necessarily turn out to be successful, and they thus fail to receive 
long-term commitments. Furthermore, one engineer from the Japanese side asked 
who would respond to emergency problems, stating, “In Japan, vendors start fixing 
the problem on the following day. Can you do the same?”  
 Raji, the Indian manager briefly replied that handli g these issues was not 
so different (presumably in relation to local vendors), yet the Japanese manager was 
not convinced and asked, “How do you do it? E-mail or telephone? How do you 
combine them?” This highlights concerns about how communication can be effective 
between people who cannot see each other. Raji responded by saying that the 
Japanese could contact offshore personnel by phone or directly through onsite 
personnel, but one Japanese engineer was still not convinced: “If we don’t 
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communicate directly, information will not be transmitted correctly. I think that is 
the most important thing.” The Indian side briefly answered by stating, “When 
communication is the problem, you can use a telephone or TV conference.” 
 Throughout this question and answer segment, the Japanese engineers still 
did not look convinced, and after this exchange, thy looked at one another. A 
manager from the Indian side stated that such issues could be specified in the 
contract, but the Japanese side was more interested in a practical level of 
communication. One Japanese engineer stated, “Chinese v ndors were flexible and 
fix the emergency problem in Japan,” and asked whether the same level of flexibility 
could be expected from the Indian firm. There was no time to answer this question, 
however, as the workshop had ended. 
 This question session exemplifies various issues that are often cited by 
Japanese clients and illuminates the conflicts of interest between the two firms. One 
prominent issue here is the issue of trust. Although the Indian firm wanted a big 
project and a long-term commitment from the client firm, the Japanese firm 
preferred to start small in order to evaluate the practices of the Indian firm. Another 
issue raised was the communication channels and their lev l of flexibility. 
Miscommunication risks are a big concern for Japanese firms, but strategies 
for such difficulties were not fully explained by the Indian side in the meeting. 
Japanese software development is known for its frequent changes in specifications, 
and it is common practice for specifications to be shaped through interactions 
between clients and vendors, with changes arising frequently, even near a deadline. 
Under these circumstances, a flexible communication channel is important for the 
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clients, but this issue was not resolved in the conversation, and the Japanese side was 
concerned if the Indian side could respond promptly in different situations. There is 
often a mismatch in expectations in Japanese – Indian business dealings, as Indian 
software firms expect to work based on a structured d velopment methodology, 
while the Japanese side often requires informal communications and greater 
flexibility in their development. These underlying issues came up during the 
question and answer session, but it is not just in this workshop that these questions 
are raised. Communication and flexibility are consta t issues in business relations, 
and these points came up repeatedly in the research for t is dissertation, as will be 
seen in the following chapters. 
 In this session, Tanaka functioned as a mediator to help bridge the Indian 
marketing manager and the Japanese audience of the workshop, and close analysis of 
his mediation, as well as the mismatch in the Q & A, highlight some of the 
differences in the expectations of both sides. 
 
 A similar act of bridging was also seen in a different workshop, also held by 
a large Indian firm, Indoganesha Softech, which revealed different attitudes towards 
“quality assurance” between the Indian firm that organized the workshop and the 
Japanese firm that attended the workshop. 
 In this workshop, Indian managers made presentations via a television 
conference from India, explaining their process of quality assurance. One of the 
Japanese engineers attending the presentation askedthe Indian managers how they 
check if quality matches clients’ requirements. The Indian side stated that they had 
104 
 
both internal and external quality assurance teams, taking a long time to explain in 
detail how the process worked. Waiting patiently until the explanation ended, one 
engineer from the Japanese firm stated that they alr ady knew how the system works 
and were more interested in how the process could be expressed in numbers: “How 
exactly can it raise quality?” The Indian side reiterated the roles of the team, but 
never explained how quality could be enhanced in terms of ratings and numbers. 
 Here again, a Japanese manager of the Indian firm cut in, attempting to help: 
“The clients want to know the effects that they can g in from this.” The Indian side 
explained, “It is not possible to express in percentage, but it is possible to some 
extent, because they have been doing this for a long time, so they can solve more or 
less 100%.” Structured software development methodologies, such as CMMI, show 
the maturity of project management skills that are considered necessary for quality 
assurance, but do not guarantee quality. The Indian side thus tried to explain how 
quality assurance was conducted, in terms of process, but they were unable to 
explain outcomes—yet that is exactly what the clients were interested in. The 
manager lamented that the gap continues to exists, and they have to mediate these 
differences. After the workshop, the Japanese executive commented that the Indian 
side was “missing the point.” He complained, “Although they understand the 
language, we always have to follow up. We need to fill in the gaps. Otherwise the 





 The analysis of the workshops illuminates various issues and tensions not 
pointed out in offshore literature: i.e., the subtle but persistent “disconnections” in 
interactions between Indian firms and Japanese audiences. Tanaka stated that such 
discrepancies revealed that they (the Indian firm) were not prepared enough to tailor 
their presentation for the client.  
 Tanaka has had various experiences with marketing for Japanese firms, and 
he stated that a sympathetic audience is not always the case in these workshops. 
Through marketing activities, Tanaka witnessed the reluctance of many Japanese 
corporate executives to use offshore outsourcing services and sometimes heard 
condescending remarks made by corporate executives such as, “India is doing pretty 
well,” which he interpreted as being based on the assumption that India was doing 
well despite it being a backwards country. Tanaka responded by thinking, “It is you 
who lag behind the world.” 
 It is not just Tanaka who is frustrated, but his many sales staff members and 
the corporate executives of Indian firms are frustrated as well. Such frustrations are 
explained by the sales manager of an Indian firm as follows:  
The frustration of the Indian marketing manager, Amit, was evident in his 
You go to a social gathering of Indian executives (in Japan). 
Their conversation is always the same: “Indian firms are 
successful in the US. Why can’t we succeed in Japan? Why can’t 
we?” All the companies are looking for a way to change the 
situation and play a big part in the Japanese market.  
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comparison between Japan and the US, as seen in his comment, “Japan is primitive.”  
 These critical comments reveal not only frustration, but faith in a structured 
development methodology (such as CMMI) as a more scintif c and modern system 
compared to the “primitive” Japanese methodology, and frustration that the Indian 
firms have to educate clients to introduce “best practice.” NASSCOM’s report states 
that Indian firms need to pursue “education initiatves” and facilitate the adaptation 
of “modern project management practices” by Japanese bu inesses. They 
recommend hiring local staff and developing the “right mindset” to become 
mediators between Japan and India (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2008:41).  
 Although NASSCOM’s argument is mainly used to explain the Indian 
business style to Japanese clients, it can be argued that it plays both ways, i.e., local 
onsite personnel explaining to the clients and to the Indian side about the gaps that 
exists. Tanaka, with his experiences working with an American firm, tried to mediate 
the tensions regarding the Indian style of development, and such mediating actions 
are not one-directional, but two-directional. One onsite engineer, who has been 
involved in pre-sales activities, states that he learnt a great deal by observing his 
Japanese coworkers and the ways in which they talk to clients.  
 
Bridging 
 NASSCOM’s report also emphasizes training bilingual Indian engineers as 
playing a “pivotal role in associating with their Japanese counterparts in strategic 
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roles in business and in technical fields. The report states the importance of training 
staff who are not only linguistically but also familiar with business practices to 
eradicate the “language and culture barriers” betwen Japan and India” (NASSCOM 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:41). Onsite software engineers (or bridge 
software engineers, BSE) are analyzed as “a unique feature of Japanese offshore 
engagement,” one that requires linguistic as well as organizational communication 
on top of technical expertise. “The role of a BSE has no precise equivalent in the 
western model of offshoring” (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:56). 
 I would argue that it is not just engineers, but peo le like Tanaka, who 
function to add comments and mitigate tensions, whoare also offshore 
intermediaries and onsite personnel. These people, at various levels in Indian and 
Japanese organizations, are expected to manage informati n flow and fill in gaps 
between clients and offshore employees and to serve as a “knowledge broker for the 
contextual business idiosyncrasies and the associated cultural subtleties of the 
outsource project (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:56).” 
 In the following chapters, the practices and voices of these people will be 
examined, in order to illuminate the difficulties, dilemmas, and tensions that emerge 
in their efforts. However, it must be noted that these onsite personnel, whether 
Indian or Japanese, are not empty vessels that mediate information flow; they have 
conflicted feelings in their act of mediation. Ikuta, Japanese sales manager of an 
Indian firm stated such mixed feelings—wanting to pr mote Indian offshoring while 




 The sense of distancing seen in Ikuta’s comment overlaps with the 
comments of Mishima and Tanaka in my interviews. These Japanese sales managers 
who work for Indian firms are certainly “offshore miss onaries” as Mishima put it, 
and they are “mediators” to facilitate understanding of offshoring business. However, 
they do so with the understanding of the irony of their work as facilitator of work 
relocation from India to Japan.  
 
Summary 
 The analysis of the marketing activity in this chapter illustrates the 
frustrations that the Indian firms express towards the reluctance of many Japanese 
firms to start offshoring, and the frustration and desire of the sales and marketing 
staff of the Indian firm to educate Japanese firms about “modern development 
processes,” as cited in Amit’s presentation. At the same time, it was also seen that 
such frustrations and faith in structured software methodology was not necessarily 
communicated well to the audiences of the Japanese firm. This reveals the need for 
bridging personnel to fill in the gaps, as Tanaka did by cutting in and adding 
comments to other marketing staff ’s presentations.  
If I were in my fifties working in a Japanese firm, I would never 
want to get involved in offshoring. It is too much work, and too 
many risks. New technology comes and my job will be lost. 
Finally when the system is complete, there would be no job for 
me. Why should I change? There is no reason to change. The 
long term merit is only for younger generations. Not for me. I 
would resist till I retire…CEOs see cost merit in offshoring, but 
there is no merit for people who actually deal with offshoring. 
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The question of “flexibility” raised by the Japanese engineer illuminates the 
underlying issues surrounding asymmetrical client-vendor relations. Flexible 
accumulation of labor is discussed in Harvey (1989) as a capital demand in the 
search for cheap and flexible (detachable) labor. Cmpanies using contract-based 
labor put pressure on workers to be flexible to serve the client as “service 
providers,” and Indian software firms supply workers ju t-in-time for overseas 
clients’ needs. The Japanese engineers’ mentioning “Chinese vendors are more…” 
or “Japanese vendors do…” highlights the corporate strategy to insinuate that there 
are many others who are willing to be more flexible than you, thus these comments 
put pressure on the shoulders of subcontractors (both Japanese and foreign 
subcontractors) to be as flexible as possible in meeting clients’ demand. 
Subcontracting firms are compared and contrasted by flexibility in price, human 
resources, as well as flexibility towards development processes. Tanaka’s statement 
that Indian people are “not good at saying no” can be connected to this point, 
because image-building marketing often attempts to represent Indian workers as 
submissive and easy to work with.  
 Tanaka’s and Ikuta’s comments, however, also illuminate that those 
intermediaries may possess conflicting thoughts regarding this process. Tanaka, 
Ikuta, Mishima and other managers interviewed stillruggle to work in their firms, 
but some of the Japanese managers that I interviewed op nly express interest in 
changing companies. One of them stated that he will work in the current firm until 
he wins a big project, then move on. Many of them expr ss a sense of distance from 
the company they work for, with a target of how many deals they can gain this year. 
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Mishima, who once was very enthusiastic about the pot ntial of Indian firms, still 
works in the Indian firm, is adjusting his view on this industry more realistically, and 
tries to find the right distance and the best role t  mediate. Mishima, working with 
two Indian sale engineers, made a presentation to Japanese firms on how to conduct 
successful offshoring with India at the expo. After spending a considerable amount 
of time for the presentation, Mishima spoke with confidence. “I am going to tell you 
the difficulties of offshoring. Understanding the difficulties and differences is the 
first step for successful offshoring.” Whether Mishima and his role as an offshore 
missionary can work is yet to be seen, but these missionaries’ efforts continue to 
connect the disjointed preconceptions that were raised n the workshops.  
 This chapter introduced offshoring from the perspectiv  of small marketing 
workshops held by Indian firms. The various tensions a d contradictions within the 
offshoring business come through even from the analysis of this small workshop 
session. These issues tend to be lost in the grand analysis of technology as a 
flattening force of labor circulation, or in the analysis of offshoring as a system of 
seamless allocation of work. The analysis in the following chapters will further 
illuminate various issues from the multi-faceted pers ctives of sales personnel and 








Chapter VI  
Resource Management by Sales Personnel 
 
 
 It is 6 p.m. in the Japan office of Indoganesha Softech. Sales managers and 
staff members in the Japanese office are busy making calls and writing and 
discussing proposals for various companies. Writing a winning proposal is part of 
their daily activities, and Ganesha Soft’s sales managers need to close deals in order 
to establish and secure their positions in the firm. The Japan office of Ganesha Soft 
has two clocks hanging on the wall: one indicating I dian time, and one for Japanese 
time, and, from the late afternoon on, the office becomes lively with telephone 
conferences between the sales personnel and offshore Indian workers because of the 
3.5 hour time difference between Japan and India.  
 The major task of sales managers and staff in the Japanese offices is to 
increase the volume of business. To win business, finding suitable resources and 
writing winning proposals to clients are the key. Sato, a Japanese sales staff member 
of Indoganesha Softech is expecting a conference call with an offshore Indian team 
in a few minutes time to discuss staffing for a legacy migration project for a 
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Japanese pharmaceutical company. Sato is anxious to find an engineer who can 
understand the Japanese pharmaceutical business process as well as the client’s 
technology for creating a successful proposal. Sato’s b ss, Kimura, states: “we are a 
service provider, and the most important thing is to have good resources.”  
 The selection of engineers may be viewed as an easy process, particularly 
considering the industry’s claim to have a large pool of qualified engineers, but when 
it comes to finding engineers that fit the local needs of clients, this process can be 
challenging. In order to respond to client firms’ request for proposals, Indian firms 
are often placed under pressure to search for enginers with appropriate experience 
and qualifications. In this chapter I will first show some cases that illuminate the 
difficulty and the arbitrariness of this selection process through several extreme 
cases which drew my attention to the function of this operation.  
Palash, an Indian software engineer from Pune, got his current job in Japan 
through an India-based placement agency. Palash received a call from the agency, 
and gained an “onsite opportunity” he was looking for. What he did not explain in 
the initial interview, but later told me was that he did not have experience and 
qualifications to do the job. Palash recalled the call from the agent asking over the 
phone, “is it a stretch for you?” With trembling voice, Palash said “no, I can do it.” 
The agency suggested Palash should elaborate his CV n the way client would like to 
see, and Palash agreed to do so. It was a stretch for him; he knew, but he could not 
miss this opportunity.  
When Palash and his family descended the stairs of the airplane that arrived 
in Japan, his wife and son were excited to enter th new world, but Palash’s mind 
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was crowded with anxiety. To magnify his anxiety, Palash found out that he was only 
hired on a trial basis, and if he did not perform well enough, he would have to return 
home. “How could I go back to India. It would bring shame to my family. If I knew I 
was hired on a trial basis, I wouldn’t have come.” Palash struggled to survive in the 
new environment and with the technology he has little confidence in for the first 
three months. He was ignored in the office, and no o e talked to him personally. 
Palash was scared to approach his supervisor or his colleagues with the fear that a 
conversation might reveal his ignorance. He was just told to file documents for the 
first few weeks without any substantial work.  
After a while, however, he decided to more actively gather information, and 
learn from other engineers and his supervisor, and started to ask questions. Palash 
received an unexpected pay raise from his supervisor a  a token of recognition. 
“Unlike many other contractors, you are very trustworthy and responsible,” said the 
supervisor. Palash realized that his performance had already been tested and 
observed by the supervisor. He was proud that he proved his ability and gained the 
trust of the supervisor and other colleagues. A year later, he was promoted to team 
leader, and when I interviewed him, he received consta t calls from his team 
members although it was weekend. He commented with joy and pride, “I am trusted 
and they need me, so I am doing my best.” 
Palash’s placement shows that engineers are not necessarily selected based 
on the clients’ requirements, but out of practicality and availability of “resources” at 
hand. Palash’s case went successfully due to Palash’s efforts and willingness to learn 
in the new workplace. However there are also unsuccessful cases that mismatch 
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engineers’ experience and the job requirement.  
Suda, an onsite engineer of Garuda Soft, states, one of his projects failed 
miserably because all the members of the team were young engineers with very little 
experience, and they did not have adequate skills that the client requested them to 
have. Suda’s client wanted to have an engineer who has a domain knowledge of the 
company’s specialized business field and also someone who understands Japanese, 
but the engineers who were dispatched neither understood the business model, nor 
the language, and spent most of their time learning the technology and language. 
Suda, an insider of the Indian firm, thought they were not capable of this project, and 
recommended the supervisor of the client firm to send them back, but the supervisor 
suggested “let’s give them a chance,” and waited for several months for them to 
learn. In the end, however, the project ended unsuccessfully and they were all sent 
back to India. 
 These cases are however extreme cases that drew my attention to this 
“resource management” practice in Indian firms, andthey highlighted the 
arbitrariness of engineers’ selection, based on practic lity and profitability rather 
than matching engineers’ qualifications and clients’ requirements. “Resource 
management” can be an issue in any software project, but the difficulty of finding 
the “right” resources can be multiplied because of the geographical distances and the 
limited availability of resources that understand linguistic and organizational 
differences, and domain knowledge in Japanese industries. However, it must be also 
noted that there are many excellent engineers with the right qualifications and 
experience to work in Japanese firms, and there are m ny other cases that go 
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smoothly and Indian engineers receive excellent evaluations.  
 What I would like to present in the following section is not extreme cases, 
but what people do in daily work, and in collaboration between their Japan office 
and their Indian head office, how they manage to find ‘resources,’ and how the two 
collaborate. Through the course of analysis, I will highlight collaborative efforts and 
disjunctions between the two sides, to illustrate th  difficulty of maintaining 
supposedly “seamless” relocation of work in an ICT business environment. 
 
Negotiation of Target Profile 
 The following is the flow of the conference between Sato, the Japanese 
manager of Indoganesha Softech introduced at the beginning of the chapter, and 
offshore. Sato is about to start a telephone confere ce in the Japanese office of 
Indoganesha Softech, with three Indian managers in Indoganesha Softech’s offshore 
development centers in separate cities in India:  
 Sato starts the conference using a special line for intra-company connection, 
and exchanges greetings with the Indian side. The voices from the other side of the 
line have some noise, but they are clear enough for communication. Sato confirms 
the present situation of a project proposal that they are preparing to the Indian side. 
The deadline is approaching, and Sato states that his major concern is whether there 
is any resource that specializes in the technology that the project requires. 
 It is usually the case that Indian firms select suiable “resources” for each 
project from offshore Indian employees rather than finding local engineers in Japan. 
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Large Indian firms, like Indoganesha Softech, have many offshore development 
centers in India and a large pool of available engineers. What Sato is looking for is 
an onsite engineer who has at least a basic understanding of the client’s legacy 
system. Below is the course of telephone conference of the day. 
 
1) Sato asked the offshore side to find a tech person with basic 
knowledge of a client’s legacy system. 
 
2) The Indian side, however, suggests that Sato should l ok for a 
bilingual engineer with strong domain understanding who could 
communicate with clients and perform consulting in Japanese.  
 
3) Sato ends up agreeing to look for a bilingual engineer in Japan, 
instead of his initial plan to find a tech person with knowledge of the 
client’s legacy system in India.  
 
4) One manager of the Indian side suggests an “IT engineer who 
knows about the pharmaceutical industry,” but later broadens the 
condition to “at least in the manufacturing industry.”  
 
5) Another manager of the Indian side agrees that a technical expert 
from India will join the engineer at a later stage, but that it is necessary 
to find someone in the next couple of days in Japan, before the deadline 
of the proposal.  
 
 After the conference, Sato explained the discussion to his boss, Kimura, and 
reported that the target resource profile had changed from technology focused to 
business process focused. They then started discussing how to find such engineers. 
For the Indian side to make the proposal, a resource had to be found quickly. Kimura 
discussed the issue with an Indian manager, Mitesh: “If we can find such resources, 
we can try (to write a proposal)... I think we can find the resources.” After a brief 
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discussion, they decided to further loosen the condition of the profile from 
“bilingual” to monolingual. Eventually, Kimura managed to find someone who 
understood the client’s business, but not English. Mitesh sounded reluctant about the 
decision, but Kimura was positive. In the end, they d cided to use a Japanese IT 
engineer with no English language skills and informed the Indian side to go ahead 
with the proposal.  
 This process highlights how the negotiations of selecting resources are 
mutually constructed in group discussions, and that a decision is constrained and 
adjusted by various factors. Compared to Palash’s case, this selection process is 
more fluid, changing and adjusting as needed to meet both client and firm needs and 
request. The decision is not unanimous, but work (poposal writing and arranging 
engineers) has to get done by the due date. Proposals are often requested with short 
notice, and sales personnel generally do not have the time to discuss the conditions 
of their proposals in detail. Many things are decided on the spot; the “profile” of 
each resource is constantly negotiated based on situational constraints and 
practicality. 
 As mentioned earlier, difficulty matching engineers and clients is the same 
in any placement business, but may be magnified by geographical distance, 
linguistic barriers, and a need for local knowledge of clients’ business processes. The 
case examined here shows that Sato’s team struggled to find someone with strong 
domain understanding who could communicate with clients and perform consulting. 
However it was not the case that Sato’s team deliberately manipulated and changed 
the requirement out of practically from the beginning.  
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 The NASSCOM report points out that Indian firms are doing relatively well 
in the area of embedded technology, and “these services can be quick wins for Indian 
companies owing to their high market requirement, low anguage dependence and 
high offshoreability” (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:6). However, 
compared to embedded systems and engineering services, the IT solution business is 
more difficult for Indian firms because it often requires understanding of clients’ 
businesses, broad knowledge of the industry, and the ability to suggest IT strategies 
to clients while interacting with clients and shaping their requirements. Sato’s team 
had difficulty finding a bilingual engineer in this area, and that is the reason for their 
negotiations and readjustment. 
 Kimura acknowledges that it is the limitation their company has and that a 
lack of engineers who have knowledge of how business is done in Japan seriously 
affects the quality of their business. He laments that Indoganesha Softech is just 
doing “body shopping” and providing low-end services (mostly coding, testing and 
software maintenance), and that their biggest problem is that engineers cannot 
establish communication with clients—not because of language barriers alone, but 
because they lack domain knowledge. Kimura states that, 
 While being bilingual is an important factor, the word “bilingual” is 
somewhat ambiguous. Indian firms’ websites often discuss their language training of 
Talking with pharmaceutical clients requires legal knowledge of 
Japanese pharmaceutical laws, and they need to know the 
government role in them. Without that knowledge and experience, 
Indians can’t communicate with clients.  
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engineers, and some firms show the percentage of engin ers who have language 
certificates such as JLPT Levels 4 and 3. However, it is also the case that these 
certificates only show that engineers have basic conversational knowledge. Many 
managers like Kimura who know the reality of these language exams make 
statements such as, “Japanese language certificates are not useful unless they are 
Level 1 or at least Level 2.” On one hand, there are many engineers who strive to 
take JLPT Level 3 and 4 as proof of basic communication skills, yet there are also 
those who are highly critical of the commodification f language certificates. 
Kimura said, “I don’t care whether the engineer hasJLPT Level 1 or 2. Clients know 
they aren’t usable anyway.” He further states that they need to function and bear the 
burden of the clients, and that the firm has been ignoring their own responsibilities 
regarding communication problems to clients. Suda’s project introduced at the 
beginning of the chapter failed partly because the mismatch of the client’s 
requirement and the experience of resources and the supposedly bilingual engineer 
was dysfunctional from the clients’ point of view.  
 
Target “Low-hanging Fruits”  
 Although Kimura is highly critical of the practices of Indian companies, he 
is an avid proponent of the offshoring industry and has a passion and great 
enthusiasm for expanding his company’s business in Japan. It is this enthusiasm that 
drives Kimura to negotiate and try to persuade the upper-level management of 
Indoganesha Softech in India to increase their investm nt in the Japanese office, in 
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order to hire more experienced resources with strong domain knowledge. However, 
his wishes have not yet been granted, and he is disappointed to hear from senior 
management that his office should “focus on the low-hanging fruits.” He replies, 
“It’s a body-shopping mentality.” 
 While Kimura feels strongly about changing the company, he feels 
extremely frustrated with the current struggles that Indoganesha Softech faces in 
Japan. This is not a problem limited only to Kimura’s firm—many Japanese staff 
members of various Indian firms make similar comments and share in these 
frustrations, stating that “India has much potential,” but that “things are not 
working,” as we have discussed in Chapter V. Also, many hint at the tension between 
Indian headquarters and Japanese offices. For many Indian software service 
companies, Japan makes up only a small portion of their otal business, usually less 
than 10%; their prime focus is the US market. “The main battlefield for them is the 
U.S.,” said Kimura.  
 Kimura and other Japanese sales managers state that Indian firms tend to 
stick to a “success formula” learnt in their business dealings with the U.S. Kimura 
points out that “targeting low-hanging fruits” and taking up a downstream process is 
how many Indian firms have expanded their relationships with the U.S., an approach 
that has also been mentioned in various studies of Indian offshoring. Although 
Indian firms are trying to localize their practices, their efforts are not effective 
enough to increase business volume according to Kimura. More than half of 
Kimura’s Japan office’s revenue is generated from business dealings with 
multi-national companies, not from Japanese firms, which frustrates Kimura and his 
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Japanese sales staff.  
 Analyses of Indian software service companies or body shopping often show 
how the industry expands, but little is known about the context in which they cannot 
expand their businesses. Also, little is known about the negotiations and tensions 
between the headquarters and local offices of Indian software service companies. 
Aneesh (2006:109-110) has defined alegocracy as a new form of electric 
bureaucracy that covers and controls transnational labor, but a homogenizing force 
of alegocratic control (combination of coding and bureaucracy) is problematized 
when examining the tensions, as well as efforts, to co-select resources between local 
offices and headquarters, even within Indian firms. 
 The expression “low-hanging fruits” is not particularly unique to 
Indoganesha Softech’s case. Another firms’ workshop also shows the same 
expression in their PowerPoint slideshows to audiences. An Indian sale manager, 
Sunil, explaining when it is best to offshore states that “well-defined and 
labor-intensive projects are suitable for offshoring,” implying its suitability for 
lower-stream processes. The presentation also states as follows: “Activities or 
projects that are people-intensive and can be easily carried out according to a 
well-defined process are “low-hanging fruit” for offshoring.” The emphasis on 
“low-hanging fruit” does not carry a negative connotation for Indian sales and 
marketing personnel, and marketing workshops and homepages of Indian firms 
openly discuss “assembly line” approaches and use a “oftware factory” metaphor to 




Man-Month and a Number Game 
 The reason why Kimura says the business is based upon body shopping is 
also related to cost estimations based on a man-month or man-day rather than the 
added value of a project as a whole. “Management parameter is based upon body 
shopping. All the Indian companies are the same,” said Kimura. “Indian firms make 
a living by selling bodies,” said Morita, a Japanese sales manager of an Indian firm 
who moved from an American high-tech company. Other managers make similar 
comments: “they must sell Indian resources from offshore. That’s how they make 
profits.” This is because offshore engineers are generally considered to be less 
expensive and the company can make more profit by using offshore personnel. 
Project estimates based on man-month rate are common practice in the Japanese 
software industry too. Indian engineers are commodifie  as abstract numbers rather 
than individuals with different experiences and skill , and they are compared with 
other commodified workers.  
 Yamada is a Japanese manager in charge of the procurement department of a 
large Japanese software firm, Doi Soft. Yamada buys goods and services, and he 
often refers to man-month rates to describe the worth f Indian engineers in my 
interview. For Yamada, engineers, whether they are from domestic or offshore 
companies, are viewed on the same continuum, from expensive to cheap, and are 
compared and contrasted on this same scale. Yamada st tes: 
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 For procurement people and upper level management teams, engineers need 
to be expressed in numbers, because they need to understand how cost effective the 
engineers can be. The problem of the man-month rate is discussed in Frederic 
Brooks’ classic book The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering 
(1995), where Brooks argues that the man-month method reats engineers as abstract 
labor, without taking into account individual skill differences and time necessary for 
communication. Pointing to the skill differences of engineers, one Indian engineer 
states that these differences should be reflected in unit price lists. From Kimura’s 
point of view, however, Indian firms cannot negotiate with Japanese firms, because 
they do not have the quality resources needed to raise the unit price. 
 Sumi, another Japanese engineer working in a large Japanese software 
subsidiary firm, Fukuda Soft, states that they picked an Indian vendor based on cost 
performance as well as technological capabilities, a large number of offshore 
engineers, and their global channels. He lists the general price range from ¥400,000 
to ¥500,000, Japanese subcontractors as ¥600,000 to ¥700,000, and regular full time 
engineers as ¥1,000,000. For Sumi’s company, the man- onth of offshore site labor 
was an attractive deal. 
In a nutshell, we buy people. Software system development is 
estimated based upon the number of programmers: one proj ct 
manager costs 3,000,000 Yen per month. Chinese (onsite 
engineers) with good Japanese language skill costs 700,000 Yen 
compared to Japanese rate of 1,200,000 to 1,300,000 
Yen…Indian vendors are not particularly cheap onsite…If there 
are two groups of engineers with the same price, on with 
language and the other without language, which do you prefer? 
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Table 3. Example of man-month rates for Indian offshore engineers compared 
to Japanese subcontractors 
・Cost     
・Technology     
















 Business based on a cheap man-month rate is frustrating for Kimura, who 
wants to do better and cultivate a more upstream business. Kimura sees a lot of 
potential in Japan, and states that the current busines  situation is unfortunate for 
both Indian and Japanese firms.  
 Kimura’s view shares the same frustrations as the corporate website 
discussed earlier that states, “Japanese clients should grow out of the use of 
offshoring for cost cutting.” In response to this point, Manoji, an Indian sales 
manager, who used to work for the same company as Kimura, provides a mixed view 
that shows Manoji understands both Kimura’s struggle and the offshore side’s points 
of view. He states that the firm has only a small voume of business in Japan, and 
that offshore Indian centers put priority on U.S. business dealings, while proposals 
for Japanese clients tend to be lower priority and thus take more time. From the 
We should get to know each other, establish rules, then this 
marriage should work…I don’t care how many engineers we 
have. I don’t give a damn. Numbers of engineers do not mean 
anything to our clients…We put a lot of strain to Japanese 
clients. We must act as an intermediary. 
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offshore perspective, “they just wonder what is wrong with Japanese businesses.”  
 Manoji also points out the incentive differences, stating that sales staff 
working in Japan gain incentives by making business deals but that managers of 
offshore Indian development centers have zero incentiv , and thus they need to feel 
motivated and encouraged to cooperate. This disjunctio  and tension, between the 
local Japan office staff and those in the offshore Indian center, again comes down to 
the analysis of the communication issues of onsite engineers in clients’ workplaces. 
These in-house organizational tensions are largely ignored by macro analyses of 
offshoring, thus this section provided valuable analysis of some instances of such 
difficulties. 
 
Long Process of Establishing Relations 
 The difficulties experienced by the Japan-based offices of Indian firms have 
also been analyzed by Japanese clients. Yamada states th t Indian vendors do not 
have “common sense business knowledge,” which he calls knowledge of Kawaita 
zookin o shiboru. Kawaita zookin o shiboru is a Japanese expression, known by 
business people as Toyota’s rigorous streaming efforts, literally meaning to “wring 
out a dried rag,” reflecting Toyota’s philosophy of rationalization to the utmost limit. 
Yamada states this is fairly common business vocabulary for Japanese corporate 
executives, and that it is useful as a form of insider greeting to establish rapport with 
clients in the corporate world. Yamada reconstructs a routine conversation with his 
clients as follows:  
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 After explaining the use of kawaita zookin o shiboru, Yamada comments, “It 
is important to establish rapport with clients using such common frame of 
reference.” Coming up with good IT solutions, for him and for many consultants, 
requires establishing rapport with clients and skillfully eliciting information from the 
clients; this is a necessary base to writing a successful proposal. Yamada comments 
that answers are often found in the conversations themselves, and that listening to 
and understanding what clients say is extremely important up to the last minute of a 
consultation, showing me a pen containing a recording evice which he uses when 
talking with clients.  
 What Yamada describes is one way of establishing rapport and eliciting 
information from clients, but this takes considerable linguistic as well as 
communication skills. This rapport-building process i  important because Japanese 
firms often informally select vendors based upon personal relationships rather than 
the result of a selection process based on set parameters. That is why the sales 
manager in the marketing workshop in the previous chapter expressed frustration and 
discontent with comments such as, “Japan selects vendors through personal relations 
rather than objective parameters,” and attempts to educate Japanese audiences. 
 Indian firms, based on their experiences with American clients, expect to 
Yamada enter a conference room and greets a CEO of a Japanese 
company, and asks how their business is going. CEO says “well, 
we have many problems.” Yamada replies “I see, you are 
wringing out a dried rag, aren’t you?” CEO then responds with 
comments such as “well, that’s the way we should be doing” ad 
conversation goes into details of business, and the CEO asks him 
“Tell me how you can wring out a dried rag for us.” 
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have a RFP (request for proposal) from clients thatspecifies clearly what the client is 
looking for. In the Japanese context, RFP is still not common, and sales managers 
have to regularly visit clients to establish relationships with them. While ways of 
establishing rapport are important when cultivating personal relationships with 
clients, this is a time-consuming process. Indian sles executives and managers 
interviewed often comment that it takes too much time to establish relationships with 
Japanese firms. 
 Sasaki, a Japanese sales manager of an Indian firm, states how he tries to 
create relationships with Japanese clients: 
 Yet visiting clients does not necessarily lead to winning business, and local 
business manners in Japan can create unique boundaries and challenges. Ranjeet, an 
Indian sales staff, regularly visits a Japanese manager, but this manager complains 
that, “He (Ranjeet) came in and plumps onto a sofa, before I offered him a seat. Then 
he asks, do you have any work for me? Of course I don’t offer anything to him.” 
 Ikeda, a Japanese sales manager of an Indian firm emphasizes, “We make 
business by meeting and listening to the client over and over.” This comment 
exemplifies the process of relationship building with Japanese firms. NASSCOM 
I go to the clients’ office and ask if there is anything for me. The 
client gives me information about a new project in he company. 
He suggest me to go and talk to such and such a person who is 
involved with the project, so I go and talk with them, and 
introduce our resources to them. This is how we arrange 
resources and do business. We have to understand clients’ 
implicit needs, and take a necessary initiative in advance before 
RFP comes up. 
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reports explain that, “Japanese clients often look towards the vendors to help them 
accurately define their requirements” (NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2008:54), yet it is difficult to do so. The process of informal hearing is connected to 
what Japanese companies refer to as tatakidai. Tatakidai refers to a working draft, a 
springboard for further discussion, and firms are expected to present a proposal that 
can be used by clients to further help meet their requir ments, yet writing a good 
proposal (or tatakidai) is difficult for a variety of reasons.  
 In the offices of the Indian software firms that I visited, sales managers and 
staff members were often pressed for time when making proposals, as they needed 
extra time for communicating and coordinating with their offshore center; a lack of 
time and coordination makes it difficult to write a strong proposal. I often heard 
from local Japanese personnel that they ended up rewriting and rephrasing the 
proposals made by the Indian sides so that they made sense to clients. This is not 
simply a matter of language; I was asked several times to check the translation of 
proposals, and often, the writing styles of the proposals had to be reformulated for 
Japanese clients, including both linguistic clarity and levels of politeness of the text. 
This requires knowledge of business registers specific to the Japanese context, and 
involves much more than simple technical translation. 
 The degree to which Japanese sales personnel rewrite the Indian sides’ 
proposals depends on how much time they have and the importance of a proposal. 
During my observation in the Japan office, a Japanese translator in the office was 
complaining that she has to translate a proposal with very short notice, and that some 
of the text was virtually impossible to understand. Some Indian firms use 
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professional translators or in-firm translation divis ons in India, and translators in 
both India and Japan divide work and reassemble texts later. However, this 
distribution and reassembly of work is also not without problems, and one of the 
translators interviewed stated that no one has the tim  to synthesize these 
translations in a coherent way. Analyzing this in-house division of labor shows the 
efforts made by personnel and the difficulties present, proving that such joint 
collaboration is not a seamless interface even thoug  it is supported and enabled by 
ICT networks.  
 
Gatekeepers and the Art of Tatakidai 
 Yamada, the manager of a Japanese firm who is involved in vendor selection, 
complains of a range of issues encountered when intrac ing with Indian firms. 
Although Yamada sees potential in the Indian software service industry and wants to 
learn from Indian firms about their business dealings with American clients, he also 
feels that Indian firms are difficult to use. Yamada therefore is keen on educating 
these firms on how to improve their client interface. On one hand, Yamada acts as a 
“supporter of Indian IT,” as an Indian sales executive describes him. However, he 
also functions as a gatekeeper who differentiates among, evaluates, and excludes 
vendors who do not match the profiles or potentials he is looking for. 
 Yamada commented that he is not happy with the proposals submitted by 
Indian firms, and showed me some of these proposals, comparing them with a “good 
one” written by a Japanese software service company. The proposal of the Japanese 
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company is filled with diagrams, tables, charts, andbullet-style short sentences; thus 
the main point is extremely easy to grasp, and everything is written in polite 
Japanese language. The Indian proposals look similar in their use of charts and tables, 
but everything is written in English, with no greeting page (except for one 
company’s) for the intended audiences.  
 Yamada states that “some of the presentations and proposals (of the Indian 
firms) are incomprehensible,” and he adds that there are no “positive surprises,” 
nothing besides what he already told the vendors. Yamada made calls to one of the 
Indian firms and explained why their proposals were rej cted. The Indian sales 
personnel who received the call appreciated his actions, because his feedback helped 
clarify what is expected of them. 
 
Summary  
 This chapter examined the engineer selection process and the collaborations 
and tensions between local Japan office managers and offshore Indian development 
managers. The selection process shows the collaborative efforts of both parties, and 
it also illuminates the arbitrariness of the “target resource,” which was shaped by 
various constraints, decided on as an outcome of compr mises and adjustments to 
the original target profile. 
 Aneesh (2006:42-43) states that “system-level” labor of IT programming 
can create a “universal medium of work,” with “delayered and flatter organizational 
structures” in his analysis based on US – India onsite offshoring. Yet the results of 
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this chapter suggest that specific, as opposed to generic, programmers are needed for 
concluding and winning business. Assisting the system migration of a 
pharmaceutical company requires legal as well as other knowledge of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry, and cannot be achieved by simply sending generic 
resources from offshore to Japan. Kimura’s frustration is directed at the lack of such 
resources. The indifferent attitude (felt by Kimura) of the head office reveals the 
difficulties of transnational placement businesses regarding the in-firm division of 
labor between Japan and India and the asymmetry of the head office and Japanese 
local office concerning who decides the allocation of resources.  
 In addition, this chapter illustrated boundaries for Indian sales managers in 
terms of ways of establishing long-term relations with sales managers in Japanese 
firms through informal interactions and improvisations. Yamada’s comments show 
that Indian sales managers are expected to learn Japanese rhythms of communication 
and small talk, using common frames of reference such as kawaita zookin when 
participating in meetings and in writing proposals.  
 The ways in which the engineers are placed on a price list compared and 
constructed using the man-month rates of other categori s such as in-house 
engineers and Japanese sub-contractors shows their current positions in the industry. 
The ways in which these offshore workers are placed in the same continuum with 
domestic workers suggests increasing global competition among IT workers, but the 
patches and disjunctions seen in the Japan-India offsh ring business also illustrates 
that global competition and penetration of the Japanese labor market are not easy or 
seamless even with the support of ICT. Many Japanese sales managers and staff 
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expressed a sense of frustration because of the division of labor. They are given little 
time to “translate” or adjust the proposal to take th message to clients.  
 Latour states that it is important to localize theglobal without losing sight of 
connectivity. The analysis of resource management in this chapter examines the 
connectivity between the global labor circulation of engineers through the local 
practice of labor management, and this chapter illustrates that such local practice is 
not an automatic seamless process as technological determinism suggests, but is an 
amalgam of compromise and practicalities.  
 At the beginning of the chapter, I presented Palash’s case as an extreme 
example of how engineers’ selection can be arbitrary, but I also discussed how he 
managed to overcome his exaggerated CV, and that he utilized the opportunity to 
learn for his own sake. He earned the trust of his colleagues and he is going to gain a 
pay raise again next month. Palash is sending money to his sister’s marriage in India, 
and Palash’s parents are coming over from India to visit him too. Palash was not an 
ideal candidate for the job based on his qualification, but an engineer’s learning 
process is also expected to some extent and tolerated in clients’ workplaces in the 
cases of Palash and Suda. The selection process of engine rs cannot be separately 
analyzed from engineers’ workplace issues. The next chapter will examine the 








Chapter VII  
Onsite Engineers’ Workplaces 
  
 “We can’t gain business without onsite engineers,” argues Furukawa, a 
sales manager of Garuda Soft. At the conference room at the Japan office of Garuda 
Soft, Furukawa and other sales managers are complaining to the head of the Japan 
office, arguing that they missed business opportunities because they could not find 
suitable bilingual onsite engineers who are required by the client in a timely manner 
and lost the client’s trust. Garuda Soft’s homepage states that they have a large 
number of bilingual engineers with high Japanese langu ge competency, but the 
managers complain that bilingual engineers are not available when needed. Many 
sales managers of Indian firms know only too well about the importance of onsite 
engineers to win a deal with Japanese firms. 
Like many other Indian firms, Garuda Soft has a corporate policy to “utilize 
offshore resources” rather than Japanese bilingual engineers because of cost 
considerations. Therefore, Garuda’s onsite engineers are mostly Indian engineers 
who have some level of Japanese proficiency. Onsite engineers contracted out to 
Japanese firms are also expected to bridge gaps and minimize discrepancies that 
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occur between clients and Indian firms.    
 Umed, an Indian project manager engineer in his early thirties, working in 
India for a Japanese firm, emphasizes the importance of having onsite coordinators 
in clients’ firms, because Umed has been struggling to communicate with the client 
without onsite engineers. Umed’s project used to have no liaison officers at the client 
side in Japan, and everything was communicated directly between the client and the 
offshore development center of his firm in India. Eventually, because of various 
difficulties and miscommunications, Umed’s firm decided to send some of their 
engineers “onsite,” to the client’s office as liaison officers. He states the problem as 
follows.  
 Umed emphasizes that onsite engineers cannot solveeverything, but they 
can overcome various communication issues. It is not just the case in Umed’s project. 
In many cases in Japan, software development is conducte  through informal 
face-to-face communications, and specifications are oft n not fixed in the initial 
stage but are formed during discussions and frequently changed during the execution 
stages; thus the liaison officer is often required for complex projects to manage 
communications and monitor ‘information sharing’ and the progress of a project.  
We had a big problem at telephone conference. We (cli nt and 
engineers in the Indian firm) can’t see each other. They (the 
Japanese clients) wanted to see. Japanese people like to see the 
picture, see the person, see face-to-face. Higher level of trust is 
established in face-to-face, lots of problem can be resolved if we 
have face-to-face meetings. If you just e-mail or just telephone 




These liaison officers are expected to broker information from the clients’ 
side to India and vice versa. They are placed in an ambiguous position, at the margin 
of the client’s firm and the Indian firm. Indian onsite engineers talk about the border 
lines, which are sometimes fixed and sometimes becom  visible when trying to cross 
them, as I will illustrate in this chapter. Sudheer, an Indian project manager who has 
five years of experience working with Japanese clients both onsite and offshore, 
states that he had to learn the hard way to work with his client in Japan, and that 
many of his colleagues do not realize how important small things are to Japanese 
business people, and that they can be magnified into seri us issues.  
Sudheer states that not everyone is capable of becoming an onsite engineer, 
who functions as a bridge between clients and Indian firms. He states technical 
things are very easy to learn, but non-technical skils are more difficult. Sudheer 
tries to educate young Indian engineers but “people do not believe me until they 
experience.” While Sudheer enjoyed friendships formed with the engineers in 
Japanese firms, and he appreciates their hospitality, he also felt that there is a 
boundary that should not be crossed, and if it is, there will be consequences. He 
witnessed one quiet Japanese engineer snaps and shouts at the Indian engineer Small 
issues such as cleanliness are taken as serious infractions of corporate codes, and 
reports such as “someone from Company X did this day at this time” may go to all 
the way to the top of the client company.  
 These cases point out why analyzing onsite engineers provides valuable 
insight into workplace issues, helps to illuminate not only how information is 
transferred but also why this transfer can be difficult, and it reveals tensions and 
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ways of creating boundaries in their workplaces.  
 
Theoretical Directions 
 Before examining onsite engineers’ work, I will briefly discuss previous 
literature of communication that impacted the direction of the analysis of this chapter. 
The importance of onsite engineers as mediators across geographically dispersed 
software development sites is discussed in various literature. Analyzing the role of 
onsite engineers reveals that offshoring cannot be automatically enabled via ICT, but 
that it involves complex mediations, and it problematizes the assumption that 
information-related “knowledge” work can be packaged and transferred to the most 
cost-effective destination, where the knowledge can then be reassembled.  
 Various studies show that offshoring requires time and effort for effective 
knowledge transfers, and that this is often not a seamless process: transferring 
client-specific knowledge frequently generates hidden costs and requires extra 
efforts to manage the information gap and cultural and organizational differences 
(Dibbern, et al. 2008; Lam 1997; Szulanski 1996). This is compounded when making 
implicit knowledge explicit in geographically separate spaces requires extra effort, 
both for clients and offshore employees (Leonardi anBailey 2008). In addition, it 
has been shown that knowing and learning are constructed through activity and 
practice (e.g., Lave 1988; Lave and Wenger 1991; Scribne  and Cole 1981). Making 
embedded, implicit knowledge explicit requires frequ nt communication and 
face-to-face interactions, and ‘sharing’ knowledge requires time for participants to 
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understand each other and is often influenced by the degree of proximity of those 
involved (Nicholson and Sahay 2004; Sahay, et al. 2003).  
 ICT provides the necessary infrastructure for connectivity, but insufficient 
conditions for participants to conduct intra-organizat onal collaborations. As Sahay, 
Nicholson, and Krishna (2003) state, the software development process, 
particularly in the offshoring context, is knowledge-intensive work, involving 
product-specific knowledge as well as linguistic, cultural, organizational, and 
national policies concerning immigration and labor laws. Work cannot be handled 
and completed simply as a sum of abstract rules and instructions. People often gain 
knowledge through informal communications and improvisations in their everyday 
interactions among peers (Gundaker 2007; Orr 1990; Rancière 1991; Varenne 2007). 
Various difficulties emerge when information needs to be transferred beyond 
immediate proximities and between those who are used to spontaneous and informal 
communications, because in these situations, people often rely on informal, 
undocumented memories of participants, and such memori s are assumed to be 
shared within the group.  
 Japanese software development is often pointed out as constructed through 
ad hoc, informal communications among participants, and such accumulations of 
experiences are difficult to articulate and to transfer to organizations in 
geographically dispersed places. Communication tends to be disrupted by difficulties 
at various levels: methodological, organizational, and societal. Such difficulties are, 
for instance, illustrated in Lam’s 1997 study of British and Japanese companies, 
where the Japanese approach focuses more on embedded practical knowledge, and 
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the British more on explicit and standardized documentation and formal training 
(Nicholson and Sahay 2004:333). Also, the relationship between Japanese and 
Indian software collaboration is analyzed in the dichotomous relations between the 
tacit knowledge-oriented Japanese side and the explicit methodology-oriented Indian 
side (Nicholson and Sahay 2004:333).  
 These difficulties are expected to be mitigated, and communication gaps are 
expected to be managed by the onsite engineers of Indian firms at the client site. 
Information and communication scholars argue that tose who can connect clients 
and Indian development centers and those who assure an effective information flow 
play a pivotal role in the success of offshoring (Gregory, et al. 2009; Levina and 
Vaast 2005; Sahay, et al. 2003). Gregory argues that onsi e coordinators (or “offshore 
middlemen”) act as boundary spanners and can bridge onsite gaps concerning 
development methodologies, working procedures, and other factors (Gregory, et al. 
2009; Mahnke, et al. 2008). These liaison officers are not only expected to ensure 
information flow, to bridge onsite information gaps between clients and offshore 
facilities, but also to function as “shock absorbers” (Sahay, et al. 2003), people who 
provide a sophisticated understanding of embedded knowledge and distribute it with 
careful monitoring.  
 However, some sales managers of Indian firms express caution and warn 
prospective customers not to have too high of expectations of “onsite engineers,” as 
these individuals do not function as all-mighty negotiat rs or problem solvers. 
Bridging gaps involves various difficulties, and engineers and other staff who 
function as coordinators struggle with client and vendor relations. Asymmetrical 
139 
 
expertise between clients and vendors always presents a danger of negatively 
affecting interactions. The emphasis of onsite engineers as mediators can be 
problematized when analyzing the difficulties and limitations they face. Sahay’s 
study shows that incompetent intermediaries can hinder and negatively affect 
client-offshore relations (Sahay, et al. 2003); they can function as information 
blockers and “gate-keepers” who not only facilitate, but also control and sometimes 
withhold information relating to the ways in which tey situate themselves in the 
social field. The role of such gate-keeping is highli ted in the analysis of third 
party consulting firms that function to coordinate offshore vendors. Third party 
consulting firms function, on one hand, to moderate gaps and mediate complications 
between clients and vendors (Mahnke, et al. 2008), yet they can also act as 
“knowledge blockers who prevent direct access to knwledgeable U.S. engineers” 
while coordinating workloads to route tasks and work progress (Leonardi and Bailey 
2008:432). 
 Furthermore, onsite-offshore relations can be analyzed in terms of practices 
that enact asymmetrical “status-differences.” Instead of analyzing collaborative 
strategies for information transfers, Metiu (2006) focuses on analyzing asymmetrical 
social boundaries between US-based engineers and offshore Indian engineers 
through participants’ voices and practices. Metiu ill strates an instance of US-based 
engineers (“high status group”) maintaining their pr vileged domain of work (dealing 
with high-end process) by excluding offshore Indian engineers, who are perceived to 
be socially beneath them, by using informal closure strategies such as refusing to 
interact and criticizing and depreciating offshore work, constructing an exclusionary 
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boundary, as in “status degradation ceremonies” (Garfinkel 1956), which Garfinkel 
defines as ceremonies to jointly construct someone’s social position in relation to a 
group. Metiu, however, adds that such status degradation is not necessarily stable 
and continues to be enacted through the everyday practices of offshoring. As 
Orlikowski argues, terms such as “knowledge” or “status” are not given, but rather 
enacted, made visible through daily practices (Orlikowski 2002).  
 When we talk about “knowledge,” there is always a question of whose 
knowledge it is that is produced, who has access to such knowledge, and who is 
excluded from it, and such questions often elucidate asymmetrical relationships in 
the division of labor in various situations, schools, workplaces—everywhere. Lave 
and Wenger (1991:76) show in their analysis of meat cutter apprenticeships that 
knowing and learning as apprentices become difficult when apprentices’ labor is 
used as commodified cheap labor and their exchange of labor for participation is 
blocked by gatekeepers and old timers. In the offshore c ntext, clients often refer to 
long-term offshore vendors as their strategic “partne s,” but it is argued that 
collaboration or partner relations in client-offshore relationships have to be analyzed 
in connection with a historical division of labor (Palm 2006).  
 The discourse of flattening the world may exemplify that ICT technology 
expands social mobility and opportunities across the globe. Yet there has been 
continuous boundary-making in the division of up-stream and low-end development 
processes (labor intensive and routine coding, testing, and maintenance). Transfer of 
work does not mean that all transferrable work goes offshore; the core and most 
valuable work is often kept within clients’ firms, and there is a continuous struggle 
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for offshore Indian workers to gain greater access to resources, to move up the 
“value chains.” Tension between clients and vendors is analyzed by Sahay et al. in 
their study of Indian – US offshoring. They found that North American clients 
wanted to minimize Indians onsite because they felt threatened, but Indians wanted 
to enter the US marketplace to get closer access to resources (Sahay, et al. 2003).  
 The analysis of onsite engineers’ labor in this andthe next chapters 
illustrates the efforts they make and difficulties they face, through which I aim to 
illuminate what is at stake. This chapter first briefly introduces the job of onsite 
engineers, and then it analyzes visible and invisible boundaries of their workplaces.  
 
Job of Bridging 
 The analysis here is based upon the interviews of onsite engineers I 
interviewed. Onsite engineers (or bridge engineers) mployed by Indian firms are 
sent to, and stationed in a client’s office in Japan during a project (or for some period 
during a project), and they are expected to play the pivotal role of mediating and 
coordinating both parties. 
 Below is an example of the ratio of onsite engineers working in various 
clients’ firms in Japan. This data was collected from the HR manager of a large 





Table 4 Ratio of onsite engineers in various Japanes  firms 
Client Firm Ratio of Onsite Engineers Working 
in Japan 
(in comparison with offshore 
engineers working in India) 
Company A 20% 
Company B 53% 
Company C 40% 
Company D 11% 
Company E 50% 
Company F 10% 
Average 16.4% 
 
 As seen in the table, the ratio of onsite engineers is diverse: some projects 
have half of their members onsite, while others, only 10%. (Not all onsite engineers 
function as liaison officers or coordinators, and there are programmers who only 
focus on coding without interacting with clients).  
 Onsite engineers can be either Indian or Japanese, d pending on the skills 
required for a project. However, Japanese onsite engin ers or coordinators are 
limited in number. Onsite engineers are mostly Indias in my research. In this paper, 
onsite engineers refer to Indian onsite engineers unless otherwise stated.  
 It is difficult to find those who understand both technology and the English 
language well enough to communicate with onsite India  engineers, as seen in the 
discussions of the sale managers of the Indian firm, so they are generally considered 
to be more costly than “utilizing offshore Indian resources.” Many firms train Indian 
engineers in India and send them to Japan. Some Indian onsite engineers do not have 
language skills, but many are expected to at least be able to understand basic 
conversations in Japanese. Some Japanese firms prefer to use English to avoid 
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miscommunications, and in such cases, Indian onsite engineers require no language 
skills; however, such cases are still limited. 
 
Understanding Requirements  
 I will summarize onsite engineers’ work based on the interviews that I 
conducted with them. Onsite engineers’ work depends on the project and the role 
they are expected to assume, but the following intends to give the readers an idea of 
common tasks that the onsite engineers described in the interviews. According to the 
onsite engineers I interviewed, their major tasks are: 1) to understand clients’ 
requirements, 2) to transfer their knowledge to offshore Indian workers and to 
enquire about clients issues that are not clear to offshore employees, and to 3) 
monitor and report the progress of projects and solve any problems.  
 In regard to the first task, an Indian onsite engineer with five years of 
experience comments, “You have to understand what clients want, more than what 
you can give. You need to understand their aspect, their expectations. Once you 
understand that, you can communicate with offshore.”  
 Indian engineers offshore who are used to structured development process 
based on fixed specifications and experiences working with US clients often find it 
difficult to deal with the ways of working required by many Japanese firms; they 
have to deal with ambiguous specifications and frequent changes that occur in the 
course of development, even when a deadline is looming. Frequent changes create 
extra work for the Indian side, and the Japanese sid  (often the primary contractor) is 
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generally reluctant to change their original schedul because they are already 
committed to the user company. Japanese clients often prefer vendors who help 
define their requirements, thus a requirement analysis is often conducted onsite.  
 Some projects have translators, but if not, communications with Japanese 
clients are conducted using a mixture of English and Japanese, and both parties use 
drawings and diagrams to clarify ideas. One Indian engineer expresses these 
collaborative efforts as a“let’s work out together” type of process.  
 
Problems surrounding ‘Knowledge Transfer’  
 Onsite engineers send clients’ requirements offshore by e-mail or phone, and 
develop ways to make sure that the ‘information transfer’ is transparent to both 
parties using remote conferencing facilities (in some cases, offshore engineers visit 
clients’ sites and gather requirements, then go back and complete their work 
offshore.) 
 Sharing information between clients and software developers offshore is not 
necessarily easy, even between those who share the sam  language, and 
miscommunication is a constant issue, while implicit knowledge, taken for granted 
information, and assumptions become a problem. The issue becomes paramount 
when it involves various other factors: linguistics, organization, and geographical 
distances. Kaneko, an engineer from a Japanese firm states that:  
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 From clients’ perspectives, providing detailed instructions are 
time-consuming, and thus onsite engineers are often expected to fill in any gaps 
between clients and offshore. After sending information, onsite engineers receive 
queries from offshore for further clarification and the elimination of ambiguities. 
Often it is not possible to understand requirements the first time, and unclear points 
are further discussed at meetings between onsite engin ers and clients.  
 There are many queries sent from offshore, and onsite engineers are 
expected to organize information. Some onsite engineers prioritize queries for their 
clients who do not have enough time to answer all the queries. Nidhi, an experienced 
onsite engineer commented as follows, “My clients don’t have time for answering 
petty questions, so I try to find solutions for the cli nt, and confirms with him if it is 
correct or not. It is like a routine…not so difficult.” Nidhi has five years of 
experience in Japan, and it is part of his daily routine to monitor information flow 
and to check if there is any problem, but he also felt it was difficult to do so when he 
just arrived at the client firm. When Nidhi started working onsite, he was very shy 
and was reluctant to ask questions. He states, “Slowly the relationship grows and 
you understand what his (clients’) expectations are.”  He feels that he has learnt how 
to be an onsite coordinator by learning from senior engineers, observing the way 
they handle queries and how they interact with clients. Nidhi also made friends with 
Engineers (of Japanese firms) make assumptions such as 1 plus 1 
equals 2, therefore this is obvious, but such an assumption is not 
shared with Indian onsite and offshore engineers. What is 
obvious to us (the client firm) is not obvious to them (the Indian 
side). We need to write things that are obvious to us. 
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young Japanese engineers, which helped him to better understand the client 
workplace.  
 An onsite engineer’s job is not just to communicate with clients; they need 
to make sure that the information they send is understood offshore. One engineer 
states, “You need to be good at communication both wi clients and with offshore.” 
Sometimes information given to offshore sites is overwhelming, and the offshore 
side pretends that they understand, then at a later stage, they realize the requirements 
cannot be met as planned. Onsite coordinators are exp cted, by the client side, to 
monitor project progress offshore and report the situat on to the client side without 
delay. This issue will be examined in the next chapter in more detail. 
 Sometimes language becomes a barrier and clients gt irritated when their 
messages are not understood by onsite engineers. Many companies specify that they 
require “bilingual engineers” who speak at least basic Japanese, and request 
engineers obtain a basic level Japanese language proficiency certificate before they 
are sent to Japan. Some Japanese firms that intend to expand their market share 
globally prefer to interact in English, but many prefer to interact in Japanese with a 
mixture of English. Both parties often use drawings and diagrams to clarify their 
points. This is a very common skill pointed out by many o site engineers, 
particularly those who are involved in embedded technology (software embedded as 
part of a device such as cell phones). I saw in an Indian firm, an onsite engineer, 
Shashi, drawing a picture while talking with his client over the phone. After the 
phone call, Shashi carefully checked the picture, faxed it to the client, and called the 
client to confirm his understanding with the client. Shashi then scanned the drawing 
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in PDF format, and sent it to offshore. As in Shashi’s case, using visual materials is 
considered to be useful for both Japanese clients and for Indian engineers, and this 
“analogue communication skill,” as one engineer put it, is commonly used between 
Indian and Japanese engineers to make themselves und rstood to each other.  
 In addition, if necessary, translators are also hired for meetings. Although 
many engineers in this research study speak basic conversational Japanese, the 
majority often have difficulty reading Japanese, so language support is provided by 
some companies so that documents are sent to a translatio  department at an offshore 
Indian development center and translated into English.  
 Furthermore, bilingual Japanese coordinators are sometimes hired to join a 
team of onsite engineers to coordinate client-vendor relations. These are the various 
measures taken by Indian firms to overcome linguistic barriers. “Language is not the 
biggest factor,” said many Indian onsite engineers in th s research. Understanding 
the Japanese language is a big asset for Indian onsite engineers, but what is more 
important for them is the broader communication skill  that can mitigate sensitive 
situations that arise. I will discuss this issue further in the following section. 
  
Being “Buffers” in Sensitive Situations 
 Pandita, an experienced Indian project manager, holds that Indian onsite 
engineers need to stay calm when a problem arises, stating,  
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Pandita states that language skills matter, but that the way in which onsite 
engineers explain situations to the client, with logical and concise manners based on 
evidence, is more important than fluency in language. Pandita’s view is shared by 
many other engineers too. One engineer explains two skills as particularly important: 
one is “analogue communication” (explanation using concise drawings), as 
mentioned in the last section, but Pandita also added that “digital communication” 
(logic based on numbers) is crucial. He explains that it is important to avoid vague 
and evasive expressions and to specify reasons in a logical manner. Uday, the senior 
engineer mentioned in Chapter IV explains this digital communication skill based on 
his own experience with his client, Oda. Oda is a tough negotiator, and Uday feels 
tense when he has to explain problem of his projects to Oda,  
Uday admires Oda, and he states that the way Oda questions Uday trains him to 
prepare and make a through preparation before reporting to clients. Uday’s 
explanation reveals that the “digital communication skill” is not simply a matter of 
We need to be calm. He is our client, so we cannot be angry. We 
have to show some smile. That is the only solution. If one party 
is angry, the other party should be calm. He is our client. He is 
paying money, and we shouldn’t be angry with him. 
“Oda asks lots of questions, and he grills me. If I don’t prepare, 
and if can’t explain logically, he snaps out...... it is crucial to 
figure out what he will want to know, and prepare for it. Prepare 
and collect evidence to support my reasoning...... because Oda 
looks for a plausible explanation for himself, because he also has 
to explain it to his boss, and what I explain, my excuse,...if it is 
logical enough.....My explanation becomes his...his explanation.” 
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logic, but it is the particular logic that is required for information to go through the 
chain of reporting in the Japanese firm, and it has to be presented in the way that can 
be approved by Oda and Oda’s boss. This issue of “digital communication skill” also 
comes up later in the discourse of offshore engineers, and will be examined in 
Chapter X.  
 Another issue is that these onsite engineers are sometimes caught between 
the clients and their firms in India when a problem arises, so they need to develop 
strategies to avoid conflicts in advance. Project delays cause tension between clients 
and offshore sites. Rishi, an Indian senior onsite engineer, states that he always has a 
“buffer period” between the client offshore deadlines, stating, “Even if his or her 
colleagues or boss on the Indian side says that he or she can deliver it tomorrow, it is 
better to add one extra day when informing client.” Yet Rishi also states that he 
recently stopped “buffering” for offshore to educate offshore engineers, so that they 
now need to stick to deadlines no matter how busy the are. Rishi states that he 
wants to make them realize what is at stake when working with Japanese clients. 
Rishi states, “Sometimes they have to learn the hardw y.” (This issue of buffering 
will be examined in Chapter VIII.) 
 Being onsite helps establish rapport with a client. Many onsite engineers in 
this research state that they were treated well in clients’ offices and were provided 
help and support for their work. Engineers’ expression  about Japanese clients are 
surprisingly uniform, and common expressions to describe them are “polite,” 
“formal,” “serious,” “cooperative,” “hard-working,” “productive,” and “focused.” 
Although there is a language barrier, many still state hat the Japanese side is helpful. 
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Rishi who spent four years in Japan states that he was treated with respect in Japan 
while never was in other countries, and that he felt h  wanted to reciprocate to his 
clients’ hospitality.  
 Many Indian onsite engineers in this research state that being onsite is a 
valuable experience to help them understand the Japanese clients’ ways of working, 
and they can see “local thinking from the customer’s side.” Many mention that their 
work became much easier after seeing a client’s work environment, talking to clients 
face-to-face, and establishing rapport (although the degree varies depending on the 
relations). Many state that face-to-face meetings and proximity with clients in a 
workplace environment help them to develop an understanding of ways of working 
in their clients firms, which is useful after going back to India and working for the 
same client from offshore. Many also state that they are nervous until trust is 
established, but once their clients know their working styles, they feel more 
comfortable. Sharat, an onsite engineer, states that his clients test him until he gains 
their trust, but after Sharat demonstrates his understanding of his work and some 
level of trust is established between him and the client, things become easier.  
 The importance of proximity in interacting with Japanese clients is felt 
strongly from the offshore side as well. Pratik, an Indian senior manager who works 
in an offshore Indian development center in India, st tes that the physical distance 
between clients and offshore sites becomes a serious iss e when something serious 
happens. Pratik finds it much easier to fly to Japan and have a face-to-face meeting 
with a client when situations get very serious. Pratik states that, “They may shout for 
some time, but in the end they agree if the reason i presented properly and logically, 
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so we have to go every time.” 
 
Mismatch and Frustrations 
 Face-to-face interaction and proximity helps encourage communication 
between clients and onsite engineers. However, Bhuvan, an Indian executive 
manager of an Indian firm, points out that there is a mismatch between these 
experienced Japanese engineers, based on long-term employment and a seniority 
wage system, and these young Indian engineers with only a few years of experience. 
The average age of Indian engineers is 28, and they oft n work with Japanese 
engineers with years of experience, because, in many large Japanese firms, 
long-term employment is still the norm, and there is much less intra-firm mobility in 
the labor market compared to the high attrition rate of the Indian software labor 
market. Bhuvan states that expectations are different on both sides; many Japanese 
engineers will retire from the same company, whereas Indian engineers will look for 
new technology to learn and want to have many varied work experiences. Onsite 
engineers and offshore managers are aware that the Japanese side sometimes feels 
frustrated. One engineer states: 
Our engineers (on the Indian side) have only a couple of years’ 
experience. The clients want to use their experienced resources 
for the next generation product development, but they can’t 
because they have taken so much of their time for explaining 
their requirements to us in details. They need to make detailed 
documents and have to answer queries from offshore. 
Acceptance testing takes up a lot of time too. 
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 Many Indian onsite engineers in this research are aware of this client 
expectation and state that they have much less experi nc  compared with their 
clients, so that it is difficult to catch up. One Indian onsite engineer commented: 
 Samir, an Indian project manager offshore explains that Japanese engineers 
are more “people-dependent,” and while experienced engineers have accumulated 
practical know-how in their head, they do not want to spend time contextualizing it 
and transferring their knowhow, because they do not change jobs. On the other hand, 
Indian engineers are more “process oriented,” and they rely on documentation, 
extracting knowledge from experts and distilling it into textual form. 
 
Seating Arrangements: Visible and Invisible Boundaries 
 Many onsite Indian engineers in this research state that being onsite is a 
great learning experience, but that it also means that engineers are always seen and 
evaluated by clients directly and indirectly. Although they are important team 
members needed to make a project successful, they are also sent from external 
organizations, and there are thus visible and invisble boundaries embedded in their 
workplaces. 
 Instances of how Indian engineers are perceived in Japanese firms can be 
I am 27, and my supervisor in the client office is 40. Our team 
leader is 37. There is a difference. Japanese engineers have been 
working for the same product for years. He knows that. He 
knows it is difficult for us…But my client sometimes gets really 
irritated. He gets annoyed when I don’t understand ask 
questions. He is always busy. He doesn’t have time to xplain. 
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seen in their seating arrangements. As mentioned earlier, Japanese software 
development is often conducted as a collaboration between a prime-contracting firm 
and subcontracting firms, and foreign vendors such as Indian and Chinese firms 
often find themselves in the second lower outside ter (NASSCOM and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). Based on the industry hie archy, boundaries between 
“inside” and “outside” are sometimes drawn, but such boundaries disappear in other 
contexts.  
 It must be noted that contractors, whether they are from a Japanese firm or 
from a foreign firm, can be categorized into two types: one is haken (contractors 
whose payment is based on time) and the other is ukeoi (project-based contractors). 
The difference between haken and ukeoi is that haken work under the instruction of 
the company they are dispatched to and their work is hourly-based. This means the 
longer they work, the more they receive in payment. O the other hand, ukeoi are 
compensated for the project outcomes, not for the amount of time they spend on 
projects. Companies pay for the final product or servic , and the subcontractors are 
supposed to be independent from the consigners’ direct control. Ukeoi workers are 
more vulnerable to exploitation because they may be forced to work for long hours 
with no wages; thus these workers are protected by law to prevent exploitation by 
the firms they are dispatched to. Consigner companies’ exploitations and direct 
control of ukeoi workers was scrutinized by the media in recent years. It i  
recommended by law that ukeoi contractors do not share the same workspace as the 
regular employees of the consigner company, in order to avoid direct control. 
Companies that are concerned with legal issues thus try to separate ukeoi workers 
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from regular employees, and this can be seen in the Indian engineers’ seating 
arrangements. 
 However, Japanese software development often requir s frequent 
face-to-face communications among those who are involved, and it is practical for 
engineers to work in proximity for communication pur oses. It had thus been a 
customary practice that consigner company engineers and h ken and ukeoi workers 
stay in the same workplace, and companies who are indifferent of legal implications 
continue to utilize mixed seating arrangements, keeping Indian engineers in the same 
workspaces as Japanese workers.  
 This section examines how Indian onsite engineers are placed in various 
Japanese offices, and the voices of the engineers situated in such spaces. Also, it 
must be noted that the term “Japanese firm” is problematic considering the diversity 
of company sizes and differences in domains. This section examines an instance of 
the ways in which Indian engineers are situated in various Japanese large-scale 
manufacturing firms and their software subsidiaries, but it by no means intends to 
generalize the practices of Japanese firms. Rather, i  aims to illustrate some of the 
instances of tensions observed in the workplaces investigated. 
 
Invisible Boundaries 
 First, a situation is presented in which Indian engineers are working at a 
prime-contractor’s office. This is based on the drawing made by an Indian engineer, 
Arun. The firm Arun works with is Tech Takeda, a large-scale software subsidiary of 
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a Japanese manufacturing company. The floor arrangement shows (see Figure 7) that 
the left side is occupied by full-time engineers of Tech Takeda. The middle to the 
right half is occupied by Japanese subcontractors, while Arun and other Indian 








Figure 7. Seating arrangement in Tech Takeda 
 When asked what the line in the middle referred to, Arun stated that this was 
an “invisible line” that he feels he cannot cross. Arun and other Indian engineers 
used to sit with the other engineers side by side, but the seating arrangement changed 
some years ago. It is presumed that this change in sating arrangement involved the 
legal considerations discussed earlier concerning ukeoi contractors. 
 The people sitting next to these engineers are now Japanese subcontractors 
who are called kyooryoku geisha san (partner company people). Based on Arun’s 
observations, these Japanese subcontractors are “those who have long relationship 
with the client.” Arun explains, “They are actually the same as the regular employees, 
but they are sent to subcontracting firms to reduce cost for maintaining regular 
employees (in the parent firm).”  
 Indian onsite engineers in Tech Takeda have regular meetings with their 










go to their Japanese clients’ desks and discuss urgent matters. Although Indian 
engineers sit separately from regular Japanese employees, they are visible on the 
floor, and their behavior is watched at times. Their working hours are not fixed, yet 
there is an unspoken code of behavior that dictates th ir arrival time range as 
between 10:30 and 10:45, and Ramesh, an Indian onsite engineer states that he feels 
unspoken pressure when he comes late: “No one says anything, but I can just feel it.” 
 Although the time to go home is not directly controlled, it is affected by the 
client side’s engineers work long hours in-office, often until midnight, because the 
Indian onsite engineers also need to attend meetings a d respond to clients requests 
after regular working hours. Some Indian onsite engineers complain that Japanese 
engineers hold meetings at 8:00 p.m. to gain overtime wages. Being ukeoi workers 
(project-based worker), Indian onsite engineers do not have to comply with clients’ 
requests, in theory, but in reality, they have to be in the office if their clients have 
questions or set up meetings because they are “service providers.” Also, when a 
deadline is approaching, engineers often work until midnight. Onsite engineers feel 
subtle and indirect pressure to work overtime from their clients’ casual remarks as, 
“your engineers come late in the morning, so work hard tonight.”  
 Indian engineers in this firm are placed on different floors. Many state that 
Japanese clients are “kind,” “supportive,” and “cooperative.” Engineers’ interactions 
with Japanese clients vary from limited interactions with a few clients, to multiple 
contact persons. One states the following, 
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 However, those who work for a company for a longer p riod—more than 
just a couple of months—often accumulate both lingustic proficiency and 
interactional experiences. The more senior they becom, the more projects they are 
given, and thus these engineers learn to interact with multiple contact persons at the 
client site. Babu, an Indian engineer in his early thirties with more than three years 
of experience working in Tech Takeda, states that he interacts with “the third-floor 
people” and “the fourth-floor people.” Babu has no issues interacting with “the 
third-floor (Japanese) people” because he has established trust and good relations 
with them, but Babu has problems working with “the fourth-floor (Japanese) people” 
because Babu had problems in past projects, and thus has difficult relations with 
Fukuda, the Japanese manager in his fifties, on the fourth floor. Babu feels unable to 
talk to Fukuda directly; therefore he usually talks to the manager via Machida, a 
young Japanese engineer who understands the situation better. Babu states his 
struggles as follows: 
I only know my contact person. I don’t know anyone else. We 
had a welcome party, but I talked with Tanaka san and Yamada 
san. I don’t know the rest. All I see is what they do every day. 
Very quiet and serious.  
I don’t talk with Fukuda san (project manager) directly. We have 
a young guy, Machida san, in between, and he functio s as a 
mediator…Machida san says that the project manager do sn’t 
understand this, so please explain this point. Fukuda san is strict 
and I don’t want to talk to him…I wanted to talk to Fukuda san 
once or twice, but it seemed he didn’t want to talk to me. Maybe 
it is difficult to talk directly to me, so he sends someone to ask 
me a question. 
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 Babu is afraid of Fukuda who is strict in regard to work and intimidating, 
asking many questions. It is difficult for him to talk to Fukuda unless he prepares 
clear answers supported with data. Babu feels that he wants to talk to Fukuda 
directly to negotiate, but he is afraid that it is risky to do so: “I’m in trouble. I don’t 
know what to do. I want to talk to him directly, but it is dangerous. It is difficult. It’s 
better to have a Japanese in-between who understands our work.”   
 Babu is also afraid of Fukuda because he was accused of being a liar in the 
past. Babu felt uncontrollable anger at the time and left the office, called his 
manager at the offshore site in India, said “I can’t work.” Babu was eventually 
persuaded to go back to the client office the next day, but he still finds it difficult to 
deal with Fukuda. “He (Fukuda) apologized, he went too far, and I was wrong too. I 
didn’t know my work,” he recalls. Nonetheless, the trus  level is still low between 
Fukuda and Babu, and no direct channel of communication has been established. 
Babu’s work in Tech Takeda is generated through an amalgam of interactions with 
various individuals and groups of people, which he calls “the third-floor people,” as 
well as “the fourth-floor people,” with a difficult project manager and a young 
Japanese engineer in-between. In addition, the level of trust established varies in 
relations and is controlled by a project manager whois skeptical of their work. 
 
“We are inseparable” 
 The next pattern is a mixed seating arrangement of regular Japanese 













Niraji Deepak Japanese 
engineer 
Figure 8. Mixed seating arrangement in Sugimoto Soft 
 The arrangement in Figure 8 shows four regular Japanese employees and 
two Indian contractors, Niraji and Deepak, dispatched from an Indian software 
service company, Kamal Softwares, who sit together as one team. In this 
configuration, Niraji and Deepak are under the direct supervision of a Japanese 
manager, Kaneko. They are expected to report if they come late to the office in the 
morning, and the company has a whiteboard where everyon  writes their working 
hours by writing “in” or “out” when they arrive or leave, respectively, and Niraji and 
Deepak are expected to follow this same reporting system. Niraji and Deepak 
mentioned that they did not understand why this reporting was necessary in the first 
place. In the offshore Indian development center thy worked in, the time worked 
was recorded, but it was not necessary to make the “ins” and “outs” of their 
whereabouts visible. Therefore, initially in this company, they did not report to the 
Japanese manager Kaneko when they were late, or when going out of the office to 
run errands. They learnt the system by being warned by the manager several times, 
until they adapted to and obeyed the company rules.  
 Yamazaki, a Japanese manager of the Indian firm that employs Niraji and 
Deepak, states that this kind of mixed seating arrangement is a “legally grey zone,” 
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but that many companies still use this type of practice out of necessity, without being 
aware of the appropriateness of direct control over th  workers. This form of control 
by the Japanese firm is, however, not negatively received by the two Indian 
engineers. This is considered a convenient arrangement for the Indian engineers too, 
because they can ask questions and communicate with Japanese staff easily. Niraji 
however states, “This is easier to work. Our manager sits next to us, so we can 
interact easily. We have to make appointment to see our manager in India. This is 
much more practical and easy going.”  
 The seating arrangement is considered to be practical g ven the need for 
communication as a team. At the same time, however, th  Indian engineers comment 
that they are surprised to see the intensity of the work in the office, and the office’s 
productivity. Offshore Indian development centers generally uses cubicle desks to 
provide some level of privacy to their workers, but the offices they work in have 
open spaces without partitions or cubicles. It is ea y to talk, to communicate with 
others, but Niraji and Deepak have less privacy. Some Indian onsite engineers 
commented that they do not like open-type seating arrangements due to the lack of 
privacy, as they can be seen e-mailing or heard talking to their friends over the phone. 
Praveen, an Indian engineer who is placed in a similar setting complained that he is 
constantly called by his supervisor to work as an interpreter for telephone 
conferences with the overseas subsidiary offices, and he has to sit next to this 
supervisor all the time because his Japanese co-worker needs him as a translator as 
well as an engineer. Praveen had to be with the Japanese manager at night meetings 
with global teleconferences, and if the conferences did not go smoothly, Praveen was 
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blamed.   
 
Is this India? 
 The third pattern in Figure 9, below, shows an India  onsite team placed in a 
room, separated from full-time Japanese employees in a large Japanese 
manufacturing company, Okaya. In this case, all India  workers are placed in a 
separate building for external vendors, both Japanese and foreign. The Indian firm, 
Lakshmi Softech, rents a room in this building, and work is conducted in this room, 
with thirty Indian engineers inside. This is not a prctical arrangement for the client 
side engineers, because they have to walk to this building every time they want to 
communicate with the Indian vendors.  
 
（Building assigned for external organizations） 
Room assigned to the Lakshmi Softech 
onsite team 
 
Room assigned to a Chinese vendor 
 




Figure 9. Seating arrangement in Okaya 
 In this situation, engineers are instructed to wear a shirt or a jacket with 
their Indian company’s logo (Lakshmi Softech) so that t ey can be distinguishable 
from other vendors and from regular employees of Okaya. From the clients’ points of 
view, this is an easy way to visualize who is working where and to control where 
they can enter and where they cannot. Hamada, a Japanese sales manager of Lakshmi 
Softech states that the client side (Okaya) sees the door to this space as a “magic 
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warping door to India”:  
 However, this type of isolated space is not necessarily independent from 
Okaya. The Indian engineers of Lakshmi Softech live near the Okaya factory 
compound and commute by company bus. Because the factory and offices are 
located in an isolated area, the Indian engineers’ work schedule is shaped by the 
corporate bus schedule, and the Indian engineers have been warned several times not 
to come late for the bus. Also, they are, similar to other software engineers, driven 
by project deadlines, and thus have to stay and work at the office in Okaya until late 
at night or on weekends to complete their projects. Engineers of Okaya come at any 
time, so the Lakshmi Softech engineers have to be prepared and organized. Suresh, 
an Indian project leader of the Lakshmi Softech states that they are often scrutinized 
over trivial issues such as leaving trash on their d sks, and such small things escalate 
to their top management level.  
 As observed in one specific case, isolated spaces can even become abusive. 
In one particular case, ten Indian onsite engineers were placed in a small rented 
apartment near the Japanese clients’ office. The apartment was in neglected 
condition, and it was extremely small. The Indian engineers, both young female and 
From clients’ (Okaya’s) point of view, this room is already 
offshore. This room is India…Open the door, and it is India for 
them, but it happens to be situated in Japan, so they can come in 
do bits and pieces of work, and go back to their office. So they 
don’t control working regulations. Clients who provide a 
separate room like this understand the difference between 
‘haken’ (hourly paid workers) and ‘ukeoi’ (project-based 
workers), and they are different from those clients who don’t 
have such understanding. 
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male engineers mostly in their twenties, were put toge her in this extremely small 
apartment room packed with desks and chairs. The room was filthy, the workers’ 
motivations were low, and they were exhausted from working from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. 
every day—even on weekends. On top of this, they had to commute for one and a 
half hours each day. Finally, two Indian female engineers asked the Japanese client 
to change the workplace, and two months later, they w re placed in the clients’ office, 
separated from the rest of the team; however, communication was more difficult 
because of the distance within the team. 
 
Two Business Cards 
 The cases discussed so far show relations between Indian contractors and 
their Japanese clients’ firms, and in these cases, th y were all able to show their 
corporate identities. However, it is often the case that the firm that the Indian firms 
work for are not the end user company, but they are prime contracting firms that 
work for their user company. Sometimes Japanese prime-contractor companies send 
Indian onsite engineers to their clients’ offices without telling the clients that these 






Figure 10. Chains of subcontracting 
Client Firm 
Prime-contract




 Figure 10 shows the connection between the three parties—the Indian 
vendor (second contractor) to the prime contractor, and from there, the user company. 
Indian subcontractors go to the clients’ office with the business cards of a 
prime-contracting company and act as employees of the Japanese prime contracting 
company. Indian onsite engineers have to disguise their corporate identities and 
pretend that they are from a prime contracting firm. 
 For instance, Ashok, an Indian engineer who works for a medium-scale 
Indian computer service firm, Ram Softech, showed me two business cards: one with 
the name of his Indian firm, and the other with thename of the Japanese prime 
contractor, Softech Tokyo, and asked which one I prefer d. Due to limited language 
competency, Ashok had to work with another Indian translator and was told not to 
speak to the user company personnel because, “it will cause misunderstanding.”  
Table 5. Flow of work 
User company 
↓ 
Japanese engineer from a prime contracting firm, Softech Tokyo 
↓ 
Indian translator  
↓ 
Ashok (employed by the Indian company, Ram Softech) 
 In this situation (shown in Table 5), although Ashok is working directly for 
the user company, the Indian firm (Ram Softech) does not have direct visibility 
within the user company. Also, Ashok is controlled by a prime contracting firm 
(Softech Tokyo) and a translator, and his access to the user company is tightly 
controlled. Ashok states that he has to learn Japanese to gain more access to the user, 
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because from Ashok’s point of view, the Indian transl tor who works between the 
user company and Ashok tends to get all the credit for his work while Ashok is the 
one blamed when a problem occurs. Another issue is documentation. Ashok is asked 
to make records of his work, but the records containing Ashok’s expertise all go to 
the prime contracting firm, Softech Tokyo, disembedded from him to the prime 
contractor. As Upadhya analyzes, documentation can function as a means to de-skill 
workers (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). Ashok is concerned with this documentation, 
and states the following: “I was famous when I first came over to Japan. I was 
someone specialized in this…and I had a lot of work. But now they (Softech Tokyo) 
have stolen my knowhow and their (Japanese) engineer s doing my work.” 
 Ashok also has mixed feelings towards Japanese coworkers from the user 
company. He says they are “kind” and “supportive,” but when he came into the 
office for the first time, he saw the peculiar glances that passed among them. Ashok 
interpreted this as a sign of jealousy, because he heard a rumor that someone was 
fired and replaced by him. Ashok is better paid for his work than regular Japanese 
workers because it is a temporary project. During the interview, Ashok’s wife says, 
“of course, I would also hate to see our jobs are stolen from India.” Ashok’s actions 
are observed by other Japanese workers in the user company, and he is scrutinized 
for his constant use of cell phones in the workplace, and has been told he will be 
fired if he uses the phone again.  
 One of the issues that Ashok experienced was his lack of language 
competency. Because of this lack of language, Ashok could not manipulate the 
controlling and panoptical environment for his own benefit. Krishna, on the other 
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Figure 11. Krishna’s seating arrangement at a client-vendor meeting 
 Krishna made this diagram (Figure 11) to describe a client-vendor meeting 
held at the user company. Krishna works in a similar environment as Ashok, and he 
also disguises his corporate identity as an engineer of a prime contracting company. 
Krishna, however, has a good command of Japanese, and communicates with 
Japanese coworkers and clients without problems. In this meeting, there were two 
engineers attending from the prime contractor, and Krishna was sitting next to them. 
The difference in this situation was that Krishna directly talks with the user 
company’s Japanese manager, Hamada, and explains his work, so he can take all the 
credit for himself. Krishna is collaborating, but also competing with other Japanese 
subcontractors in this situation. Furthermore, Krishna secretly told Hamada that he is 
actually an engineer for a subcontracting Indian firm, and he assures Hamada that if 
there is any problem, the prime contracting firm will be responsible. Krishna gains 
credit for his work and establishes rapport with this manager by telling the truth, 
while at the same time, he undermines the credibility of the prime contractor by 
letting Hamada know that they are using a foreign vedor. 
 


















Work from Office to Private Space 
 Sometimes, engineers have to work at home as well.Ganga works on a 
maintenance project for a large Japanese bank, Suga, and he is placed in a different 
section on the same office floor as the first case. His team is instructed not to talk to 
the client side engineers of Suga Bank directly, but Ganga does not know the reason 
for this instruction.  
 However, his maintenance work requires communication with the client 
firm during weekends as well. During my interview, Ganga had to pick up the 
clients’ calls many times. Ganga’s conversation with the client manager was as 
follows: 
Ganga states that the client side should do the work themselves, but the 
telephone queries do not stop; the engineers are exp cted to work long hours on 
weekends. He, however, states that he must work hard because he gets paid a lot and, 
this work what the client pays for, yet he is paid much less compared to his Japanese 
colleagues, who do the same work, and wishes he spoke Japanese and could change 
his job.  
 
Please don’t ask me to work on Saturdays and Sundays 
(laugh)…Come on, you know the password…you can log in. You 
can log in, no problem. You can ask the data center guy and log 
in. Just log in and ....., simple. Come on, what is thi ? Yes, yes, 
yes…OK…Suda-san is supporting this, and I twice called him 




 The previous section discussed how engineers are situated in various 
workplaces in Japan as project based contract workers, but the question remains how 
engineers view this work control by Japanese firms. The issues analyzed in the 
following section are common themes that emerged from engineers’ interviews. 
These issues have considerable overlap with a memo made by experienced onsite 
engineers employed by a large Indian software service company, Ganga Software 
Solutions, for newly arrived engineers. This memo consists of practical advice on 
how to live and work in Japan, and part of it reflects experiences concerning 
corporate control in large-scale Japanese workplaces. Sudheer, who I introduced at 
the beginning of this chapter, and other engineers comment that the issues raised in 
the memo capture the common issues they experienced. Th refore, in this section, 
engineers’ views are analyzed using both their voices and the engineers’ memo.  
 The memo contains various topics, and one theme is the r actions on the 
clients’ premises. The memo instructs onsite engineers not to raise any unnecessary 
suspicion from the client. It states that the India engineers “should stick to places 
allowed for them and should not go and explore the client’s premises.” As discussed 
earlier, many Japanese firms are concerned with the protection of IP, and such 
caution was also seen in the seating arrangements in the previous section.  
 Security varies in different companies, and some are more relaxed than 
others, but engineers’ interviews suggest that there are areas, at least in some 
companies, in which foreign vendors are excluded or are allowed to enter only with 
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supervision. Sudeep, an Indian onsite engineer working in a Japanese firm, Kyosaka 
Soft, states that he was not allowed to enter certain zones in his workplace although 
other Japanese subcontractors were, and that he always needed someone to 
accompany him to enter certain zones.  
 The memo also states that “your behavior is observed by the Japanese client 
although he doesn’t express his views openly. He will share it in a formal manner 
later.” As seen in the earlier section, Indian onsite engineers are scrutinized not only 
for their work, but also their time management, andworkplace rules need to be 
followed, such as keeping the premises clean. Rule breaking can be easily reported 
to top management. The memo explains, “A rule is established after careful study of 
the situation and after collaborative approval. After that everyone is expected to 
follow it religiously.”  
 Furthermore, the memo also states that the Japanese firms report to senior 
management, not to Indian engineers directly, and therefore “one should not take 
him (Japanese clients) for granted and talk in any other than official language of 
communication.” Reporting small issues to upper management is a form of control 
by client firms. Some engineers on the Indian side state that they are worried about 
such “escalations” (reporting to upper management), because they may affect their 
evaluations from the Indian management side. Prabhat, one of the engineers laments 
that he experienced “escalation,” and complains jokingly about his Japanese client 
stating, “Please don’t talk to my boss, but talk to me. It affects my appraisal.” 
Another engineer says that they are constantly compared with other foreign vendors 
by their client and told, “Other vendors are following rules, and why can’t you do 
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it?” In this way, pressure is placed on their shoulders, not only in the way they 
develop software, but also in regard to their behavior on the company premises.  
 Also, the memo states that they should not use a langu ge that the clients do 
not understand. Pradeep, an Indian onsite engineer working in a Japanese firm, states 
that he was told not to use a language other than English or Japanese. Nakata, a 
Japanese engineer of a client firm, states that he felt that the Indians were hiding 
something at the conference because, “When it comes to sensitive issues, the Indians 
start talking in the language that he does not understand.” Using these languages on 
the client’s premises may thus raise unnecessary suspicion.  
 These rules can be extended to their private lives as well. The memo states 
that, “talking or laughing loudly should be strictly avoided.” It also states that such 
complaints also come from neighbors in apartment premises, and warns that this 
“may even lead to police complaints at times.” Noise is a common issue raised by 
many Indian engineers in this research, and many stated hat they received 
complaints formally and implicitly from their neighbors in Japan.  
 Tarun, an Indian senior manager, who visited Japan on business pointed out 
a memo system to circulate corporate rules. When visiting a Japanese client firm, 
Tarun saw a circular memo that required individuals’ signatures and the date. The 
memo stated that there was a bike accident, and it explained how to avoid such 
accidents in the future. Everyone who read the circula  memo had to sign his name 
and date it; in this way, the company made sure that the incident was understood, and 
that “every worker takes responsibility for it.” Tarun was impressed with the ways in 
which information sharing was conducted, but this can also be analyzed also a form 
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of control, used to elicit the consent of participants and make them conform to 
corporate regulations. 
 Another point is punctuality and time management. The memo states, 
“Always be on time or 5 min. before a meeting. If you are late, say sorry for the 
delay without any hesitation.” This punctuality and time management issue is a 
common topic raised by Indian engineers discussing their learning in Japan. Many 
engineers who spent time in Japan found it extremely important to be punctual, as 
can be seen in my interviews. The same point was also analyzed in regard to Indian 
software engineers’ labor in European firms (Sahay, et al. 2003; Upadhya 2006). 
Many told me that adjusting to Japanese-style time management was a steep learning 
curve for them when they first arrived.  
 
Summary 
 Much of the previous literature illuminated the importance of onsite 
engineers as facilitators of communication, but little is known about how they are 
placed in clients’ sites. This chapter started by analyzing onsite engineers’ work, 
from understanding requirements to monitoring the progress of projects. It then 
examined the seating arrangements of several companies, and clarified how they are 
exposed to clients’ subtle or more explicit forms of c ntrol. However, it also reveals 
fluid positionality of foreign software companies in the Japanese labor market and 
some acts of appropriation of such as corporate control.  
 The first case reveals the issue of IP protection, as well as legal 
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consideration for ukeoi workers (project-based workers). Sahay, Nicholson, and 
Krishna (2003) state that Indian firms who try to move up the value chains want to 
gain IP in order to work for up-stream development processes, yet they rarely 
succeed in doing so, and there continues to be a digital divide between the client 
firms and the offshore Indian laborers. The same exists in the Japanese software 
market, but it becomes complicated in this situation because of the subcontracting 
chains of the Japanese software industry. Both Japanese subcontractors and Indian 
subcontractors are placed as workers from external organizations, but the Japanese 
subcontractors, particularly those from subsidiary fims, are expressed as being “on 
the same boat.” The ways in which Indian workers are compared with these local 
subcontractors are in part based on cost, but they are also judged based on the 
quality of their work (these issues will be discussed in a later section). The first case 
illuminated that the Indian vendors are placed at the outer edge of this industrial 
hierarchy. 
 The second, mixed seating example shows the need to stay close as a team 
for collaboration, and in this context, IP protection is not considered an issue. 
Engineers’ comments show that a mixed arrangement is, in part, convenient for 
communication, but it also can work as a mechanism to expose Indian engineers to 
greater control by the client. The third example shows a workspace separated from 
the client, and this can be a timeless “space” rather an a “place” under local 
contexts, constraints, and influences, yet a closer examination also reveals that they 
are affected by various forms of control by the clients, such as time management and 
cleanliness, and even small issues can be magnified into major issues when reported 
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to managers. The fourth example shows that the enginer has to hide his offshore 
corporate identity, acting as part of the prime contractor’s team. It reveals the 
alienating effect as well as the subversive possibilities of this situation, and the 
difference between Ashok and Krishna shows that opportunity is affected by the 
communication skills of engineers. The final example shows that clients’ control can 
go beyond workspaces, and that engineers’ private spaces can also become a site of 
control. All these cases illustrate various ways of creating boundaries. 
This section also examined the Indian onsite engineers’ views of Japanese 
clients’ control. The memo made by experienced engineers, as well as various voices 
of onsite engineers, reveals instances of how onsite engineers feel about their clients’ 
control.  
This section emphasized more the controlling aspect than the enabling 
aspect. Umed emphasized potentiality of onsite engineers as a facilitator of 
communication, yet Sudheer emphasized more the controlli g aspect that surrounds 
onsite engineers, and the issue of workplace surveillance. Both these issues need to 
be incorporated in order to present a balanced picture of the engineers’ workplace. 
Engineers’ worksites are neither total heaven nor hell. Many engineers describe their 
workplace both as learning experiences and a site of intense work.  
 While there are many engineers who change clients or pr jects to seek to 
learn new technology and accumulate diverse experiences, Umed and Sudheer 
continue to work for Japanese clients. Even though Sudheer mentioned that there are 
certain boundaries that they should not cross, he also believes that there is a great 
deal to learn from his client firm, and he wants to be specialized in this field. It is the 
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same for Umed. Umed argues that as long as he gets int resting projects from the 
Japanese client, he will stay. Investigation of client and vendor asymmetry highlights 
various work issues, and boundary makings, yet, as seen in the seating arrangement, 
such boundaries emerge, disappear, and reappear depending on the necessity and 










Chapter VIII  
Onsite Engineers’ Communication with Offshore Engineers 
 
Onsite engineers’ work tends to be understood as close face-to-face 
interactions with clients, but part of the difficulty they face is their communication 
with the development center in India. Arita, an exprienced Japanese manager of 
Indian firm Ganga Software Solutions, feels the difficulty of intra-company 
communication. Like many other Japanese engineers woking in Indian firms, he 
also moved from an American software firm to Ganga. Arita states that both teams 
(onsite and offshore team) “cry in anguish” to make th  collaboration work. “It is 
like tilling a barren field with sickles. It is no ne’s fault, but it continues to be so 
despite efforts of both sides.” Arita is known as a hard-working manager, spends 
most of his time in clients’ office until late at night during his project, and he 
laments to his colleagues that he does not even have time to take out trash from his 
apartment in the morning. Arita laments that he cannot see how his counterparts 
work. He explains when there is a project delay or something goes wrong, suspicion 
and distrust magnifies regarding whether they are working as expected. Arita’s work 
is to find out what is really going on in the Indian side. Arita states that he lacks 
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skills to deal with the Indian side and asks his India  colleague to deal with offshore 
while he focuses on persuading clients and finding solutions when problems arise.  
Another Japanese onsite engineer, Kaneda, employed by the Indian firm 
Saraswati Tech, also struggles to deal with his counterpart in India. Kaneda has 
experience working in India, and he understands workplace situations in India much 
more than most other Japanese onsite engineers. Kaneda enjoys working for 
Saraswati Tech, and wants to continue. Like Mishima, Kaneda sees a future in the 
Indian software industry, and wants to see the growth of the industry in Japan. 
However, lately Kaneda finds it difficult to work with his Indian counterpart. Their 
projects get delayed and he wonders if this is a difference in work ethics. Kaneda 
states, “It is like the temperature is totally different. There is a wave of heat and a 
sense of urgency to make the project successful. That is to ally lacking in India.” 
Kaneda’s struggle will be examined in this chapter in detail. 
It is not just the Japanese onsite coordinator who has a hard time; Indian 
onsite coordinators and managers also struggle. Manik,  experienced Indian 
project manager states, “It’s not just clients’ requirements that we need to understand. 
We need to understand the offshore situation, and we need to negotiate for them.” 
Manik worked in Japan for several years as an onsite engineer and a team leader, and 
he has various experiences managing the information flow between the client and the 
team working in India. Looking back on his experienc s of working with Japanese 
firms, Manik recalls that he became very close to the client. Manik’s job as an onsite 
engineer has been interesting for him because he learnt a lot about how to interact 
with clients, and to have “proper balance.” Manik also states that some onsite 
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engineers end up acting as a “client” and alienating hemselves from the very 
companies that employ them.  
 Many onsite engineers (both Japanese and Indian) interv ewed in this 
research emphasize the importance of understanding both the Japanese clients’ 
requirements and offshore capabilities and balancing the two. “Onsite coordinators 
(onsite engineers) should understand offshore capability and keep both, onsite and 
offshore in synchronization,” states the memo discused in the previous section too. 
 Like Arita suggested, Manik also states the difficulty of dealing with the 
offshore side. Manik states, “Sometimes the offshore side hides something and that 
causes a lot of tension and problem for clients...you need to detect it. You need to 
have a technique to elicit information from them.” The memo discussed earlier also 
supports this point: 
 This section explores an instance of how onsite engineers collaborate with 
offshore sites, and illustrates difficulties that they face in various cases. 
 
Status Report 
 The following section analyzes the reporting process at a telephone 
conference between a Japanese onsite engineer, Kaneda of Saraswati Tech, and 
engineers of the offshore development center of Saraswati Tech in India. The 
OSC has to be smart enough to extract all the requid 
information from the offshore team. The offshore team may hide 
details of an issue or situation. OSC needs to get these details in 
order to discuss them effectively with the customer.  
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Kaneda (Onsite engineer  
of Saraswati Tech) 
 
Figure 12. Telephone conference 
 Analysis of the conference illuminates both collaboration and slight tensions 
in this activity. This telephone conference was held to check the progress of one 
project. This team is working towards the final deliv ry date set next month, and in 
this telephone conference, they are checking the progress of various modules. Before 
the telephone conference starts, Kaneda and Yokoi are discussing and checking the 
status report sent from offshore in advance. The report shows the progress of each 
task with “complete” and “incomplete” notations. They are discussing that some 
tasks are marked as “complete” by the offshore site,but are rejected in Japan as not 
complete. This discrepancy is the focal point of the discussion. 
 
Yokoi (client) (Reading the status report) How about this? 
Kaneda (onsite engineer) They told us that this is already tested, but… 
Yokoi (client) This is different from your validation plan? 
Kaneda (OSE) Yes. This reject...well…this one is rejected. The 
ones with no mark are not delayed. 
Yokoi (client) 
 
Is this already rejected? The one they say complete 
is rejected...this one is marked complete there, but 
it hasn’t arrived here. These are all rejected 
(laugh). What does this OK mean? 
Kaneda (OSE) （explanation） 
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Yokoi (client) Did you tell them these are rejected?  
Kaneda (OSE) Yes, I did. 
 
 Kaneda later explained to me the discrepancy in the report as, “Usually you 
can’t trust their status report (i.e. status reports sent from offshore personnel), so this 
is a procedure to ask them what really is going on.” This issue is related to the 
comment in the memo that “OSC has to be smart enough to extract all the required 
information from offshore team.” Kaneda is trying to elicit information on the 
progress of the offshore side and the Japanese client Yokoi is also aware of this 
issue.  
 The following conversation then took place at the m eting. Yokoi, Kaneda, 
and two Indian managers from offshore side were on the telephone conference.  




We will discuss about status...This first. This “complete” 
means development is complete, then (it is) rejected 
actually (by our side), so… 
 
Indian side Can we know the result cause of the rejction? Is there any 




It means no one from our team has responded to you…at 
least you are not aware of the defects of this report? Or 
from your point of view…it’s complete? (1) 








OK, that will be good actually. If there is any defect or 
anything, then we can fix it in a day and we can send it 







Or it means that offshore team will inform any defects, 














Ah, probably yes…If (A), then we will be able to finish it 
in one day, and we will send back to you. But if (B), then 
by the weekend, we will deliver it to you. 
 
 









OK…so 10th is fine. After that, the onsite team will check 




Let’s go next. 
 
 In this conference, the onsite engineer, Kaneda, is wondering whether the 
offshore side has tested the status properly, but he is not explicitly blaming the 
Indian side, as seen in his comment (1), “at least you are not aware of the defects of 
this report?...or from your point of view…it’s complete status?” Then, the Indian 
side answers that their work is “basically fine” (2), and want to know the reason for 
the rejection. The offshore side promises that they will finish it “in a day” (3).  
 Yokoi, the Japanese client, also plays a part in eliciting information. He cuts 
in and confirms the deadline “by Monday,” and confirms the date with the Indian 
side (4)-(7). The flow of the conversation shows that t e Japanese side, both Kaneda 
and Yokoi, is concerned with the deadline and the output rather than blaming anyone 
for what has happened. 
 After the conference, Yokoi, the Japanese client, added: “The distance 
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makes it difficult to see what they are doing. That’s how I feel. I can call and ask 
them to come by. Telephone conference has a limit.” Kaneda also states, “We feel 
like we understand each other, but sometimes it is the case that we don’t.” Kaneda, 
who has been working with Indian firms, states that e checks the status report every 
week, but the report could contain false information. Kaneda states, 
 
Difficulties of Eliciting Information in Onsite-offshore Relations 
 The above telephone conference reveals an instance of onsite and offshore 
engineers struggling to make the flow of information “seamless.” This section 
further analyzes the politics of onsite–offshore relations and the difficulties eliciting 
I set a meeting (with colleagues working in India, in the offshore 
development center) to confirm each other’s understanding. 
Sending e-mail does not necessarily convey your message. That 
happens in communication. If I want the other side to understand 
me, it’s my responsibility. Conveying the message is my 
responsibility. Even if I am logical, and correct, if that is not 
conveyed and not understood by them, I should blame myself. 
Miscommunication is my fault. Honestly I feel resentful and 
think like “how could you”…but it’s not 100% their fault. When 
tasks are tested and rejected by the onsite team, we wonder what 
they have been doing in offshore. Then they (engineers working 
in the Indian development center) tell us that they s nt us the 
tasks without reviewing. Once we know that, we ask them to 
review. Maybe they are pressured with time, so I don’t blame 
them. When we have time, we offer help and do the testing. That
is fine internally. That has to be done between me and the team 
leader in offshore side…It doesn’t matter which one is right. If I 
think they don’t get it, I send emails, and be consistent to ask, 
“do you understand the problem?” Once I understand they didn’t 
do it on purpose, the discrepancy doesn’t become an issue, 
although I may sound harsh. 
182 
 
information from various perspectives.  
 
“I can’t see how they work.” 
 Both Japanese and Indian onsite engineers mediate cl ent–offshore relations, 
but the difference between Japanese and Indian onsite engineers is generally 
understood as Japanese engineers are good at client int rfacing, while Indian 
Engineers are good at offshore relations, although experienced engineers can deal 
with both interchangeably. 
 Many of the Japanese onsite engineers in this reseach find it difficult to 
deal with offshore situations. Similar to Arita, who I introduced at the beginning of 
this chapter, and Kaneda, other onsite engineers and coordinators are struggling to 
communicate with their Indian counterparts. Shimizu, a Japanese onsite engineer, for 
instance, states, “I don’t know how to handle offshore, “I can’t see them….I can’t 
see how they work.” Noda, a Japanese onsite engineer, states that it was so hard to 
work with the offshore side by e-mails and by phone, but the engineer flew to India 
to talk with the offshore team, and “once I got there (in India), things were much 
easier. I could see them work in front of me.” 
 Most Indian onsite engineers have extensive experience living in India and 
working in offshore development centers in India, and they are much more familiar 
with Indian social and organizational structures, know offshore team members better, 
and they have networks in offshoring. Indian onsite engineers are generally more 
familiar with the rhythms, time management, and ways of working in India, and they 
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understand various local contexts in India, such as family orientation, organizational 
hierarchy, reporting structures, internal competitions and career aspirations, 
appraisal systems, infrastructural issues, the high attrition rate, and so many other 
organizational factors in their offshore development centers.  
 These issues are often not visible to Japanese onsite engineers, who have no 
or very limited experience working inside offshore development centers. Most 
importantly, offshore engineers know key personnel ad can contact them when 
problems arise. For Japanese personnel (engineers, sale staff, etc.), it is often very 
difficult to obtain the same accumulation of social c pital that offshore members 
have. For these reasons, many Japanese onsite enginers state that the offshore 
interface is the most difficult thing for them. For them, the invisibility and 
unpredictability of offshore personnel becomes a problem, and if something goes 
wrong, the trust level tends to drop fast. 
 However, this does not mean that Indian onsite engineers have no problems 
working with offshore personnel. Below are the points raised by Indian onsite 
engineers when interacting with offshore personnel. 
   
 
“Spicing Up Information” 
 Indian onsite engineers discussed how they deal with offshore personnel in 
various ways. For instance, Balan, an Indian onsite engineer with five years of 
experience in Japan, states the important issue as, “You need to handle the diplomacy. 
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You need to know how to handle the offshore team. If they are not cooperating, you 
need to find different ways.”  
 When Balan started working as an onsite engineer, th e was a delay in a 
project, and he conveyed the client’s anger to the offsh re personnel in a 
straightforward manner, which ended up putting a lot of strain on his relations with 
offshore. Balan states that the onsite engineers (whether Japanese or Indian) tend to 
be caught between the clients and the offshore personnel, so “staying calm is very 
important.” From the client’s point view, some functionality may be crucial, but 
from offshore’s point of view, this may not be so, because the offshore team in India 
may think they worked so hard that “this one thing can be omitted.” In such 
situations, onsite engineers have to intervene and “spice up” the information in such 
a way to encourage the offshore side. 
 Onsite engineers, whether Japanese or Indian, need to a d a touch of 
personal flavor of the client so that the offshore side can feel they are appreciated by 
the client and are a part of the team. Udit, an India  engineer, states that “you have 
to make them (offshore personnel) feel important; you have to make them work 
successfully.” From the offshore side, it is difficult to imagine what clients are like 
unless they have experience of working onsite. Both Japanese and Indian onsite 
engineers in this research state that “motivating offsh re is extremely important.” 
You have to put more spice in it. The client personality wants this 
functionality, this personally is important. You have to see the 
situation and decide accordingly, understand their mentality. 
These things, I didn’t understand when I was in India…now I 
understand and I can visualize the importance. 
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They often add personal touches of the client in such words as “the client appreciates 
your efforts personally.”  
 
Maintaining “Proper Hierarchy” 
 Personalizing information is important as a motivational factor, but many 
Indian onsite engineers in this research state the difficulties of interacting with 
offshore personnel in the organizational hierarchy: it is usually the case that onsite 
engineers report to offshore managers who are higher in corporate rank. Onsite 
engineers, as discussed earlier, have information both from the clients and from the 
offshore team, and it is sometimes hard for them to take a balanced view. When 
clients are “shouting” at the onsite engineers, they cannot always be detached from 
the situation and as the earlier example shows, they may convey the clients’ anger to 
the offshore side without mitigating it. On one hand, proper hierarchy should be 
followed, because offshore managers are the ones who influence their appraisal and 
promotion, yet onsite engineers also need to gain trust f om clients. As seen in the 
status reporting, they also need to find ways to elicit information from the offshore 
side and need to check whether offshore personnel are hiding something. Some also 
state that they need to send “suggestions” (not orders) to offshore personnel to solve 
problems. Ajay, an Indian onsite engineer, states that onsite engineers should not 
push the offshore side to the limit. 
 However, onsite engineers are sometimes blamed as “acting like clients,” as 
Manik points out at the beginning of this chapter. Japanese clients do not necessarily 
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view onsite engineers just as liaison officers; some clients view them as 
representative of the offshore center and expect them to make decisions on the spot, 
not just transfer information offshore. The engineers’ memo also states the tensions 
between onsite engineers and offshore personnel as follows: 
 Many offshore managers have experience working in Japan, and one such 
manager states that he can sense “whether onsite engineers are just bossing around 
and just ‘playing customer.’” 
 
Proud Representatives 
 Onsite engineers can be gatekeepers themselves to con rol information, and 
they themselves can exclude someone from access to re ources in some contexts. 
Many engineers who come over and work onsite are chosen for onsite assignments, 
and some state that there is a sense of superiority among onsite engineers over 
offshore team members. Onsite engineers are usually selected based on the clients’ 
requirements and engineers’ experience, technical skill sets, and the ranking of 
offshore personnel. Many Indian onsite engineers state that when they go onsite, 
their parents are very proud. One engineer states his feelings as follows: 
(Japanese customers) want the OSC to be a full and final 
representative of the offshore team. The offshore project leader 
and project manager may feel that the onsite coordinator is 
overriding their suggestions and playing customer to them. This 
sometimes results in conflicts between the offshore project 




Hiding High Attrition Rate 
 Those who work onsite and then return to offshore are expected to circulate 
their knowledge. By rotating engineers regularly between onsite and offshore, 
Japanese clients expect offshore to accumulate knowhow and establish a more solid 
knowledge transfer model, yet this is not necessarily the case because of the high 
attrition rate on the Indian side. The high attrition rate of offshore engineers is well 
known in India (20-25% in a good economy). Clients want those who return to 
offshore work to remain on the same project and work f  their company, but these 
engineers often change companies or move to different projects, because many want 
to learn new technologies and acquire new experiences.   
Some onsite engineers state that they try not to talk about the change in 
offshore project members to their Japanese clients, especially about the departure of 
key personnel, unless specifically asked by clients, because such “sensitive 
information” may affect the trust level that they have established with the clients. 
The engineers’ memo supports this point. It states that “it is necessary not to expose 
crucial information like high attrition rates.” NASSCOM (NASSCOM and 
If you are going abroad, it means you are very important, so 
(laugh) at least within the project…if there is a project of 10 
people, and if there is one person who goes onsite, that means, oh 
this person must be more intelligent, and important, because he 
will also gather all the knowledge on the projects, and coming 
back for the entire project…One person who knows more 
(laugh). Here people want to go onsite and learn. 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:40) also mentions that the high attrition rate of Indian 
engineers gives a negative impression to Japanese customers. It states, “Avoid 
frequent changes in client-facing staff. Terms like ‘attrition’, ‘employee mobility’, 
‘buffer’ and ‘resource optimization’ are still alien for the Japanese” (NASSCOM and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008:40). Indian firms in this research try to accumulate 
documentation for knowledge sharing, but producing documentation requires extra 
time and investments, which are often difficult to get approved by Japanese clients. 
Sriram, an Indian senior engineer states, 
 
Knowledge has a Hard-Won Consequence 
 In addition, some onsite Indian engineers state that knowledge circulation 
by rotating engineers does not work effectively because engineers “who know more” 
We started this project a couple of years ago, but the original 
team members all left. Our clients think that our productivity is 
going up, but it is not. They think we don’t need time for 
buffering (communication difficulties). But we don’t have 
experienced engineers. Experiences are not cumulative (they do 
not stay). New engineers know the theory, but they n ed to 
understand functionality and codes. We can’t tell our client that. 
It is common in India, and we can’t help it. The offshoring 
industry is still expanding. Japanese clients still don’t know how 
it happens in India. Full-time workers also quit in India. Clients 
want to retain key resources, but they can’t give incentives to 
everyone, not so much. The number is limited…New engineers 
also leave very quickly. Some want to go onsite andsome leave 
for study. We can’t help it. It isn’t our job to tell that to our 
clients. I don’t say it directly to clients.  
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do not necessarily want to share their information. Personally acquainted with clients 
and understanding their needs and requirements is, o some engineers, a source of 
power and a resource, and thus cannot be easily shared with others. Also, there is a 
practical constraint, that knowledge cannot be shared just by documenting, and 
engineers have to go and work in Japan in order to understand certain things.  
 Carlile states that information has a hard-won consequence (Carlile 2002), 
and the ones who have access to information gain more p wer. This can be seen in 
onsite-offshore relations. Badal, an Indian offshore manager, points out that 
knowledge sharing is not always happening because knowing a client in person and 
having experience working with them is an important resource that helps some 
engineers to stay ahead of others. Some engineers also show off their information 
that they can gain only onsite, to prove their abilities to offshore. Badal recalls one 
incident that symbolizes this point. Badal was in charge of a project for a Japanese 
client, Marumatsu Japan, as an offshore manager. Badal received regular reporting 
from onsite engineers working in Marumatsu Japan. He has a large offshore team, 
and only one tenth of the offshore team was onsite. “Onsite engineers are proud, but 
they also need to prove why they were selected, not others,” Badal explains.  
 One day, Badal received a circular email from one f the onsite engineers, 
Gurpreet, stating that he found a misunderstanding of the offshore team, and the 
mistake should be corrected. The email was circulated not only to offshore team 
members, but it was also sent to all the senior managers involved in the project, as if 
Gurpreet wanted recognition for his ability. This email was however taken as 
Gurpreet showing off his findings and his privileged position as an onsite engineer 
190 
 
who can interact with clients and gain valuable information that offshore team 
members cannot access. Gurpreet’s email was taken as hurtful by the manager 
because it was a big embarrassment for those who did not notice the problem before 
Gurpreet’s correspondence. Badal explains as a manager that those onsite engineers 
need to stay ahead of others, and they have to show that they have more resources, 
they have to show that they know their clients personally. Badal heard other onsite 
engineers bragging about their close relationships and personal connections with 




 This chapter analyzed how Indian and Japanese onsite engineers 
communicate with offshore managers, and what can be difficult in ‘sharing’ 
knowledge. Close examination of the onsite engineers’ monitoring illuminates their 
skills to elicit information from offshore, as well as their suspicions that people may 
be hiding something. The analysis in this chapter illustrated that the efforts and 
struggles sharing knowledge are deeply embedded in the relationships between the 
participants and the social world, as in the analysis of seating arrangement discussed 
in the previous chapter, and are also related to various social factors, differences in 
employment systems, knowledge asymmetry between old timers and newcomers, the 
attrition rate, and many other factors, which severely challenge the disembedded 
view of knowledge and a packaged and portable approach towards ways of knowing 
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and learning.  
 This research reveals that proximity matters, but is not necessarily a 
sufficient condition to make seamless knowledge transfers happen detached from 
social relations, because knowledge has hard-won consequences. People go back 
offshore, but knowledge does not necessarily accumulate. The relationship between 
clients and onsite engineers, as well as onsite engin ers and offshore, cannot be 
analyzed as a unilinear knowledge transfer. Transferring or not transferring 
knowledge can be filled with tension. Onsite engineers are great facilitators of 
knowledge, but they can become obstacles when knowledge bears important 
meaning as a resource to help them stay ahead of others. They are also vulnerable to 
the disapproval of others, criticized as “playing” customers. All these factors come 
into play in how offshoring businesses operate.  
 Arita, the Japanese onsite manager that I introduce  at the beginning of the 
chapter still works for the same company, trying to get work done but “crying in 
anguish.” When I asked him what that “crying in anguish” comes from, he replied, “I 
hope it is a birth pain. I hope that it is because we are trying to create something that 
was not possible before, but it may be just a final death rattle,” and he smiled for a 
second. The pain that Arita feels when dealing with the Indian side may partly be a 
cry to connect the disjunctions and make the busines look “seamless” as the image 
that technological globalization proponents take for granted, or it may be a birth pain 
of corporate globalization of Japanese large forms. “Crying in anguish” can also be 
heard from the voices of people who work in Japanese firms. The next chapter will 







Chapter IX  
Control and Uncertainty in Japanese Firms 
 
 “Offshore o monitaa shinakya. Marunage wa dame (You must monitor 
offshore. Providing no supervision is a recipe for disaster),” says Sato, a Japanese 
engineer of Tokyo AEC Tech, who has years of experience working with offshore 
business. What Sato referred to by “marunage” is to leave everything to the offshore 
side or to the onsite coordinators without the client’s supervision. Sato emphasizes 
Japanese firms should actively be involved in the process and communicate with 
offshore. He argues “onsite coordinators (of Indian firms) are never Harry Potter’s 
magic wand,” and leaving everything to them is dangerous. 
 There are many horror stories about unsuccessful offsh ring projects, and 
less-than-satisfactory end results such as many bugs in the software or late delivery. 
Tales of disastrous projects, rumors and exaggerated cautionary tales are spread 
quickly through word of mouth. “How to manage offshore,” is thus a hot topic both 
for Indian firms and for those clients who are thinking of starting the process. 
Therefore, workshops are organized by Indian firms to promote the value of 
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offshoring and its applicability as seen in Chapter V. Sometimes they invite their 
Japanese clients as speakers, and engineers and managers of Japanese firms that have 
business relations with Indian firms share their experiences with the audience. These 
speakers, however, do not necessarily talk only about p sitive experiences with 
offshoring, but include how they struggled in the past nd how they continued to 
have some issues working with Indian firms. For insta ce, in the workshop 
organized by an Indian firm, KBS India, there were several speakers from Japanese 
firms. Rajan, an Indian sales manager of KBC India, st tes that they do not want 
their audiences to have too many expectations of what offshore firms can do, and 
they want the audiences to understand what kind of challenges they have, so they can 
be prepared. Rajan’s firm therefore invited several speakers at the workshop from 
their clients’ firms in Japan, and asked them to share their experiences of working 
with Indian firms in general as offshore partners. Watanabe, a senior manager of a 
large Japanese software firm, Japan-Suga Soft was one of the presenters at the 
workshop. Watanabe explains how his firm learns to have long-term business 
relations with Indian firms.  
 The room is packed with people who are in offshoring business. The 
audiences wear business suits, and many listen attentively to Watanabe’s experiences 
with Indian firms. Some are taking notes attentively and nodding their heads in 
response to the issues that he explains, particularly at the difficulties that Watanabe 
describes such as the issues surrounding quality. Watanabe passionately speaks to the 
audiences using charts and matrices and explains how his firm has learned to work 
with and “manage” offshoring. Although he uses words such as “collaboration” and 
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“mutual understanding,” he also frequently uses words such as “manage” and 
“control.” How to control offshore is a common concern for the Japanese firms that I 
investigated, and it repeatedly comes up in various offshore-related articles and 
websites.  
 While the word “management” evokes images of corporate control and 
panoptical gaze over vulnerable workers, the act of managing and controlling is also 
a form of labor itself, and workers who are involved in “offshore management” are 
not the perfect prison guards in the imaginary 18th century prison surveillance 
system that Foucault described in his argument. They ar  themselves workers who 
struggle to allocate their time in offshoring on top f their heavy workload, and the 
people whom I interviewed described the challenges of working with Indian firms. 
 This section first discusses anthropological and sociological studies of 
Japanese corporations, and presents three case studi s of how Japanese firms try to 
manage Indian firms.  
Relevant Theories 
Cultural Analysis of Japanese Management Style 
 The structure of large-scale Japanese firms drew attention from Western 
social scientists beginning in the 1950s, and generated a set of analyses that 
identifies the characteristics of Japanese firms as a long-term employment system, 
seniority system (reward based on the length of servic ), and enterprise-based 
unionism (Abegglen 1958; Clark 1979; Cole 1971; Dore 1973).  
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 The success of large Japanese firms during the high growth period was 
linked with the security-based employment practice, and from a cultural point of 
view, was also linked with the group orientation of Japanese society and culture. 
Group orientation was explained as a result of a patern listic status hierarchy by 
sociologist Chie Nakane (1970), and the psychological underpinning was provided 
by Doi (1981) in his theory of Japanese interdependency (amae). Doi argued that 
Japanese group orientation and interdependency generat  corporate familialism and 
employee loyalty (Doi 1981). This type of literature (known as Nihonjinron, the 
theory of Japaneseness) was popular in the 1970s, and it presented a homogenizing 
image of Japanese society and people, using a simplitic demarcation between the 
West and Japan. The group orientation of Japanese firms was also emphasized in 
organizational studies in the US, as can be seen in the ‘learn from Japan’ literature 
(Vogel 1979).  
 However, the discourse that emphasizes the uniqueness of Japanese 
management style from cultural perspectives was strongly criticized as 
over-generalizing Japanese firms based on a static and monolithic assumption of 
Japanese society and culture. Hamada’s criticism in the 1980s points out that the 
discourse of groupism masks variations in Japanese management and different 
degrees of corporate success, and overlooks the economic rationale and imperative 
for such a security-based employment system, based upon a static view of the culture 
(Hamada 1985:1215). An emphasis on economic success linked with a harmonious 
social structure was also argued as being more an ideological construct than a reality 
(Befu 1997; Yoshino 1992). Scholars who examine social stratifications and conflict 
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in capitalism argue that Nihonjinron ignores internal stratifications, power struggles, 
and social conflicts (Kawamura 1982; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986). 
 
Anthropological Contributions of Analyzing Japanese Corporations 
Large Japanese corporations, because of the global economic influence, 
were given a central place in many organizational anlyses of Japanese companies. 
The analysis of Japanese organizational structure often focused upon large-scale 
firms, and the employment structure of male white-collar regular workers. However, 
such workers who enjoy security-based employment system constituted only a small 
portion of the workforce, and many workers in smaller business operations were 
largely unexplored in many studies.  
As Lebra (1992:1) emphasizes, it was anthropologists’ task to challenge and 
unveil the homogenizing myth of Japanese workers, though fine-tuning 
ethnographic studies of various workplaces and workers. Past anthropological 
studies made great efforts to achieve this goal, and revealed multiple perspectives of 
work and workers’ lives in Japanese firms in various institutions.  
A number of researchers have contributed to a better understanding of 
Japanese labor practices outside the sphere of major corporations. Kondo’s seminal 
study of a family-run confectionary company illuminates he connection between 
family and work, and revealed conflicting work relationships and ideology in the 
seemingly family-oriented small company (Kondo 1990). Turner (1995), in turn, 
illuminates the struggles and protests of blue-collar workers marginalized in society. 
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Likewise, studies of craftspeople and artists also expanded our understanding of 
diverse work practices and workers’ lives (Hareven 2002; Kinsella 2000; Moeran 
1984). Studies of female workers not only illustrate th ir peripheral and auxiliary 
positions (Lo 1990) but also reveal their resistance and subversion (Ogasawara 
1998), and some studies also shed light upon workers’ agency in an analysis of 
female entrepreneurship (Ito 1983).  
Intensifying global competition and deregulation have resulted in an 
increasing number of contingent workers. Studies of young workers reveal the 
complex social world of people who are categorized as NIITO (a social category 
referring to those who are not in education, employment, or training, originally used 
in the UK as NEET, but the meaning was further localized, and used to accuse young 
workers of being lazy in the Japanese context). Sociol gical studies problematize 
such social categories and show how those workers have been alienated from the 
labor market of regular jobs, and caught in social onstraints and economic pressure 
(Honda 2007; Honda, et al. 2006).  
Anthropological and sociological analyses also enrich our understanding of 
work in Japan from the perspective of foreign workers, many of whom engage in 
manual contract labor, such as Japanese Brazilians and Peruvians (De Carvalho 
2003; Linger 2001; Roth 2002; Takenaka 2009; Tsuda 2003). The similarity in the 
role as “economic buffer” in the transnational labor supply of Indian software 




‘Commitment’ of Workers in Japanese Firms  
  The discourse that emphasizes group orientation in the Japanese workplace 
tends to assume harmonious social relations as well as workers’ commitment and 
loyalty to the company. Although the nationalistic Nihonjinron discourse toned down 
with the decline of the Japanese economy in the ’90s, the image of Japanese workers 
as committed to work and sacrificing their families r mains strong. In my data, 
Indian workers almost always described “Japanese workers” with words such as 
“commitment” and “long work hours.” Some expressed the view that “work is a 
passion in Japan...we can’t work like Japanese. We are more family-oriented.” Many 
people attributed such “commitment” to a part of Japanese culture rather than 
structural factors.  
 A critical labor analysis unpacks and challenges thi  type of cultural 
assumption by arguing that these so-called commitment and work ethics cannot 
simply be attributed to national characteristics or Japanese culture but should be seen 
as structural outcomes induced through corporate human resource management 
strategies (Mouer 2009; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Sugimoto 2003),  
 The corporate role in creating workers’ consent through various incentives 
and rhetoric is not particularly unique to the Japanese management system. 
Burawoy’s classic analysis of workers’ manufactured consent has revealed corporate 
control embedded in a game-based reward system (Burawoy 1979). Kunda’s classic 
work on American high-tech corporations discussed corporate management’s 
ideological manipulation of workers with the use of “strong corporate culture” 
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(Kunda 1992). Kunda was interested in “why do people work so hard and claim to 
enjoy it,” and found that workers’ “taken for granted” values are generated through 
workshops and the rhetoric of management, despite workers’ attempts to distance 
themselves from managerial rhetoric. Kunda’s book was ritten when the strength of 
Japanese corporate culture had drawn attention fromAmerican corporate 
management. Kunda describes the interest of one of his interviewees, an American 
corporate manager, in Japanese management style as, “They know something about 
putting people to work – and we better find out what it is” (Kunda 1992:4).  
Sugimoto (2003:96-98) has analyzed various corporate s rategies in 
Japanese firms to induce workers’ productivity by examining the nebulous definition 
of ability. The definition of “ability” in Japanese firms, as Sugimoto points out, uses 
neither simple manifest ability (jitsuryoku) nor latent ability (soshitsu); instead, the 
term includes a more ambiguous definition of ability, noryoku, meaning general, 
overall ability, and companies use this broad category to include personality traits 
beyond one’s occupational duties. Sugimoto argues that the manipulative definition 
of noryoku plays a pivotal role in the evaluation and surveillance of workers’ 
behavior. Kumazawa (1996; 2010) points to corporate ideology in a total evaluation 
that seeks to generate workers’ competition and internalization of corporate 
censorship.  
As for corporate socialization of workers, Rohlen (1974) provides an 
analysis of the corporate training method of workers in a Japanese bank (‘spiritual 
education’). Although Rohlen sees it as a vehicle for creating corporate cohesion, 
more critical labor analysis criticizes such socializ t on programs in terms of 
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corporate indoctrination and a site of ideological struggles (Sugimoto 2003).  
Furthermore, critical labor analyses reveal various ways in which workers’ 
consent is generated in the surveillance and quality control of the factory floor. 
Kamata (1983), through his own experience working as a contractor in a Japanese 
automobile company, has shown the corporate control and exploitative working 
conditions on the shop floor. Furthermore, Ihara (2003) reveals how Toyota workers 
come to internalize corporate management and surveillance through daily activities 
on their shop floor. Kaizen, a well-known Toyota quality control (QC) circle, is
organized by workers to improve production processes (Liker 2004), which is well 
delineated in a number of management studies. In contrast to Liker’s study, which 
illustrates the positive aspects of Toyota’s competitive corporate culture, the darker 
side of QC and its surveillance effects are analyzed in etail in Ihara’s study. Ihara 
(2003) illustrates how QC systematically puts pressure on workers, and how 
workers’ autonomy ends up increasing their workloads nd labor. 
Culture of Long Work Hours? 
 The intensification of labor was tolerated when the growth of the company 
was apparent via material rewards to employees. However, conomic stagnation and 
the intensification of global competition drove large Japanese firms to reduce the 
number of full-time employees, and existing regular employees were driven to 
overwork. Critical labor analysts illustrate that working long hours cannot be simply 
explained as workers’ commitment and loyalty. Mouer (2009) argues that long work 
hours are not the outcome of work value per se but are more likely connected to 
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structural and organizational parameters. An appraisal system that assesses 
employees’ levels of cooperation, commitment, and flexibility to perform 
extra-job-specification duties drives workers to work long hours. Although workers 
are entitled to be paid overtime, about half of the workers in Japanese firms engage 
in unpaid overtime in various ways, and officially recorded overtime is more than 
100 hours per year, with service overtime accounting for 10% of Japanese workers’ 
work hours (Sugimoto 2003:100). 
 Service overtime leads workers to exhaustion, and mental stress tends to 
accumulate. Kumazawa (1996; 2010) reveals cases of kar oshi (death or suicide 
caused by excessive work). Kumazawa’s wide-ranging case study (2010) analyzes 
the nebulous boundary of work hours and overtime, workers’ struggles to absorb an 
excessive number of tasks, and the impossibility of keeping set deadlines. 
Kumazawa illustrates the contradictory processes that workers take in a desperate 
attempt to adapt themselves to corporate demands and needs, pushing themselves to 
the limit of physical exhaustion and mental depression. He argues that many 
middle-class Japanese employees identify success with the appiness of oneself and 
one’s family, which blurs the boundary between work and personal life. The issue of 
karooshi revealed overwork and the intense pressure on regular employees and 
subcontractors, driven by the intensification of global competition, restructuring, 
downsizing, and labor deregulation. 
 The software development workplaces in this study are diverse, and difficult to 
generalize, yet it is clear that they cannot be disembedded from the general labor 
context (such as corporate structure to induce longwork hours) of many Japanese 
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firms. The work overload surrounding software engineers is common in Japan, and 
the average work hours of software engineers are 100 hours longer per month than 
those of other industries. It is often in this context that Indian engineers witness the 
extremely long work hours of Japanese engineers.  
Japanese Management in Transnational Settings 
 The analysis of Japanese firms is also deeply related to the studies that 
examine Japanese management in transnational settings. With increasing global 
competition, many Japanese firms are placed under pressu e to expand their markets 
across geographical borders. Various studies conducte  cross-national analyses of 
Japanese corporations, and illuminate negotiations and issues that generated 
transnational collaborative efforts. Hamada (1991) conducted an ethnographic 
analysis of a US-Japan joint venture, and reveals the collaborations of two 
managerial cultures through the voices of corporate executives in a joint labor 
operation in Japan. Several studies also examine Japanese subsidiaries abroad. 
Sedgwick (2007) examines the subsidiary of a Japanese corporation in France, and 
reveals how Japanese corporate practices are negotiated in the subsidiary. Wong 
(1999) emphasizes managerial control in his analysis of a Japanese supermarket in 
its Hong Kong subsidiary. Sakai (1999) analyzes a Japanese bank operating in 
London, describing the lives and culturally-bound pers ctives of Japanese bankers. 
 Although the analysis of Japanese software engineers in Japanese firms 
reveals corporate control and ideology, the major part of the data in this section 
reveals the dilemmas and frustrations that come from the difficulties of corporate 
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control. Offshoring is considered a risk for many Japanese firms, because controlling 
labor is difficult due to the distance, time, and energy required for communication. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the onsite coordinator in the status report was 
struggling precisely because he cannot see his counterpart face-to-face. Kochi (2008) 
argues that attitudes toward offshoring are split in Japanese firms: the enthusiastic 
top managers who understand the overall cost merits of offshoring versus reluctant 
engineers and managers in charge of day-to-day interactions with offshore firms. For 
many of the software engineers that I interviewed, managing offshore labor involves 
risks of failure. 
 The frustrations revealed in this section may be called the ‘warden’s 
problem.’ Foucault’s concept of the panopticon involves wardens who worked in 
18th-century French prisons. As one can see in the analysis of coordinators’ 
workplace surveillance, panoptical control is powerful in proximity, yet the previous 
chapters also illustrated that the panopticon does not easily accomplish its role in a 
geographically distance place. To exert control, wardens have to make extra effort. 
The following section reveals such wardens’ problems.  
 This chapter discusses these issues in the analysis of three case studies of 
Japanese firms’ offshoring experiences, through the voices of the firms’ engineers. 
The engineers whom I interviewed all directly communicate with Indian offshore 
workers. The first case study includes a project manager s well as an experienced 
engineer who supervises Indian onsite and offshore engineers. The first case 
illuminates the Japanese engineers’ concerns and struggles regarding how to 
‘manage’ offshore workers. The second case study illum nates how Japanese 
204 
 
engineers struggle in communication not simply because of language. Although the 
engineers discussed the difficulty of verbalizing a tacit communication style, the 
second case also illuminates the ideology hidden behind such tacit communication, 
which is a demand for flexibility. The third case shows the anger and frustrations of 
one project manager at the time of the failure of the project. 
 These three case studies do not intend to generaliz  the way Japanese firms 
work, but they are analyzed to illuminate the necessity as well as the difficulties of 
controlling expressed in this form of labor.  
 
Case 1  Japan-Suga Soft: “Dig into Other’s Territory” 
 The first case examines the workshop introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter, focusing on the presentation of Watanabe, the senior engineer of Japan-Suga 
Soft. Japan-Suga Soft is a software subsidiary of a large Japanese manufacturing 
firm, and it has ten years of experience working with offshore Indian engineers. 
Japan-Suga Soft collaborates with a large-scale Indian software company, Technet 
India. I will analyze Watanabe’s narratives in the workshop, and compare them with 
alternative views presented by a different engineer, Yoshi, in the same firm. 
 Japan-Suga Soft has been offshoring hundreds of projects to India and has a 
longstanding relationship with one Indian firm. The relationship between the two 
firms has been growing, yet it was not an easy process to reach this stage, according 
to Watanabe. At the initial meeting, Japan-Suga Softgave the offshoring team a 
small internal project, and then gradually increased the volume of projects. 
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Nowadays, they have a large-scale business, with morethan 300 offshore team 
members working in India. Japan-Suga Soft invested a considerable amount of 
money, time, and energy to make this offshoring work, establishing infrastructure 
and communication channels, as well as training offshore team members. 
Japan-Suga Soft states that the offshore Indian company is an important partner, and 
that they intend to continue working with them. 
 Japan-Suga Soft first selected one offshore Indian company as part of their 
overseas market development, to accelerate the speed of product releases. Watanabe 
explains that offshore Indians with the latest technology, a large number of qualified 
engineers, cost-advantages, and process management standards such as CMMI were 
the main selection criteria in choosing this company.  
 A slightly different view to that of Watanabe is provided by Yoshi, an 
experienced engineer of Japan-Suga Soft. Although Watanabe holds a higher 
corporate rank than Yoshi as a manager, Yoshi has been working for this project 
since its inception. I was introduced to Yoshi informally by one Indian engineer who 
highly respects him as a supporter of Indian firms. Yoshi expresses his affection for 
Indian engineers whom he taught and worked with closely since the inception of 
offshore projects in his firm. Yoshi states, “Indian engineers shine. They are so eager 
to learn. They are so much better than Japanese youngsters that do nothing but 
reading manga.” Yoshi explains how his company select d an Indian firm to work 
with in the 90s. He states that the biggest factor was cost, although they value the 
technological competence of the Indian firm. Yoshi tates that, “if they can develop 
at half the price of domestic development, it had a merit despite the investment 
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necessary for relocation of work to offshore.”  
 Watanabe passionately explains in the workshop that one of their corporate 
philosophies is harmony, which is necessary for successful offshore development: 
“We cannot achieve our ideal unless we stand on our principle. It may take 100 
years.” What Watanabe means is that the firms may needy ars to accomplish smooth 
offshore development. Watanabe’s statement of “ideal” shows that Japan-Suga Soft 
is striving to improve their offshore business, and that they are not yet satisfied with 
current offshore conditions. Watanabe explains to the audience that harmony is not 
simply the avoidance of conflict with offshore personnel or having harmonious 
relations. Rather, it means to “dig into others’ terri ory and harmonize,” and he 
continues, saying, “We cannot be one if we only care about job descriptions as 
foreign firms do.” This point of view is connected to the principle of Watanabe’s 
company, “harmony,” but this emphasis of commitment to “dig into others’ territory” 
can also be connected to the general tendency of Japanese firms to emphasize broad, 
deliberately nebulous job specifications and to define ability including comparative 
behaviors discussed earlier.  
 The need to be actively involved in offshore projects is emphasized in 
Watanabe’s presentation in various ways. Watanabe stat s hat he thinks highly of 
Indian technology, but he also argues that the India  firm has difficulties in 
constantly maintaining quality in all areas: technology, “quality,” “scalability,” and 
“maintainability.” Moreover, he holds that it is necessary to transfer know-how and 
train offshore Indian personnel, and to provide necessary infrastructure as well as 
boost security. When problems arise, the engineers of Japan-Suga Soft try to visit 
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and interact with offshore engineers to find solutions.  
 However, despite such efforts, Watanabe also explains that there are many 
unresolved issues that still exist: quality issues, delivery delays, the high attrition 
rate of Indian engineers, miscommunications, and issue  surrounding specifications, 
which are not only matters of concern for the Indian teams. Indeed, these concerns 
can be partly attributed to Japan-Suga Soft’s inability or delay in fixing 
specifications, states Watanabe.  
 Throughout the presentation, Watanabe emphasizes the importance of 
commitment to ensure quality. He argues, “For the Indian vendor, the end of the 
process means the end of their work. For us, the end of work is when the quality is 
validated.” 
 Strict quality control is a well-known feature of Japanese firms, whether 
dealing in software or hardware. Reducing the number of bugs to a minimum has to 
be rigorously pursued, which consequently intensifies the work of their engineers, as 
well as pressures offshore employees. Watanabe tries to xplain the difference in 
terms of methodological approaches. He states that Japan-Suga Soft is trying to 
standardize quality by establishing a quality assurance division in India, and further 
explains the firms’ efforts to transfer their standr s to India.  
 The importance of quality is also emphasized by Yoshi who states that it is 
necessary to control quality from the start of a project because his firm has many 
government-related projects that require the highest quality of deliverables. Yoshi 
states that Indian engineers are well aware of Japan-Suga Soft’s expectations and 
pressures from the user firm, and that the Indian firms are in general very 
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cooperative. This point can be seen by the Indian onsite engineers’ comments in the 
project such as, “I understand the clients’ pressure, because they have already 
promised the user company.” 
 Pursuit of quality and maintainability can be seen in Watanabe’s statement 
that his firm tries to achieve “white-boxing” of their processes. Watanabe, on one 
hand, feels that Japan-Suga Soft should respect the Indian firm’s own process, yet 
they cannot trust the Indian testing method and want the vendors to replicate the 
Japanese testing process.  
 Replicating the process of Japan-Suga Soft requires th  training of offshore 
resources, yet the firm faces difficulty in doing so because of the high attrition rate 
of Indian engineers. Watanabe states that they feel th y are wasting their time 
training them, because people who accumulate experience leave, and sometimes no 
original member is left on a project, so they have to start training from scratch. 
Because of the frequent changes of resources, “It is not worth training them,” said 
Watanabe, in a slightly resentful tone. This point overlaps the onsite engineers’ 
strategy (described earlier) of not discussing the attrition rate with clients.  
 This turn-over in Indian engineers is addressed by Japan-Suga Soft trying to 
provide incentives to key offshore resources with experience and management skills, 
according to Yoshi. Japan-Suga Soft has a “hallmark” tracking system, assigning a 
“serial number” to each offshore engineer and keeping track of key personnel that 
they need to retain, trying to provide those workers with new developments and 
opportunities to learn new technology. In this way, the firm separates key personnel 
as “core resources” versus lower-level engineers who are “replaceable.” One may 
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argue that Japan-Suga Soft is commodifying project labor, but at the same time, the 
firm is trying to differentiate between who is replace ble and who is not. 
 Japan-Suga Soft’s tracking of Indian engineers’ experience provides a sharp 
contrast to previous literature in which Indian workers in general have been analyzed 
as “generic” and “universal” workers (Aneesh 2006; Upadhya and Vasavi 2006) who 
perform a wide range of tasks to accommodate the needs of different industries and 
clients; high-earning but low-cost, project-based, replaceable (temporary) workers 
who take up downstream design and coding.  
 From both Watanabe’s and Yoshi’s comments, the firm’s hallmark system 
also shows that there is an internal hierarchy and differentiation from Japan-Suga 
Soft’s point of view as to who is replaceable and who is not, based on the 
expectation of working long-term. 
 In the workshop, Watanabe compares the quality of work by Japanese 
subcontractors with that of Indian vendors, and state  the former is higher than the 
latter in terms of quality, and that the firm wants the Indian vendor to follow the 
Japanese testing method. Yet from Yoshi’s explanatio s, Japanese kyooryokugaisha 
san (subcontractors) are by no means the same as Indian vendors. Yoshi points out 
that the domestic subcontractors in their office ar basically “on the same boat,” 
meaning they share the same destiny in their reciprocal relations. Many of these 
workers belong to their subsidiary companies, and these subcontractors strive to 
work hard and be as flexible as possible, to deliver th  quality that the firm expects 
in exchange for a long-term relationship. There is an assumption that the firm will 
take care of these subcontractors on a long term basis, nd in return, the firm expects 
210 
 
these subcontractors to work as if they were their own regular employees, only with 
lower wages, as employees of subsidiary firms. These subcontractors are vulnerable 
to the pressure to conform and complete whatever tasks they are asked to. Yoshi 
states that, “Indian vendors are different. We treat them as partners,” yet Watanabe’s 
comparison between the quality of domestic subcontracto s and the Indian vendor 
shows that the same criteria is applied to them, and the Indian firm is compared and 
critiqued based on the firm’s assumption of what “quality” means and how it should 
be maintained, even in offshore projects. 
 One of the issues that Japan-Suga Soft has with the Indian vendor is 
negotiations for extra costs for specification changes. Japanese firms are known for 
not “freezing” specifications at the beginning of a project and frequently modifying 
them through negotiations and discussions, but India  firms are primarily based on a 
structured development methodology that works best when they work upon fixed 
specifications, following these specifications step by step (often without major 
changes). It is a constant struggle for Indian firms to work with Japanese clients, 
because the frequent change in specifications generates isks of incurring extra costs 
for the time and efforts of Indian engineers. As mentioned earlier, extra costs are not 
necessarily paid by the prime contracting firm, which is part of the reason that 
project-based labor is preferred over time and material based labor, because in 
project-based labor, clients can put pressure on contractors to do extra work without 
paying extra wages. One Indian manager laments that often, project-based 
subcontractors have to provide service overtime and do unpaid work. One senior 
manager of a Japanese software service company states, “I can’t say whose fault it is. 
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Usually Japanese firms impose their request on Indian vendors, and the Indian side 
has to put up with it with no extra pay, and sometis user company pays extra. In 
any case, the workplace becomes 3K.” 
 3K, in the software industry, refers to words starting with “K,” such as kitsui 
(exhausting), kiriganai (endless), kaerenai (we can’t go home), and 
kigayasumaranai (there is no peace of mind). Frequent specification changes 
intensify the labor of software engineers and become an area of exploitation in 
client-vendor relations, as subcontractors find thems lves in a vulnerable position to 
say “yes” to the pressure of unpaid work because they ne d to maintain business 
relations with their client firm. Yoshi is sympathetic with the situations of the Indian 
firm and states, “They have to deliver by the deadline based upon unfixed 
specifications. Not being able to charge for extra price was a risk for them. It is like 
ten tasks become 12 with no extra pay. It is a lossf r them.”  
 This concern about Indian vendors is common, but it is perceived as 
“inflexibility” by those who are used to the “more flexible” attitudes of Japanese 
subcontractors. One manager of a Japanese firm states that Indian vendors are 
difficult to work with because they are inflexible compared to the more flexible 
Japanese and Chinese subcontractors. Watanabe and Yoshi’s firm negotiates with the 
Indian firm and allows the Indian firm to charge extra, establishing trust “without 
bullying the subcontractor,” according to Yoshi. Yoshi tates that Japan-Suga Soft 
does not treat the Indian firm as “subcontractors” but as “win-win” partners in a 
situation satisfactory to both.  




 This comment shows the difficulty they have; on one hand, they want this 
business to evolve, but they are constrained by the quality requirements. Also, 
Watanabe’s comment “we are told to have 10% of offshore Indian” requires attention. 
In many cases, the top management of Japanese companies is interested in 
offshoring for cost-reduction, and engineers are told  have a certain percentage of 
offshore employees in their projects, whether engineers want this or not. In 
Japan-Suga Soft’s policy, this number is fixed at 10%. Japan-Suga Soft has difficulty 
finding good engineers in Japan, and there are also co t pressures from global 
competition. Another engineer of Japan-Suga Soft state  that, “Even Japanese 
subcontractors don’t want to take up our projects because of the cost, and good 
engineers are decreasing, so we need to use offshore. But they are far from 
satisfactory. Maybe our approach is wrong. I don’t kow.” 
 Both Yoshi and Watanabe show an eagerness to work with and actively 
involve themselves in offshore projects, but their efforts also show that this process 
requires a lot of time and effort for both parties to synchronize, for the Japanese to 
monitor and to validate, and for the Indian parties o provide consistent, quality 
deliverables.  
The firm cannot assign something crucial to the India  firm…if 
there is some defect discovered and if it is from the Indian firm, 
they will no longer be needed. We partly give important 
projects...in part…but we can’t give them crucial projects. This 
is also the case for Japanese subcontractors…We are told to have 
10% of offshore Indian, but it is difficult to increase the number 




Case 2:  J-Yamato Tech: “Go Figure it Out!” 
 Many Japanese firms are concerned with communication difficulties, and 
communication always appears as one of the biggest concerns in offshoring 
(NASSCOM and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008; Soomushoo 2006). As mentioned 
earlier, Japanese software development tends to be bas d upon informal, ad hoc 
communication, with frequent specification changes rather than clearly defined 
specifications to work with. Often clients’ instructions are brief, and the software 
developers of subcontracting firms have to struggle to figure out implicit 
conventions that are taken for granted by clients. Spending long working hours 
together in similar settings makes it easier for engineers to share certain conventions 
of working; this is the case inside Japanese firms. Many Japanese engineers talk 
about the value of “aun no kokyuu” (literally meaning rhythmic breathing, referring 
to tacit understandings among participants without explicit verbal interactions), or 
“kuuki o yomu” (literally meaning to “read the air,” referring toreading between the 
lines). Engineers in Japanese firms often make comments such as, “they don’t 
understand aun no kokyuu,” separating “them” (foreign vendors) and “us” (Japanese 
engineers).  
 However, some Japanese engineers also argue that “aun no kokyuu” or 
“kuuki o yomu” is more a myth than a reality, and that there are, in reality, constant 
miscommunications even among Japanese engineers because of the unspoken 
assumptions of each side. “Aun no kokyuu” also needs to be understood in the 
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context of client-vendor relations. One sales executive of a Japanese company 
criticizes the ideology of “aun no kokyuu”  as it is based upon a client-centric 
ideology, not making efforts to explain what is wanted but forcing subcontractors to 
figure out what the client wants.  
 For those who take tacit understandings for granted, working with a new 
vendor from a geographically distant place with a highly structured and formal 
methodology is extremely tiresome. As discussed earlier, Japanese engineers who 
work with offshore Indian engineers are not necessarily willing to work with them 
on top of the heavy workload they have, and the Japanese engineers interviewed in 
this research found themselves in the difficult situation of dealing with offshore 
queries on top of their regular workloads. From top-management’s perspective, 
offshoring often has a definite cost merit, but engineers do not necessarily have 
incentives to work with offshore personnel because they gain little credit whether a 
project succeeds or fails (Kochi 2008).  
 The following case analysis examines an instance of communication 
difficulties experienced by Japanese engineers—how four engineers working for a 
Japanese software subsidiary company, J-Yamato Tech, talk about communications 
with offshore employees. (This data is based on the group interview.)  
 Responding to my question as to how they manage communication with 
offshore teams, all four engineers explained that simply answering questions from 
offshore teams took up too much of their time. For instance, one engineer, Beppu, 
states, “There is a tacit understanding between Japanese vendors, and we expect 
them to understand what is unsaid, but foreign vendors want to confirm and ask 
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detailed questions.”  
 Some of the questions Beppu received were important, but many were 
redundant. For Beppu, and for other engineers, it took a lot of time to read all the 
queries and answer questions in English. These enginers all understand English, but 
they have never studied abroad and have never used English extensively for 
communication; they feel that discussing specifications in detail in English takes too 
much time. Akasaka, a Japanese engineer, states that it was an excruciating 
experience to receive so many queries in so much detail. He felt that he could not 
handle so many queries, even in Japanese: “They ask me what they should do, what 
they should do, but I felt like, ‘Go figure it out!’”  
 In Akasaka’s project, there was an Indian onsite engineer, but he did not 
control or filter information for clients. Therefore, queries from offshore staff were 
simply transferred from the onsite engineer to Akasa. Although Beppu and 
Akasaka understand that it is good to communicate directly to avoid 
miscommunication, they wonder whether it is a really good idea to do so considering 
the vast amount of time and effort needed for this communication, at least in their 
experiences. Akasaka expressed a sense of confusion regarding spending so much 
time answering the questions of offshore engineers: “Offshoring means relocating 
work, so I am expected to do something else instead, but controlling offshore, and 
explaining in English takes too much time.”  
 This is, in part, a language problem, which may be solved by providing 
translators. A similar issue is discussed Sahey et al. (2003), who illustrates that 
language barriers make offshore coordination difficult, if not impossible.  
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 However, this is much more than a simple language issue. Mori, who is in 
charge of marketing at an Indian company states that clients tend to think that it is 
just a matter of language, but it is not. Mori states hat if Japanese firms are not 
prepared to make effort to solve communication gaps, they are doomed to fail in 
offshoring. By showing his marketing presentation materi ls, he explains how to 
educate audiences (Japanese clients).  
 Blending his personal experience with his Indian roommate into his 
marketing presentation, Mori explains the following: one day Mori had to go to work 
early, and he did not have time to wash his shirt, so he asked his Indian roommate to 
do the laundry for him. His roommate said, “OK, no pr blem,” so Mori made an 
assumption that his shirt would be washed, dried, an  ironed. When he came back, 
he found that the shirt was washed, but still left in the washing machine. Using his 
experience as an example, he argues that Japanese firm  need to be aware that no one 
understands their expectations unless they clearly state and explain them. Figure 13 
is the slide he presents in his workshops for Japanese firms who are interested in or 




Figure 13. Mori’s handout 
（NIHON NeST CORPORATION 2009:6） 
 The title is “Indians do not have a sense of “aun no kokyuu” (tacit 
knowledge) or “gyookan o yomu” (read between the lines).” Mori states that omitting 
some information as obvious can cause misunderstandings, and simple software 
functions that are obvious to the Japanese are not crea ed by the Indian side unless 
explicitly explained and instructed.  
 A similar problem can be seen in the engineers’ narratives. Beppu states that 
the project outcome of the Indian firm was not as good as expected compared to 
local Japanese vendors: “There are many questions. Many questions, but the result is 
simple (laugh). So many queries and this little result?”  
 Akasaka also states that, “it was just a migration project of an already 
existing system. So there are no specific instructions. I just asked them to bring 
proposals.” It was a pilot project and if it went well, their fi m intended to continue 
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working with the Indian firm, but they are now unsure whether they want to work 
with offshore Indian teams in the future because “it takes too much time.”  
 Saito compares the Indian vendors with Japanese vendors and states, 
“Japanese vendors can propose alternative plans, but they (Indians) can’t.” The 
biggest issue, according Beppu, is they do whatever they are told to do and nothing 
more. Beppu analyzes what is at stake as follows: 
 These comments raise three issues: 1) the Japanese side’s control, 2) the 
Indian side’s coordination ability, and 3) the commodification of engineers’ labor 
simply to obtain as labor intensive “bodies” (as in the body shop metaphor) rather 
than working with these engineers as creative partners who can think for themselves. 
These engineers state that Indian engineers they work ith have technical 
capabilities, but they are “yuuzuu ga kikanai” (inflexible). This criticism of Indian 
firms as inflexible constantly comes up in comparisons to more flexible Japanese 
subcontractors. Sato explains, 
Things are disconnected. It is either we commit ourselves and 
aggressively control them, or they provide a good manager who 
can understand technical things and can fill in the gaps…If that 
is not possible, we use them as resource that assembles parts, and 
not more.  
They are cheap, friendly, and have good technical skills, but they 
are inflexible…It’s a pity that those personnel who have become 
flexible by working here leave after a while…It is hard to train 
new people to be flexible every time they come. We ne d an extra 
step to establish communication. I wish it could be solved. 
Onsite engineers are basically weak even in large Indian firms. 
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 Another related issue, as mentioned earlier, is the heavy workload of 
Japanese engineers and the time constraints they have. This issue was also touched 
upon in the comments of the Indian engineer in the previous chapter, who states that 
his clients do not have time to answer questions, even face-to-face. Many Japanese 
software engineers work extremely long hours, which almost always surprises Indian 
engineers who come and work in Japanese clients’ offices for the first time. This 
problem in communication is not simply a matter of language, but should be 
analyzed partly as a structural problem of overwork in software workplaces and in 
client-vendor relations, including the pressure that tends to be put on subcontractors 
to be flexible. 
 A Japanese manager illustrates the issues surrounding the exhausting 
working conditions in this firm: 
 The manager explains that miscommunications may be partly due to this 
culture of “overwork,” which can be linked to the structural issues surrounding long 
working hours and service overtime that Sugimoto (2003) and Kumazawa 
(Kumazawa 2010) identified. Aun no kokyu (tacit understanding) is explained by this 
manager as a consequence of long-working hours and exhaustion by workers in the 
Japanese software service companies in general.  
They (engineers) don’t have energy left to explain things in 
detail because they are too exhausted. They do not take notes, 
and they do not make documents, because they cannot. They do 
not make confirmation. Instead they make assumptions that the 
other side should understand without saying. There is always 




Case 3:  Kita-Japan Machinery: No Commitment 
 The last case study analyzes a failed project between a large Japanese 
manufacturing company, Kita Machinery, and an India software service company, 
Indra Softech. The analysis is based on an interview with a project manager of the 
Japanese firm and is supplemented by the voices of Japanese onsite engineers who 
were involved in the project. This section examines why this project failed from the 
perspective of the Japanese manager, Wada, and from the onsite engineer, Yoshino. 
 Kita-Japan Machinery started this project as part of implementing a new 
system in its overseas group companies in Southeast Asia. Indra Softech was 
selected because of their English capabilities for gl bal interfacing. The system, 
however, did not go as planned, and Indra Softech failed to launch the system. 
Initially, the failure was accounted for by frequent specification changes caused by 
Kita-Japan Machinery, and Indra Softech was not heavily criticized.  
 However, Wada’s firm’s investigation revealed that Indra Softech did not 
create proper documentation for their development, a d this made it impossible to 
analyze the cause of the problem. It also turned out that the Indian firm did not 
conduct proper testing before delivery. Kita-Japan Machinery tried to find solutions 
with the Indian firm, but their senior managerial meeting did not go well, and Wada’s 
firm eventually terminated the contract. According to Wada, they did not receive any 
positive responses from Indra Softech to help solve the problem.  
 I interviewed Wada shortly after Kita-Japan Machinery terminated the 
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contract. Wada was still upset about the responses of Indra Softech. “It was a black 
box,” Wada explains. Wada regularly received reports from the offshore team of 
Indra Softech, but their reports always mentioned that ere were no critical issues. It 
was thus a big surprise for Wada to discover that the project went so wrong. He 
stated that they should have controlled and micromanaged the Indian team more 
rigorously from the beginning to the end. Wada added that this will create a difficult 
situation for future offshore teams because they will be put under surveillance, and it 
will also create extra costs because more Japanese staff will be involved. He states 
that he does not need the Indian firm if they require so much time and energy to 
control them from the Japanese side. 
 Wada wanted a recovery plan from Indra Softech, but he complained that the 
Indian side “adds nothing other than doing what they are told to do.” Wada sees this 
lack of responsiveness and passivity as a serious problem. Indian IT engineers are 
criticized as incapable of thinking outside the box. Wada’s comments overlap the 
European clients’ views of Indian engineers (Sahay, et al. 2003; Upadhya and Vasavi 
2006). The UK manager in the study of Sahay, et al. mde a very similar comment to 
Wada’s criticism of Indra Softech as unable to come up with any solution in these 
cases: “If you miss something or something doesn’t quite add up, they won’t see it as 
a problem that they need to solve independently. They’ll read that as what to do.” 
Wada states that they should go outside of the box, and try new things to produce 
high-end work. Wada states, “You need to communicate with clients and work for 
them going beyond your job descriptions. You can’t say you don’t know just sticking 
to your own domain. It is more like sales.” 
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 Wada was also frustrated because the onsite engineers and offshore 
engineers were evasive, and nobody took responsibility for what happened: “Onsite 
engineers state it is not their job, and they state there was no such input (from the 
client). This is a business, and I need someone to coordinate, and bridge the gaps.” 
 Wada does not hide his anger, and strongly dismissed the Indian’s “lengthy 
30 page report stating that they can’t do without resources and money.” Wada felt 
that it would have been faster to do the work themslves rather than hiring them. It is 
not that Wada does not appreciate the Indian engineers’ fforts—he felt that the 
Indian engineers worked hard as individuals, but there was a lack of coordination, 
and, as the second case study suggested, either he must control them, or they must 
coordinate themselves. As in the earlier cases, thi is not Wada’s main job and he 
cannot spend all his time on this. For the future, Wada explains that he would work 
with offshore Indian teams only on the conditions that they were under the control of 
other Japanese firms (i.e., on the condition that tey work in a lower tier 
subcontracting chain). He comments, “I can’t just do this. I don’t want to work with 
them because there are too many risks involved.” 
 Yoshino, who coordinated the onsite-offshore relations, provides a slightly 
different view. Yoshino was extremely anxious whether offshore personnel could 
complete the task before going live. He was upset at the time because the offshore 
side never wanted to make a commitment: “They never say they will do it by the 
date.” For Yoshino, the most important thing was to work for the clients and operate 
the system on the date already decided. He states, “It was like they don’t have to do 




 He was caught in the gap between the offshore manager’s insistence that he 
did not make any commitment, and the client’s plan to go live on the timeline 
already fixed in advance. Yoshino stated that the int nse work pressure and 
responsibility that onsite engineers feel in Japanese workplaces is difficult to convey 
to distant places, that proximity matters and different rhythms of working affect 
offshore collaboration. Yoshino explains the clients’ expectations for “commitment” 
to deadlines, or “commitment” to proposing alternative solutions are difficult to 
translate to the offshore side, because there are mny job opportunities in the 
offshore Indian industry, and “if they don’t like the work here, they may go 
somewhere else.”  
 
Summary 
 This chapter analyzed three case studies in relation w th long working hours 
and exhaustion in Japanese workplaces, and complements the views presented by 
onsite engineers in the previous chapter. The previous chapters illustrated the 
difficulties that onsite engineers face in various workplaces in Japan, where the 
Japanese side is portrayed as a set of “panoptical eyes” that control onsite engineers’ 
behaviors. On one hand, the voices of the engineers of the Japanese firms in this 
chapter reveal their attempt to control offshore labor, which cannot be disembedded 
from structural and organizational factors such as their long working hours, broad 
job specifications, and organizational pursuits of quality. The chapter, however, also 
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reveals such control is difficult. Attempting to control offshore work generates and 
intensifies the work for Japanese engineers, on top of the highly pressured workloads 
they already have. It is easy to criticize those Japanese firms that exercise control 
and put unreasonable pressure on offshore workers, y t this chapter showed not only 
their sense of pride in their own practices as seen in Watanabe, but illuminated ironic 
intensification of labor because of the time and effort needed for communication.  
 In addition, the communication issues raised in Case 2 highlight the fact that 
“communication” is not simply an issue of language, but it involves clients’ demands 
for flexibility—flexibility to figure out what the clients want, as well as flexibility to 
think outside the “box” and flexibility to be a creative resource that does more than 
assemble parts. The discussion reveals that the strong demand for tacit understanding 
thus needs to be understood in the context of client-v dor relations that Indian 
engineers are placed in. Tacit knowledge may be, as suggested by one of the 
managers, a structural outcome of exhaustion, generated by long working hours. 
Following this view, communication issues are, at least in part, a socially and 
organizationally induced issue, deeply connected to the tension of, on one hand, 
wanting to have “vendors” with brains and tacit understanding, while on the other, 
making compromises, using a “vendor” as cheap commodified labor. 
 The chapter discussed the difficulties, struggles, and tensions in the analysis 
of three case studies of Japanese workplaces. The voic s f the clients discussed in 
this chapter also need to be complemented by offshore engineers’ points of view. The 








Chapter X  
Voices from Offshore in India 
 
 The city of Pune is located in the mid-west region of India, in the state of 
Maharashtra, and it is well known as a college town with many educational facilities. 
The city experienced rapid development with the development of the IT sector in 
recent years, and it attracts software workers across India. 
 India Tech, one of the offshore development centers that I visited, is located 
in a special zone for IT related companies, known as an IT park, that are designed to 
provide necessary infrastructure for the IT industry, with modern building facilities 
and network and communication infrastructures. The park and the modern facilities 
of IT firms play an important role as marketing tools and showcase that Indian IT 
has state of the art, modern facilities and infrastructures in these IT zones, and that 
they are reliable business partners for OECD clients. The offshore development 
center of India Tech occupies three floors of the office building inside the IT Park. 
Some of their office sections are exclusively dedicated for Japanese clients, and the 
security allows entry only to those who work for these cli nts. I was allowed to visit 
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the managers and engineers in their offices, cafeterias, and homes and to talk with 
them concerning their experiences of working with Japanese clients.  
 Engineers have diverse experiences working for different clients, but many 
engineers I interviewed emphasize that they appreciate working for Japanese clients, 
and that it is a great learning experience for them particularly in terms of quality 
control. Yet some do not hesitate to voice frustration owards their Japanese clients. 
Jalal, a project manager in his thirties, comments, “Japanese clients are super fussy. 
They like to micromanage us.” Similar comments were heard from other engineers 
and managers, although some show understanding of why their Japanese clients are 
meticulous in detail. For people like Jalal who has d a good deal of experience 
working with US clients, “particularities” of Japanese clients seem especially 
noticeable. Jalal was not used to reporting detailed activities to his clients before he 
started working with the current Japanese project. (Jalal’s US clients only required 
brief, one-page reports with one sentence: “I am working on this problem.”)  
 Jalal states that the status report for the Japanese firm requires writing about 
daily activities, such as “What do you do every day, Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday…day-by-day.” The reporting was broken down among individual 
engineers, and every member had to report what they did on an Excel sheet with 
their individual names, providing plans regarding what they might be doing next 
week. The following week, they are expected to compare what they planned with 
what they did and whether the two matched or not. Jalal explains the clients’ 
micromanagement as follows: “They pay for JPY3000 (USD24) per hour for 
offshore, so offshore is expected to report what they did at the end of the day.”  
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  Jalal visited the client company on a business trip to Japan, and he was told 
by a Japanese manager that they were not happy with his reporting that he was doing 
a lot of work, but not telling them what he was doing. The client wanted more 
visibility, explains Jalal. Jalal understands that this is necessary for a Japanese 
manager, who also needs to report to his boss, as Japanese upper management 
requires detailed reporting. Yet Jalal strongly exprsses his frustration regarding 
such micromanagement.  
 Another Indian engineer, Rakin worked for American clients for five years, 
and he has recently transferred to the division that de ls with Japanese projects. 
Rakin also agrees with Jalal’s comment, but with some reservation. Rakin states that 
there are American firms that like to micromanage just like the Japanese clients that 
they deal with. However, Rakin adds, that Japanese clients are generally more 
demanding and wanted them to be more flexible in terms of later changes caused by 
the clients’ side, and that many have high quality standards. Rakin strongly suggests 
that those who have never worked with Japanese clients need to be aware of the 
difference. 
 A group of other young engineers sitting next to Rakin also commented. 
Some started with such gambits as, “I don’t mean to offend you, but...” They were 
first cautious not to offend me because I was visiting from Japan. However, after 
Rakin’s comment, they started joking about how fussy Japanese clients are, and how 
detailed their requests are in asking for progress ports, or counting bugs. Many of 
them said in a resigned tone that “I can understand, but...,” and laughed. Some 
attribute it to cultural differences, “they can’t help it, it is Japanese culture.” Others 
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show a hint of annoyance in their tone of voices and facial expressions, and some 
remained totally silent.  
 Their casual remarks stopped when Teji, their manager, came into the 
cafeteria, and joined them at the table. Teji has been working for Japanese firms for 
some years, and he has frequent interactions with the Japanese client side managers. 
Teji knows very well about these issues, but he is much more cautious about the 
words he uses, and he emphasizes that the firm has a successful offshore 
collaboration with their Japanese clients. Teji exprsses that they are proud of their 
history and development with their Japanese clients, and that there exist difficulties 
but basically “trust is there,” and their ties will become stronger in the future in 
hopes that more long-term partnership will flourish.  
 These voices of Jalal, Rakin, and Teji illustrate offshore engineers’ mixed 
feelings towards Japanese firms. This last chapter takes readers to India and 
examines the voices of Indian engineers and managers who have experience working 
with clients in Japanese firms, and illustrate how offshore personnel view Japanese 
clients’ control and micromanagement. Both supportive opinions as well as 
expressions of distancing from clients are analyzed.  
 
Theoretical Directions 
 As mentioned earlier, a major part of the Indian IT Industry’s operations 
deal with lower stream design, coding, and testing (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). 
Compared to the upstream process (requirement analysis nd design), the lower 
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process is considered labor intensive and more structured and routinized. In order to 
control the offshore development process and outcome, structured process 
management methodology such as CMMI is used to monitor and control workflow, 
particularly in the US. Such process management methodology has been analyzed as 
a panoptical gaze and corporate controlling mechanism to enhance productivity and 
efficiency, and such control has been criticized as “Neo-Taylorism” (Upadhya 
2009:9-10), and as “alegocracy,” a combination of bureaucratic control and universal 
coding (Aneesh 2006). Standardization measures such as CMMI are designed to 
facilitate the visibility of workflow, by requiring alarge volume of documentation of 
work progress in reports and timesheets (Upadhya and V savi 2006:76). Although 
many Japanese firms do not follow structured CMMI processes, the firms’ emphasis 
on high-quality standards within a fixed timeframe leads many firms to exercise 
micro-level control over the outcomes generated by the offshore teams. The issues of 
micromanagement and control by Japanese clients will be discussed in this chapter 
in detail.  
 Along with explicit control of workers through process management, more 
indirect psychological control of workers by the managerial side has been critically 
analyzed in Upadhya (2008). By examining a case study of cross-cultural training 
provided by Indian firms, Upadhya argues that such workshops emphasize the 
importance of “customer centricity,” i.e., to become an “English butler who knows 
his master’s need even before the master has the need” (Upadhya 2009:7). Various 
studies point out that it is not in the Indian culture to be passive and obedient, but 
such responses are shaped in asymmetrical client-vender relations (Sahay, et al. 
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2003; Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). The narrative of “customer centricity” is a very 
common voice in my data as well, and this issue will also be analyzed in this chapter.  
 At the same time, terms such as “Neo-Taylorism” or “Electric Panopticon” 
tend to overemphasize the controlling and domineering aspects of the work process. 
As seen in the analysis of onsite engineers’ communication issues, it is very difficult 
to control the outcome of the offshore process. Workers are not necessarily totally 
controlled by clients. As Latour argues, total contrl and panoptical gaze has to be 
understood in terms of connectivity, through various voices of onsite engineers, 
clients in Japanese firms, and offshore engineers. Kleifgen (2005) examines the 
implementation of quality control in high-tech workplaces, and illuminates that 
quality control is a complex social practice and that implementation of standardized 
procedures (official illiteracies) in high-tech workplaces generates an unstable, 
shifting field of conformity of the employees. This section also reveals these mixed 
feelings through the voices of offshore intermediaries operating in India. The 
analysis of this chapter illuminates the clients’ micro-control seen from offshore 
engineers’ points of view, and examines how workers distance themselves from the 
control of a client.  
 
Voices of Offshore Engineers and Managers 
Quality Control and Discontent 
 As seen in the previous chapter, the strict quality requirements of Japanese 
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clients are well known among engineers working in offshore development centers. 
As experienced onsite engineers working in Japan explained, it is part of their job to 
explain and educate offshore team members regarding what quality means to 
Japanese clients, particularly to those who are new to Japanese projects. Akshay, a 
project manager who was assigned to a Japanese project a year ago commented that 
he had a hard time working with a Japanese firm until he understood the level of 
quality they required. Akshay states, “We need an adjusting period to understand that 
before starting to work with Japanese clients.”  
 Teji, the project manager introduced at the beginning of the chapter and 
other people in managerial positions (project managers and executives whom I 
interviewed), expressed an understanding of the quality standards of the Japanese 
companies that they work with. Many managers who have experience with Japanese 
projects are aware of the well-known Japanese management style typified by the 
Toyota production system. Referring to Toyota’s kaizen (quality improvement) or 
“Five Whys” (a question-asking method for the root–cause analysis of defects), the 
Indian managers I interviewed made comments such as, “J panese engineers ask why, 
why, and why five times, but we do so only twice,” “Japanese clients are good at 
root-cause analysis,” and “One problem leads to ten questions.” 
 Bala, an executive of a large Indian firm who has many years’ experience 
working with Japanese clients states that the word “quality”  is a key when talking 
with Japanese customers. Bala states, “ A lot of salespeople who never worked for 
Japanese people, they don’t understand what quality is, or how to talk to a Japanese 
person about quality.” Bala explains that the Japanese concept of quality means 
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“defect-free in everything.” This is not limited to just the end products, but includes 
the process as a whole. Bala states that whenever h talks to people in the Japanese 
office of the Indian firm or in clients’ firms, he hears conversations such as, “How 
are you? How is your work?” “Oh, there are many problems. There are many 
problems.” (The executive humorously raised his voice when he uttered “there are 
many problems.”) Bala explains that every Japanese person that he knows expresses 
areas in which they need to improve. He explains humorously the episode of an 
onsite engineer in his firm as an example to make his point. An engineer in Bala’s 
firm went to see a Japanese client to solve some issue, but when the client asked 
“How is the project?” the Indian engineer took it as a greeting, and replied that 
everything was fine. But this answer made the Japanese client furious, and the client 
suddenly yelled at him: “You don’t have any problem? Your engineers don’t even 
recognize there are many problems?” Bala states that if the same person was 
Japanese, he would have replied, “Oh there are many problems, many bugs, we need 
to fix.” He states that the Japanese way of analyzing problems is very clear, with 
“Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3,” and that meeting the expected quality requires a lot of 
effort.  
 Mitali, a project manager who has been working for the same Japanese firm 
for a long period also explains their efforts to “understand the clients’ needs” and 
“replicate” their style. However, Mitali also raised the point that it is difficult to do 
so unless one understands the kind of acute sense of commitment that the Japanese 
firm has towards their customers. As mentioned earli r, Indian firms often work as 
second or lower tier subcontractors in the Japanese IT hierarchy, and thus it is often 
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difficult to see the pressure placed on the prime contracting firm to fulfill the 
expectations of their user company. Mitali shows sympathy to his client in the sense 
that they are also pressured by their client’s demands, by the user company of the 
product. Mitali states the following: “Once we understand what quality is to our 
client, we can really deliver that product, and the cli nt can directly deliver that to 
customer without much of inspection at their end.” 
 However, Mitali also states that it takes time to understand a client’s 
development process and fine-tune the overall development processes of the clients 
they work with, along with their own processes. For instance, in Mitali’s case, his 
team initially tried to replicate processes similar to the client’s, but this was difficult 
to achieve because the technical competency of developers in the client company 
was very high, and Mitali thus needed to scale up their offshore engineers to this 
level so that every person in the offshore team could be accountable for the work 
they are doing. As the offshore relationship grows, engineers acquire greater 
understandings of clients’ methodologies and ways of working, yet engineers from 
Mitali’s team frequently left the projects. This issue is not limited to Mitali’s 
company, and he states that the high attrition rate in he Indian IT industry makes 
knowledge accumulation difficult.  
 Engineers who have experience working for US firms or who have heard 
about American clients from their colleagues compare and contrast them, 
commenting on the strict and picky quality control of the Japanese firms that they 
work with. Discussions with junior engineers revealed that at least some feel 




Infrastructure does not always synchronize 
 Standardization (replication of the development processes of Japanese 
firms) is also viewed as difficult because of their t chnical and infrastructural 
differences. The modern facilities of offshore development centers are used to 
showcase their capability to create something of a little America, or a little Tokyo in 
India, yet synchronization of infrastructure is not necessarily a straightforward 
process. Sometimes infrastructural issues negatively affect the progress of projects, 
and it can be escalated into the termination of projects. However, this issue tends to 
be overlooked, or not openly discussed until problems arise because of business 
considerations and the goal of winning deals. India engineers who are in charge of 
infrastructure express frustration and worry about the difficulty of synchronization 
and recreation of the same level of infrastructure with the OECD nations. 
 Vimal, an offshore infrastructure engineer states that the Japanese engineers 
he works with do not understand infrastructural problems and expect things to 
operate in the way they do in Japan. Vimal explains that he machines that Japanese 
clients expect them to purchase cannot be purchased  asily as the clients imagine 
because of bureaucracy and the complex division of labor in back office transactions 
in the offshore development center. Also, Vimal’s cients do not understand that the 
quality of machines in India is not as high as Japanese clients expect. Vimal states 
the difficulty of explaining these differences to the Japanese clients he works with, 
“I can see it but Japanese engineers have no idea. Indi n onsite engineers in Japan 
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don’t explain these things to clients, and they say yes. That causes a problem.” 
 Vimal also adds that he often gets caught in betwen the offshore manager 
and the client side, because the offshore managers he works with try not to purchase 
necessary machines to reduce costs and try to ask clients to bear the costs, but the 
clients expect this to be taken care of by the offshore side in the first place; 
infrastructure engineers therefore get caught in the middle. Vimal argues that “local 
realities” have to be explained to clients through onsite engineers and sales managers 
in Japan, but this does not always happen because of business pressure to emphasize 
and sell the image that they can create a replica of working environment in Tokyo. 
Vimal laments that there are very few onsite engineers who can explain the 
difficulties to their clients and ask the client for understanding and support.  
 
Quantification for Surveillance 
 Many of the engineers interviewed also mentioned the importance of 
quantification and the use of data when working with Japanese clients. This issue is 
related to “digital communication skill” that one manager pointed out as a skill 
necessary for onsite engineers (see Chapter VII). For instance, Anand, a project 
manager, states that when there was a problem, the Japanese clients he worked with 
often required the offshore side to justify the cause in quantitative terms. Anand 
states, “Only if you are able to quantify, the customer will be able to agree on the 
points that we are making.”  
 This same point was made by many other engineers whom I interviewed. 
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Kala states his client frequently demands logical and concrete explanations as if 
there had to be a reason for every action. Some engin ers suggest that client requests 
for data make offshore engineers nervous. Vinay, for instance, states that he feels 
nervous before having a telephone conference with the client firm in Japan. Vinay is 
aware that the client “studies” the report he sends thoroughly before each meeting; 
thus, if there is a problem, he knows that he will be scrutinized and he needs to be 
ready to present logical explanations. 
 The detailed monitoring of work progress and outcomes by clients in 
Japanese firms was commented on by many of the engineers in this research (e.g., 
schedule slippage, defect numbers, coding numbers). P ashant, an engineer, states 
that his project managers used to be irritated and worried about the client’s demand 
for lots of data, “A lot of information...so much of spread sheet filled with all the 
data. They were very, very worried.” 
 These quantitative evaluations are, however, not always received as negative 
qualities, at least at the managerial level in the Indian firms that I interviewed. 
Engineers and managers say that they are now more used to this data-driven 
approach: “Now they can see, they can measure the results, check whether they are 
improving or not improving…Everything works together.”  
 Mahesh, a project manager, states that, “They are demanding. No doubt. But 
at the same time, we talk to them logically, give th m proper reason and data to 
support your reason (why it cannot be done), they will understand, and try to 
implement next time. That level of understanding is also there.”  
 Furthermore, according to the interviews with experienced onsite engineers, 
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quantification is an important means to persuade Japanese clients. Explaining 
schedule slippages in term of quantity, and explaining what percentage of tasks can 
be completed on time can become an important tactic for onsite engineers to use 
when talking with the Japanese clients that they work with. Many of the engineers in 
the interview explain that quantifying work progress and presenting both “good 
news” and “bad news” makes it easier to negotiate and elicit cooperation and 
compromises from their clients. The digital mode of c mmunication explained in the 
previous chapter is used by both clients and Indian firms for negotiations.  
 
Micromanagement  
 As introduced at the beginning of the chapter, many e gineers in this 
research mentioned that their clients ask offshore f  detailed reports and try to 
micromanage them. Monthly, weekly, or even daily status reports are requested by 
their clients, and hourly reporting is required in extreme cases. Frequent and detailed 
progress reports as well as strict quality control ae forms of “micromanagement” 
from offshore personnel’s point of view. Micromanagement becomes an issue 
particularly when a problem arises. Micromanagement and a demand for frequent 
status reporting is not unique to Japanese clients, but the detailed reporting that the 
clients of Japanese firms demand is often felt as aspecial characteristic of Japanese 
firms.  
 Madan, a project team leader, describes the frequent status reporting 
demanded by a client as follows: 
238 
 
 Many engineers in this research had negative feelings about clients’ 
micromanagement and the demand for frequent reporting, although many state the 
importance of monitoring the progress of projects. Reporting creates more work, and 
engineers already feel pressed for time. Some mention that they feel they are not 
trusted and cannot do things independently. While there are projects that are not 
micromanaged and reporting is just a formality, once a problem arises, many clients 
start micromanaging. Pranav, an engineer, explains the reason for frequent reporting 
as, “Japanese clients do not like surprises” or “clients need visibility.” 
 Hari, a team leader, explains that there is a gap between clients’ emphasis on 
process and quality, and engineers’ career aspirations in offshore development 
centers; many young engineers, especially those with three to four years of 
experience, want to learn many different types of technology, want to change jobs, 
change projects. For them, a client-specific process or quality control is not relevant. 
The client may try to micromanage through documents ad check whether the Indian 
side completed the proper testing, but for these engineers, documentation is 
irrelevant to their careers, and those who are discontent quit to take jobs with more 
interesting technologies, higher incomes and better opportunities.  
 As shown at the beginning of the chapter, engineers who have worked for 
They track your day-to-day activities…and (if the client asks 
why the) activity was to end by 5 pm today, but it did not end. 
What is the problem?...let us know. What is your analysis? Is the 
management doing preventive activity on that?...Doing all these, 




US clients tended to compare the micromanagement of Japanese firms with that of 
American clients. Although many engineers interviewed do not have experience 
working for American clients, they have colleagues and friends who are involved in 
US projects, and they are aware of differences in reporting systems. Many engineers 
said that US clients are often more relaxed about quality, delivery timing, and budget, 
and they do not require frequent and detailed reporting. One engineer who works on 
a project for a US firm states that it is much more comfortable working with the US 
client. At the same time, some engineers like Rakin, introduced at the beginning of 
the chapter, comment that the image of “US clients” is simplified and idealized in 
contrast to the detailed and picky Japanese firms, and these simplified narratives and 
images of US clients seem to intensify negative feelings and frustrations towards 
those Japanese clients who try to micromanage. 
 
Jalal: An Alienated Manager 
 Jalal, the project manager introduced at the beginning of the chapter, was 
extremely frustrated with the way he and his team was micromanaged by status 
reporting. Jalal feels frustration because he feels alienated from his own projects by 
this micromanagement and reporting system. Although he spends a considerable 
amount of time managing this project at the offshore development center, he feels 
that his efforts are not appreciated by the client company. Jalal was told by the client 
that a management fee should not be charged to the client. The client wrote the 
following e-mail in response: “Why do you need to manage 15 people? If they are 
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told to do this…they should do that…why do we need another person to look after 
them?”  
 Jalal feels that the concept of “project management” is not well accepted in 
Japan. After showing me the status report that he was required to make, he explains 
that he was not being paid for his efforts. Pointing to his own workload on the sheet, 
Jalal lamented, “look at this, 0 per hour (for payment).” Jalal’s frustration continues 
to accumulate because his managerial role is ignored n the sheet. Matsuo, the 
manager in the Japanese firm states that it is standard practice to exclude a 
management fee at their firm, but that it is possible to include it in the overall 
estimate without explicitly stating that it is a management fee. However, Jalal 
compares this with US conventions, and he subsequently questions the value to 
himself of “0 per hour” as a manager taking part in he project. 
 Jalal argues that software development activities cannot always be 
expressed as a visible output because the software industry differs from 
manufacturing industries which can show tangible products. Jalal laments that, from 
the client’s perspective, learning a new technology r language is not justifiable as 
paid labor and cannot be included in the report. He argues that there is no such 
culture in Indian IT workplaces that allows one to micromanage and check what 
someone else does every day. For Jalal, what matters r  the final deliverables, not 
daily activities. Jalal points out that this involves an issue of trust, and the client’s 
lack of trust leads them to ask for proof of work. This point has been raised by many 




 Jalal’s team is also asked to video record whether testing is actually 
performed. First, they were asked to conduct one hundred test cases, and then they 
were asked to show proof on video, so they had to rec rd the whole test. After the 
testing process, the client was finally convinced that t ey did their work. Jalal states 
that this has to do with “visibility”: “Because the work is conducted in a distant 
place, the clients need to have the proof, proof to justify the work.”   
 Madhu, a leader on this team, explained to me how the testing was 
conducted and recorded, and stated that he had never don  anything like this in order 
to validate his work for clients. Furthermore, the status reports demanded by his 
Japanese clients are very detailed, and usually take up lots of his time every Friday. 
Madhu felt that the client wanted to know how the company worked because this 
was the first project with them. He stated that he was required to generate documents 
for every process, and there were many specification changes, that for them 
everything was a “reactive approach” because they needed to respond to changes the 
client made every time. It was also difficult to find resources, and it took them time 
to train them, thus they lost further time. Madhu commented, “Of course we expect 
changes, but not 100% change. I have been working for 12 hours these two months, 
and I am not paid overtime. There are so many changes, and the delivery date is 
approaching.” 
 When a problem gets really serious, it gets reported to senior management’s 
level, and the reporting further intensifies. Managers need to report not only to 
Japanese clients, but to their own senior managers, and frequent reporting drives 
engineers and managers to the edge of reason. Kartik,  project manager discusses 
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this escalation in reports up to senior management as follows: “the moment it started 
escalating, everybody comes into the picture. Senior managers start asking questions, 
and most of my time was to create presentations for them and telling what went 
wrong. The team also worked hard from 9 (a.m.) to 11 (p.m.) for six months.” 
 This micromanagement or need for visibility was expr ssed differently by 
an engineer dispatched from the Japanese firms. Sometimes, Japanese firms send 
their engineers offshore to investigate issues because it is much easier to find issues 
once they are in India. Some companies have representative offices in India, and 
these representatives regularly visit offshore India development centers and discuss 
project progress with them.  
 Shibuya, a residential officer of an Indian office of a Japanese firm, works 
closely with an offshore Indian firm. Shibuya resides in India, visits their offshore 
development center regularly, and discusses the proj ct’s progress with the teams in 
the Indian firm. Shibuya feels that it is much easir to monitor their work in close 
proximity in India, to see how they work. One of Shibuya’s jobs is to train Indian 
engineers and to teach them the testing methodology of the Japanese firm he works 
with. His company has been working with the offshore fi m for more than five years, 
but they had problems in several large projects because of quality issues, so 
Shibuya’s firm decided to establish an officer residing in India to closely monitor 
and train Indian engineers.  
 However, Shibuya feels that even being in India, it is difficult for him to 
understand the offshore company’s ways of working. Shibuya attends status report 
meetings, but it is difficult for him to understand what and how much is really 
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complete and what measures are being taken. The Indian side starts talking in their 
language when things become problematic, he explains, so he feels he needs more 
quantitative proof to analyze root causes. This “quantit tive proof” is linked to the 
“digital communication skill” that I have discussed in Chapter VII, and one can see 
the link between the need to see the clear reason step by step through “digital 
communication” and the pressure to show it in a quantit tive way.   
 
“Hitotsu Yoroshiku” (Thank you in advance):  
Issues Surrounding Client Centricity and Pressure fo  Flexibility  
 One Indian onsite engineer states that micromanagement is closely 
connected with another commonly discussed assertion: “no problem.” It is often 
pointed out by Japanese firms that the Indian side cannot say “no” to clients’ 
requests, even if they are already overloaded. This becom s a problem later when a 
client finds out that a task accepted by the Indian team is actually not possible. This 
issue is not a secret, and is sometimes openly stated, s in the marketing workshop of 
the large Indian firm discussed earlier as “they (India  engineers) cannot say no,” or 
“They may discuss, but do not oppose,” and “They value silence like us, and value 
good manners.”   
 Yoshimoto, a Japanese onsite engineer of a large Indian firm, states that, 
“Indians can’t say no. I don’t know why. Those clients who understand why they 
can’t…They have experience, and they will succeed in offshore. Those (clients) who 
don’t, they have a long way to go.” Yoshimoto points out that clients micromanage 
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when they are not sure if an offshore company is telling the truth. Many engineers 
explained in the interviews that clients do not want negative “surprises” such as 
delays in delivery or low quality deliverables, and that they feel the need to monitor 
the process and outcomes and conduct micromanagement for greater visibility and 
predictability. One Indian engineer generalizes thiissue as a matter of national 
characteristic: “The main thing is all the Indian peo le have a tendency to say 
directly yes to any of work even if it is a big request, most of the time yes to it, then 
he or she may come into trouble.” 
 This is similar to the cultural stereotypes of Indians by European clients, 
such as “the submissive Indian mindset,” but studies illustrate that often these issues 
are rarely analyzed as client–vendor power relations (Upadhya and Vasavi 
2006:97-98).There are various reasons, accounted for by ffshore engineers and 
managers in this research, for not being able to say “no” to clients’ requests, or not 
reporting the issues they have to their clients. Some f these reasons are attributed to 
simple time management differences and optimistic estimations, but others address 
organizational and industrial power relations between client and vendor, and 
pressure to conform to clients’ requests.  
 Many of the managers that I interviewed emphasized that they are trying to 
conform to clients’ requirements. Such efforts can be seen in the comment of 
Ravindra, an Indian project manager: 
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 Indian engineers in this research often called their customers “project 
owners,” signifying their relationship as one between those who own the project, and 
those who provide service for the owner. Many engineers used expressions such as 
“he is my client,” “we are customer-centric,” “we are a service provider,” and “how 
can I say no to clients?”  
 Some Indian engineers in this research explained that they sometimes feel 
pressure to say yes to clients out of business considerat ons, even when it seems 
difficult to meet a deadline. Upadhya et al. show a similar example between 
Germans and offshore Indians (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). Some engineers in the 
interview explained that deadlines set by Japanese clients are unrealistic compared to 
those of US clients, and they are forced to do a large mount of tasks in a very short 
time for Japanese clients compared to Indian or US clients. One engineer argues that 
the amount of work Japanese clients allocate is greate  than that of the clients of 
other countries.  
 Due to business pressure, there are times that the Indian side has to say yes, 
no matter how unreasonable the request of the client. Takahashi, a manager who 
works in a Japanese firm states, “Sometimes we haveto sacrifice them (the Indian 
vendor).” However, Takahashi’s firm is not simply bullying the Indian firm for their 
I can’t change the entire Japanese way of working, but I can 
change my project, my team…So we have changed our ways of 
working for Japanese customers…because we are service 
providers, and we have to align our service to our 




own interest. They too have pressure and commitment to their clients. If their clients 
request to change something, they feel obliged to do so, because for them also, 
clients are the first priority, and they want to incorporate their clients’ request as 
much as possible. This client-centricity of Japanese firms is recognized as 
characteristic of many Japanese firms by many Indian onsite and offshore engineers. 
This chain of pressure (from the user firm to the Japanese prime contracting firm, 
and from there to outsourced vendors) goes down to I dian vendors, and the pressure 
ends up intensifying Indian side’s work.  
 In Chapter V, I have discussed Japanese clients’ expectations such as 
“Japanese subcontractors are much more flexible. Why can’t Indian firms do this?” 
Those comments were often heard in my interviews with those who work in 
Japanese firms. This pressure for flexibility is notsimply a matter of communication 
(figuring out what clients mean), but it is a pressure to be flexible workers: to be 
flexible for specification changes, and to complete th ir project no matter how 
unreasonable the client’s request appears to be. It is also a common understanding 
for many Indian onsite engineers that Japanese subcontractors do “anything” to 
complete their projects, and they are expected to do the same. 
 Samir, an Indian onsite manager, laments that his clients often request 
specification changes with a simple phrase “Hitotsu yoroshiku, (thank you in 
advance)” to which Samir has to say “yes.’ “Hitotsu yoroshiku” is a difficult 
expression to comprehend for those who have limited knowledge of Japanese 
language. However, Samir who has a high level of Japanese competency perfectly 
understands the ironic function of this expression “Hitotsu yoroshiku: it is a soft way 
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of making a request, and depending on the way one says it, it can express a sense of 
appreciation for cooperation. However, by thanking i advance, the client does not 
take “no” as an answer. Samir had a wry smile on his face, and adds, “They know it 
is difficult for us, but they always say that to us.”  
 Rajiv, another Indian onsite manager, compares American clients with 
Japanese clients: American clients generally give them extra time for additional 
changes, and pay the additional cost, but Japanese cli nts often ask them to make 
changes without extra time or additional pay, which generates pressure on the 
offshore teams.  
 This does not mean that Indian firms do not try to resist or change the 
situation. Lokesh, an Indian onsite engineer stated that the first thing that he was 
taught by his offshore manager was to not say “yes” to clients until he read a 
document carefully and was sure that he could do well on a project for Japanese 
clients. How to resist clients’ request in a polite way is something these offshore 
intermediaries have to learn. Samir states that successful negotiation depends on the 
relationship he develops with his clients. Samir can explain the difficulty of 
fulfilling the request to his clients, and sometimes he can negotiate and sometimes 
he can’t. Samir has been working as an onsite manager to coordinate relations with 
client firms and offshore teams for more than ten years, and it is a routine part of his 
work, but Samir also explains that it is not easy to negotiate when there is a strong 




 Critical analyses of offshore Indian workplaces and work culture tend to 
focus on direct and indirect corporate control and workers’ resistances, but most of 
the literature does not address workers’ emotional bonds and friendships with client 
firms. Interviews with engineers show that many onsite engineers are impressed by 
the sincere attitudes of Japanese engineers and their support and “passion” for work. 
Many state that Japanese clients might micromanage, but that they are also helpful 
and supportive, and there was a sense of respect shared by many Indian engineers in 
the interview towards their Japanese counterparts.  
 Jalal, the manager I mentioned in the previous section, in a way, also thinks 
highly of this system because it shows clients’ commitments to and support for a 
project and helps him to understand what clients expect him to do. Jalal was 
impressed with the commitment of the Japanese managers, and he explains that 
Japanese managers are reachable anytime, day and night, and he received e-mail 
replies even at 3 a.m. in the morning, the client’s time. 
 Kanak, a senior manager of Jalal’s firm compares Japanese firms with US 
firms, states that Japanese firms have a deeper levl of involvement. In the case of 
US firms, if something goes wrong, they simply sue th offshore center for breach of 
the SLA (service level agreement) and ask for a penalty. Kanak explains that 
Japanese firms, in contrast, have greater involvement, and that the success rate of 
their projects is higher (80% success rate with Japanese firms compared to 70% with 
the US firms). He thus feels more pressured when working with US customers.  
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 Kanak’s view is shared by Jalal. Jalal states that although many Japanese 
firms that they work with micromanage, they give a sense that the project is jointly 
owned. Jalal comments “in a way, this monitoring helps us.” He feels that they also 
deliver more than what they expect. For him, the clints’ monitoring was irritating at 
first, but he got used to it and now feels that they should implement this process 
themselves. 
 Some engineers state that their Japanese clients, well-known for their 
detailed management of offshore employees, spend a lot of their own time studying 
how to improve processes; their passion for quality nd intense desire to improve 
were respected. Mohan, an Indian manager who worked in Japan for four years, 
stated that the engineers in the client’s office were dedicated to work, and that the 
“energy levels” of workers were very high from early morning until late evening, 
and the parking lot was packed from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., with everyone working 
overtime without making a fuss.  
 The dichotomy of “client” and “vendor” becomes blurred when engineers 
circulate between Japan and India. Mohan sends off a large numbers of onsite 
engineers to Japan and watches them come back and work offshore. He states that 
onsite engineers who work in Japan and come back to India are “different persons” 
who work late and are more productive and responsible because they know how 
much the client side works. Nagesh, an Indian onsite engineer who came back stated: 
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 Ojal, an onsite engineer who came back to India on  vacation, stated that he 
was amazed to see the slow pace of work in the Indian evelopment center, people 
coming late and going out for breakfast in the morning and having lunch and going 
for a walk after that. He thought, “What? These peopl  are not working at all!” 
Another onsite engineer who came back stated that working hours in the Indian 
development center were much more flexible, that employees might be in-office for 
12 hours, but they work only nine to ten hours, and that productivity is slow.  
 Some engineers state that they are happy to work for the current Japanese 
company long-term, particularly those who are in the middle management level and 
those who are highly thought of as a “key resource” by the Japanese clients. Ram, a 
project manager, stated that he did not mind continuing to work for the client, that it 
was a challenge to fulfill the expectations of the cli nt, but when he did, it was very 
rewarding, and that he has learnt a lot about quality control and processes from this 
client firm. Ram states that it is “infectious” to work long hours, until late at night, 
because they know the expectations of the client: “Keep on improving, keep on 
improving. If there is no work, I should do testing.”  
you have to work on site and come back, and the motivation to 
work to create correct and accurate products is even 
more...Sitting here, we may be able to imagine what and how the 
client is thinking, or what the client wants, but once you go in 
there, you see how much the client-side engineers work and how 
much effort they put in. They work late, so long hours. After 
seeing that, at least in my own experiences, I feellik  putting 
double effort, you know, to make sure to create what t ey really 






 However, many workers in the interview expressed that ey distance 
themselves from the way work is organized in Japan. Many commented on the 
different ways of working: “Japanese engineers are very productive, but we are 
different,” “we have family obligations,” “we can’t do the same thing in India,” “we 
work long hours but not like Japanese clients.” In the case study of 
micromanagement, Jalal, the manager, never committed to a set “delivery date” (of 
software), because he knew that once he committed, delivery becomes a liability. 
Also, the offshore manager who stated that many engineers in this research became 
changed persons also commented that he will tell thm not to work long hours and to 
focus on the regular working hours, because he personally does not believe that 
people can concentrate for such long hours. Also, a mentioned earlier, many 
engineers in this research compared Japan to the US, based on their own experiences 
and on information from their colleagues, friends, and the media, and they developed 
critical views of the ways clients do business. The issue of the attrition rate was 
discussed in various chapters; engineers move from client to client, from project to 
project, and many want to learn new technologies rather than being confined to one 
company or one technology. Their mobility also subverts the ways in which work is 
controlled by clients. Engineers in the Japanese firms are often impressed with the 
young and energetic Indian engineers whom they work with, but they have trouble 
understanding the high attrition rate. Kanno, an engineer of a Japanese company 
252 
 
states, “It is, in other words, losing engineers who acquired know-how of our firm 
and it is a tricky issue.” 
 
Between Partnership and Alienation 
 When asked about the future of the Japan–India relationship, many 
managers and engineers from offshore Indian development centers state that they 
want to transform their relationships from project-based labor to long-term 
partnerships. However, this has been difficult in many cases, and this issue was 
brought up by various managers and engineers. In addition, protection of product 
information makes it a necessity for many Japanese firms to split their work into 
small pieces and distribute them to different service providers. As a result, 
subcontracting firms often only have a partial picture of the whole project, and they 
are often alienated from the user company and from knowledge of how a product is 
used. Sharing more product information and long-term planning with client firms 
was desired by many Indian firms that I interviewed.  
 Below are the comments that offshore managers and engineers expressed 
about their frustrations, as well as hopes they have for their relationships with the 
Japanese clients they work with. Roshan, a project manager of a large Indian firm, 
states that Japanese firms generally do not trust foreign firms because of bitter 
experiences of IP theft by Chinese firms in the past, nd they are thus very cautious 
about IP related issues. The programs are therefore divided into pieces, such as 20% 
goes to Company A, and 20% goes to Company B, and pieces are reassembled and 
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integrated in the end. He states, “We don’t know what our work is for…We are just a 
part, not the whole.” Many managers also stated that it takes time to gain trust from 
Japanese clients.  
 Pravin, an Indian project manager, compares the Japanese situation with the 
US, and states their experiences of working with US firms as long-term partners: 
sharing information of long-term business planning, attending clients’ business team 
meetings, and sharing business requirements. Comparing this US experience with his 
Japanese experiences, Pravin commented, “Japanese firm  never share such 
long-term planning outside their firms. All they tell you is to write thirty programs. 
When the work is complete, they tell you what to do next.”  
 Pravin states that his firm can do resource planning and give advice to 
Japanese clients if the clients share their long term plans. They have more than four 
hundred engineers in the Indian development center working for their Japanese 
clients, and they want the clients to share more plans with them. Similarly, the other 
manager criticizes the project-based business and lck of long-term commitment by 
the Japanese firm, saying that, “they do not share their plans for the next six months” 
and it is based on “a quarter term mentality,” which he compares with his 
relationship with the US companies, usually a three y ar contract.  
 Rohan, an Indian project manager, states that management is the problem at 
the Japanese firm he works with, and explains that everyone blames each other in his 
project. Also, Rohan’s Japanese client firm does not k w how to use an outsourcing 
firm or how to integrate different products into one. Rohan believes the problem is 
that “there is no one who can manage and integrate.” He states that they need a 
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strong driving force to unite the different parties, directed by a strong person who 
can visualize all these things, and some initiatives are required to make this happen. 
Rohan argues that collaboration is fine, but when different countries and cultures are 
involved, it is essential to have someone to unite people.  
 There is also an issue of competition with domestic ubcontractors, which 
makes it difficult for Indian firms to gain the trust of Japanese firms. One Indian 
onsite engineer stated that the client he works for gives very routinized and similar 
projects to them, and gives more important tasks to domestic subcontractors. This 
can be seen in the case study of the clients’ comparisons between foreign vendors 
and domestic subcontractors. 
 Many managers and engineers see the nature of their project-based work as 
limiting, because they cannot build long-term partnerships, since their work is over 
when the project is over. Some suggest that offshore engineers are not willing to 
work when they are not appreciated or are treated disrespectfully. The word 
“commitment” often appears in the narratives of Japanese managers and Indian 
engineers, in various scenarios, but one executive manager of a large Indian firm 
states that “commitment” is difficult to expect in short-term relations, especially 
when it is the type of “commitment” seen in the previous chapter: “digging into 
others’ territory” and paying attention to things that are beyond your job 
We may not give 100 %...I don’t know…whatever we have done 
so far…we have very similar projects…main components are 
given to the local team…so probably they think that important 




specifications.   
 Many engineers in this research state that it is often the case that little 
appreciation is given when projects are over, and yet they are blamed for things that 
seem to be small details. Sachin, a senior Indian sales manager states that they will 
be happy to receive even a small token of appreciation, such as a prize or T-shirt, 
pens with the clients’ corporate logos, or anything to remind them that they work for 
the client. Sachin states that it is very difficult working offshore because of the lack 
of a strong connection to the client or a feeling that the client and the vendor are a 
team.  
 Rupesh, an Indian sales manager states that it is important to share product 
information and release data, not only because this motivates them to work, but 
because it helps them understand the purpose behind doi g things and feel the 
importance of the product’s use or its belongingness. Rupesh argues that offshore 
Indian sites are often not informed about release dat s or product information, and 
without such knowledge, it is difficult to feel that they are part of the team. Rupesh 
states: 
If I know I am working on this product and the final aim of this 
product is that this product will go to market…so I have to finish 
it by this date…if that is shared in India, they will also equally 
get motivated…Otherwise, they will only do that part of job and 
go away…They do not pay attention to how their part functions 
as a whole…People do not know what they are 
doing…sometimes you are not able to say it is right or wrong…if 




The motivation issue is explained here as connected to sharing information and 
creating a feeling of being part of the team. Rupesh states that it is difficult to 
motivate workers when they are alienated from the final product. 
 When client–vendor relations mature, Indian firms develop partner relations 
with Japanese firms. One Indian firm just started a partner arrangement with a 
Japanese firm for a product line, and they will help the clients with product 
marketing in India, as well as being involved in the customization of the clients’ 
products. Noor, one of the managers of the project, comments on the transformation 
of the relationship as follows: 
 The maturity of a project gives engineers a sense that “we have grown with 
the client,” and their trust level is enhanced. Shankar, an engineer in this project, 
states that they have spent quite a long time establi hing rapport with the client by 
trying to understand the client’s needs and by alignin  their resources to meet client 
requirements. Noor also explains that trust is built over the period of time; it cannot 
be built overnight. He explains the growth of the project, from making internal tools 
for the client, to gradually moving up towards product-based relations. 
 For this large Indian software service company, like many other companies, 
their objective is to start from a small project and become a strategic partner, in two 
or three years, to create a stable relationship. They want the clients to share their 
we have come to the stage that we are understanding what the 
product map is…Earlier, we were…do this screen, develop this 
screen, do this…do that…but now we know that by next year, I 
want to develop this software, so this is how I should do it...so 
nowadays we also feel like we are partners. 
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resource plans and ask for their opinions. “That is the partnership,” states a senior 
manager, Neelesh: “Not just do what is told to do. We feel that we are participating 
with the client’s growth. That is our goal. The client’s goal is our goal.” The manager 
of this firm states that they look forward to moving to the next level and assuming 
more responsibility and ownership of product development. 
 
Summary  
 This chapter provided counter-narratives to compleent the previous 
chapter, by examining the voices of offshore engineers and managers who have 
experience working with clients in Japanese firms.  
 Past contributions in this field (Aneesh 2006; Upadhya 2009; Upadhya and 
Vasavi 2006; Upadhya and Vasavi 2008) revealed direct and indirect controlling 
mechanisms of US clients’ firms and the management of Indian firms who used 
structured methodologies and human resource management techniques. This chapter 
contributed to these lines of enquiry by analyzing the views of Indian engineers and 
managers towards the control exercised by the Japanese firms they work with.  
 Many offshore personnel compare Japanese clients with those in the US. 
From the perspectives of this US–Japan comparison, Japanese micromanagement 
and quality control are often explained as peculiar forms of controlling mechanisms, 
and the greater involvement and micro control of the Japanese clients are not 
appreciated by offshore engineers and managers.  
This chapter, combined with the analysis of the previous chapter (Chapter 
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IX), illustrated clients’ pressure placed on onsite engineers to be flexible not only in 
terms of communication but also in their willingness to work provide additional 
labor without being given additional time or pay. This chapter also illustrated that 
such pressure can be wrapped in a nebulous soft expression such as “hitotsu 
yoroshiku,” but it is nonetheless difficult to resist. 
 However, this is not simply a critique of the practices of Japanese firms; the 
analysis in this chapter shows the mixed feelings towards such practices, and the 
chapter illustrates that the greater involvement of Japanese firms is, in part, 
respected as a sign of “commitment.” As Kleifgen (2005) argues in her direct 
observation of quality control in high-tech firms in the US, quality control is by no 
means straightforward corporate control or a decontextualized literacy practice. The 
engineers’ discourse concerning Japanese firms’ quality control and 
micromanagement reveals possibilities and difficulties. The final section of the 
chapter highlighted the Indian engineers’ desire to change the situation, and to have 
more “ownership” and “control.” Some of the engineers’ comments show that this is 
gradually happening, but many others voice dissatisfaction, demonstrating that 
building trust and true partnership require a gradual process over time. 








 The rapid expansion of ICT has accelerated the distribution of work across 
geographically dispersed areas, and the transnational relocation of work is often 
viewed as a series of seamless transactions by technological globalization 
proponents such as Thomas Friedman.  
 However, past analysis of Indian software professionals challenged this 
view by illustrating that this seemingly seamless relocation of work requires a highly 
flexible and detachable form of labor that can be supplied “just-in-time” and cut off 
at the economic downturn (Aneesh 2006; Xiang 2007).  
 Yet few studies have illuminated the corporate demands for flexibility in 
two layers: demands for being flexible in macro-labor circulations, to function as 
“labor buffers,” and being flexible in terms of communication and ways of working 
(micro-communication aspects). Compared to the relative success of Indian firms in 
the US, these same firms have been struggling to penetrate the Japanese market.  
 This dissertation documented these workers’ voices from their workplace 
situations, and illuminated both their collaborative efforts and struggles. This study 
contributes the following conclusions to the three major theoretical directions 





Human Broker Perspectives 
 Xiang (2007) and Aneesh (2006) illustrated the unstable labor conditions of 
Indian workers who were supplied through the Indian labor supply system to OECD 
nations. This dissertation built upon these studies and provided analysis of the Indian 
labor supply system of software firms, and highlighted how workers are filtered in 
India, transferred to Japan, and placed at the bottom of chains of subcontracting as a 
detachable form of project labor (Chapter IV). 
 Past contributions illustrated Indian engineers’ movement between India and 
English speaking countries, but the linguistic boundary added in the Japan-Indian 
collaboration and immigration boundary system provided a different context from 
the previous studies. The analysis of the government’s led policy discussions 
revealed contradictions between the idealistic images of “highly-skilled workers” as 
long-term labor resources and the actual employment situations that are project 
based and temporary. The analysis of this dissertation revealed that project-based 
Indian engineers should be referred to as highly skilled and highly vulnerable 
workers, by illustrating that their duration of stay in Japan is strongly affected by 
fluctuations of the economy. 
 Furthermore, the analysis of Chapter VI illustrated how resources are 
arranged between the Japan office and head office o Indian firms in the amalgam of 
collaboration, compromises, and contradictions. Previous studies tended to analyze 
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the tensions between overseas clients and offshore firms, or the management side 
and engineers in the Indian software industry, yet little was known about the subtle 
disconnections and difficulties of intra-firm relations of Indian firms. This study 
illuminated those disconnections and difficulties and found that the logic of 
time-space compressions or seamless offshoring busines  is problematic, even in the 
instance of the intercompany telephone conference.  
 By exploring the labor supply system of Indian software engineers for the 
Japanese market, with the examination of not well-explored areas such as 
intra-company labor arrangements, this dissertation expanded the past studies of 
labor brokering of software engineers, as well as the studies of global circulation of 
skilled labors. 
 
Control and Demand for Flexibility 
 Past studies of the Indian software industry also drew our attention to the 
control and surveillance by overseas clients over Indian software engineers using 
structured software development and stressing the importance of client centricity as 
a service provider to Indian engineers (Sahay, et al. 2003; Upadhya and Vasavi 2006; 
Upadhya and Vasavi 2008). Clients’ extreme corporate control has been critiqued as 
Neo-Taylorism (Upadhya 2009:9-10) and alegocracy (Aneesh 2006). 
 Building upon these studies, this dissertation attempted to further expand 
the theoretical direction by examining the demand for flexibility expressed in the 
workers’ discourses in two ways. Many Japanese firms prefer specification to be 
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shaped in the course of development through face-to-face informal interactions, thus 
subcontractors are subsequently required to be responsive to specification changes 
while also remaining committed to the timeline alredy set in advance. What it 
means is that there are dual demands for flexibility: one is to be a flexible labor 
supply (Chapter IV) and the other is to be a flexible worker who can figure out what 
clients want (emphasis on “tacit understanding”), and who can act accordingly and 
respond even to unreasonable requests from clients (including unrealistic client 
demands to absorb large amounts of tasks in a shortperiod without incurring extra 
costs) (Chapters IX and X). The contribution of this d sertation lies in capturing 
these dual demands for flexibility through the voices of workers and workplace 
observations. 
 At the same time this study also shows that corporate desire and need to 
control and manage work and workers across geographic lly dispersed areas is very 
difficult to accomplish. A panoptical view of control highlighted by Foucault 
provided an important analytical tool for examining corporate control in Japan-India 
offshoring. At the same time, the analysis throughout this dissertation also reveals 
that the panoptical gaze needs to be balanced by examining the unstable frame of 
references of intermediaries as Latour (2005) suggests. The voices of the offshore 
intermediaries in this study show their efforts as well as dilemmas and mixed 
feelings, and revealed the intermediaries’ ongoing struggles to connect patches in the 
flow of work and workers.   
Chapter VII showed the potentiality of onsite engineers as facilitators of 
communication, while highlighting the controlling aspect that surrounds onsite 
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engineers, and the issue of workplace surveillance. Engineers’ worksites are neither 
total heaven nor hell, and they are sites of intense work as well as being sites of 
learning to communication with clients, a skill tha can continue to be utilized for 
their career, as shown in Chapter IV. In addition, the analyses of Chapter VIII and IX 
showed that it is not just onsite coordinators who are struggling in “anguish,” but 
also those who work in Japanese firms. 
 
Communication as Joint Accomplishment 
 Various anthropological and sociological studies of learning and 
communication showed that knowledge transfer is deeply mbedded in social 
relations (Nicholson and Sahay 2004; Sahay, et al. 2003), and learning and 
knowledge transfer is a set of socially-organized practices (Lave 1988; Lave, et al. 
1984; Lave and Wenger 1991; Scribner and Cole 1981). This study built upon past 
contributions, and further problematized this notion n the context of Japan-Indian 
software offshoring where linguistic and social boundaries highlighted the issues 
surrounding this concept. 
This study did not center on learning or knowledge transfer. Instead, the 
main focus was to problematize the notion of seamless knowledge transfer, by 
highlighting its difficulties, and it attempted to illuminate in reverse what is at stake 
in the work of knowledge transfer by these liaison officers (Chapter VII and VIII). 
Onsite engineers are expected to function as mediators who can bridge gaps between 
Japanese clients and Indian firms, but it is difficult to deny that they are often 
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utilized as marketing and sales tools as a “magic wand” that can solve everything 
(Chapter VI). This study highlighted the difficulties that the workers expressed, and 
it expanded the understanding of onsite coordinators as struggling mediators who are 
caught in the midst of various boundaries (Chapter VII and VIII). This study thereby 
added further evidence to illustrate the attempts at sh ring knowledge, the 
difficulties, and failures as complex social practices. 
 The analysis of onsite engineers’ work in Chapter VII on the one hand 
illustrates that intermediaries (onsite engineers) play an important role as cultural 
and linguistic mediators in managing the information flow between clients in Japan 
and offshore team members in India; on the other hand, close examination shows 
that their work is bound by the constraints of the social spaces of clients’ offices in 
various ways. Sending onsite engineers to clients’ offices enables face-to-face 
interactions, and many things can be more easily negotiated by placing onsite 
engineers in clients’ offices. There is no doubt that proximity matters for interaction, 
particularly in the place where face-to-face communication is generally preferred as 
in many Japanese firms. However, an analysis of the onsite engineers’ seating 
arrangements revealed that it is not just straightforward proximity between these 
onsite engineers and their clients that facilitates collaboration; further boundaries 
can be built inside clients’ offices, and the analysis illustrated that such 
boundary-making practices are connected to issues surrounding the protection of IP 
and other legal factors. The analysis of the clients’ seating arrangement regarding 
Indian onsite engineers, at least in part, illuminates the issue of the panoptical gaze 
of the clients. 
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 Further examination of the communication issues reveals that such total 
panoptical corporate control is difficult to achieve. As Latour has argued, networks 
and associations (such as the link between client and vendor) often consist of 
heterogeneity of members and are accompanied by potential instability. Associations 
have to be enacted and maintained repeatedly through daily practices, thus some 
level of communication is required to stabilize theassociation. The clients’ control 
over Indian engineers’ labor needs to be enacted through communication, and the 
analysis of the communication difficulties and offshore intermediaries’ mixed 
feelings highlights the fact that such control is actu lly very difficult to achieve 
(Chapter IX and X).   
 A close examination of the onsite engineer’s telephone conference with 
offshore engineers illustrated the difficulties of eliciting information from offshore 
personnel, as well as onsite engineers’ efforts and struggles to create a balance 
between clients’ needs and the problems of the offsh re side (Chapter VIII). 
 Communication issues were further explored in the analysis of the clients’ 
desires for “tacit understanding” in the offshoring business in Chapter IX. Corporate 
control was shown to be not a monolithic and totalizing force but an unstable and 
contradictory process generated through the struggles of Japanese engineers who are 
caught up in the heavy workload in Japanese firms, and who are frustrated and 
struggling to explain their development style to new vendors through the linguistic 
difficulties they incur when using English. The analysis of engineers’ voices also 
reveals the contradictions that offshoring (transferring work to external 
organizations) generates more work for them because of the efforts to textualize (or 
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verbalize) their implicit assumptions into explicit formal language that can be 
understood by those who do not share the same work experi nce. 
 This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the role of intermediary 
engineers and demonstrates all these different layers of communicative efforts and 
difficulties in social relations when labor is outsourced across geographic 
boundaries.   
 
Workers’ Distancing 
 This study tried to not only focus on analyzing the controlling aspect of 
offshoring, but to also capture workers’ efforts to distance themselves from corporate 
control (both from the client firm and the firm they work with). As illustrated in 
many past studies, workers and learners often try to find some way to manipulate 
structural constraints for their own purposes (Hull 2001; Rancière 1991; Varenne 
2007; Willis 1981). This study discovered, observed, and analyzed a variety of such 
stances. 
 The Japanese marketing manager in Chapter V, on one ha d, tried to sell 
India and Indian IT, by providing information to onsite to bridge the gap between the 
two sides. Yet his comments also illustrated a sense of distance and ambiguities in 
his approach towards the offshoring business. Likews , the analysis of the 
communication issues of onsite engineers in this study shows that ‘knowledge 
transfer’ can be impeded, and that some engineers may try to keep knowledge to 
themselves as a means of differentiating themselves from others in in-firm 
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competition. Furthermore, the clients’ demands for flexibility and micromanagement 
ironically created the negative image of Japanese firms as “super-fussy” despite their 
best intention to ensure high quality standards. The case study of Jalal illuminated 
that micromanagement generates a danger of exhausting and frustrating engineers 
like Jalal who felt his value had become worthless. It howed that frustrated 
engineers such as Jalal resist committing to the project and can impede the success 
of project (Chapter X). In addition, one of the case studies showed that some onsite 
engineers can utilize their linguistic resources and ppropriate situations for their 
own benefits (Chapter IV). 
 Furthermore, Chapter X illustrated that many offshore personnel have mixed 
feelings regarding the control of the firms in Japan they work with; no one in the 
interview presented the simplistic view that one party is wrong and the other party is 
right. It is very easy to cast Indian engineers as victims that are oppressed by the 
micromanagement of Japanese firms, if we simply focus on their negative comments 
about Japanese firms. However, many engineers also expressed appreciation for the 
Japanese firms they work for, and a hope for future business growth, and desire to 
learn from them. Corporate control and engineers’ de ire to learn new technology, 
and their high attrition rate do not necessarily contradict each other, as some 
engineers express their commitment to Japanese clients on the condition that they 
have interesting project.  
 The clearest act of workers’ subversion can be seen in ngineers’ 
job-hopping and in the high attrition rate that has been a constant issue for the HR 
managers of the Indian IT industry. This high attrition rate makes knowledge 
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accumulation difficult from a corporate perspective. Individual engineers’ 
accumulating knowledge and experience to utilize in his or her own career 
advancement and mobility is promoted and necessitated in response to the highly 
unstable labor market and employment conditions in the Indian IT industry. However, 
the analysis in the section “Commodification That Has Wings” illustrated that 
engineers’ attempts to take control of their stays in Japan are also influenced by 
corporate demands for flexible labor, and this is by no means an easy process.  
 
Future Implications 
 In this age of global circulation, one can directly access various resources 
online without going through intermediaries. Therefo we tend to make an 
assumption that brokering or intermediary activities are becoming less important. 
However, even in this age, we still require a good deal of brokering in many 
situations because of linguistic, organizational, infrastructural and societal boundary 
makings. As long as the fierce global competition and technological advancement 
continues, neoliberal corporate globalization and the search for cheap labor across 
the globe will expand further. Circulation of highly skilled labor from the third world 
to the OECD nations, as well as relocation of work t  the third world, will continue 
to increase.  
Japan has been relocating work to China, India and other countries to 
“utilize optimized resources,” but the labor cost is rising in these countries. If the 
demand for cheaper labor continues, future offshore destination may be shifted to 
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less expensive countries such as Vietnam in the near future. How far will offshoring 
expand and to which country is it heading is difficult to foresee. One thing that one 
can say is that the need for brokering labor and culture will remain no matter where 
work is relocated or from wherever workers are supplied. The analysis of those who 
are brokered and brokering will continue to be highly relevant for Japan and for 
nations that search for or provide labor across geographical boundaries. This study 
contributed to expand our understanding of various ten ions and difficulties in 
Indian offshoring business.  
Further research is needed to examine detailed daily programming work. 
Future analysis in this area will be useful to illuminate the potential and difficulty 
for offshore intermediaries, especially highlighting their communicative roles and 
social relations within the context of the controlling aspect that surrounds these 
individuals.  
 As with all exploratory research, the findings of this study are tentative. The 
small number of participants, while appropriate for the focus of my research, is not 
intended to, and will not, support a generalization of results and conclusions to all 
offshore or body-shopping practices between Japan and India. The offshoring 
business is a complex phenomenon, requiring multiple perspectives for analysis: 
areas such as engineers’ individual mobility levels and career aspirations; their 
personal lives, family issues, marriages, and gender issues; as well as community 
associations, were not the focus of this study and were thus not addressed in this 
dissertation. These themes should be further investigated to gain further sociological 
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